somewhat similar standard in Washington

2018State v. Witherspoon, 180 Wn.2d 875, 887-891 , 329 P.3d 888 (2014).

2018State v. Witherspoon, 180 Wn.2d 875, 887-891 , 329 P.3d 888 (2014).

2012In State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 186-87 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986), three defendants attempted to argue that under the SRA, the State should be held to the Holsworth beyond a reasonable doubt standard for purposes of proving prior convictions to accurately calculate a defendant’s offender score: “The fifth challenge, made by all three appellants, is that due process requires that the state must prove a prior conviction, considered in sentencing a defendant, is constitutionally valid and was imposed upon this defendant.” The Ammons court rejected this re

2012In State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 186-87 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986), three defendants attempted to argue that under the SRA, the State should be held to the Holsworth beyond a reasonable doubt standard for purposes of proving prior convictions to accurately calculate a defendant’s offender score: “The fifth challenge, made by all three appellants, is that due process requires that the state must prove a prior conviction, considered in sentencing a defendant, is constitutionally valid and was imposed upon this defendant.” The Ammons court rejected this re

2012In State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 186-87 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986), three defendants attempted to argue that under the SRA, the State should be held to the Holsworth beyond a reasonable doubt standard for purposes of proving prior convictions to accurately calculate a defendant’s offender score: “The fifth challenge, made by all three appellants, is that due process requires that the state must prove a prior conviction, considered in sentencing a defendant, is constitutionally valid and was imposed upon this defendant.” The Ammons court rejected this re

2012State v. Chervenell, 99 Wn.2d 309, 315 , 662 P.2d 836 (1983). ¶81 In 1986, prior to passage of the POAA, the court was asked to address a somewhat similar standard of proof issue related to sentencing under the then recently passed Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A RCW.

2012State v. Chervenell, 99 Wn.2d 309, 315 , 662 P.2d 836 (1983). ¶81 In 1986, prior to passage of the POAA, the court was asked to address a somewhat similar standard of proof issue related to sentencing under the then recently passed Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A RCW.

2012In State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 186-87 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986), three defendants attempted to argue that under the SRA, the State should be held to the Holsworth beyond a reasonable doubt standard for purposes of proving prior convictions to accurately calculate a defendant’s offender score: “The fifth challenge, made by all three appellants, is that due process requires that the state must prove a prior conviction, considered in sentencing a defendant, is constitutionally valid and was imposed upon this defendant.” The Ammons court rejected this re

2012In State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 186-87 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986), three defendants attempted to argue that under the SRA, the State should be held to the Holsworth beyond a reasonable doubt standard for purposes of proving prior convictions to accurately calculate a defendant’s offender score: “The fifth challenge, made by all three appellants, is that due process requires that the state must prove a prior conviction, considered in sentencing a defendant, is constitutionally valid and was imposed upon this defendant.” The Ammons court rejected this re

2012In State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 186-87 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986), three defendants attempted to argue that under the SRA, the State should be held to the Holsworth beyond a reasonable doubt standard for purposes of proving prior convictions to accurately calculate a defendant’s offender score: “The fifth challenge, made by all three appellants, is that due process requires that the state must prove a prior conviction, considered in sentencing a defendant, is constitutionally valid and was imposed upon this defendant.” The Ammons court rejected this re

1989See State v. Christensen, 75 Wn.2d 678, 686 , 453 P.2d *394 644 (1969); State v. Bradfield, 29 Wn.

1989See State v. Christensen, 75 Wn.2d 678, 686 , 453 P.2d 644 (1969); State v. Bradfield, 29 Wn.

1986Grinier , at 169-70. [12] Although the majority's rule is based on independent state grounds, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that a somewhat similar rule basing the distinction on the nature of the container would run afoul of the Fourth Amendment: One point on which the Court was in virtually unanimous agreement in [ People v. ] Robbins [ 103 Cal. App.3d 34 , 162 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1980)] was that a constitutional distinction between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers would be improper.

1986Grinier , at 169-70. [12] Although the majority's rule is based on independent state grounds, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that a somewhat similar rule basing the distinction on the nature of the container would run afoul of the Fourth Amendment: One point on which the Court was in virtually unanimous agreement in [ People v. ] Robbins [ 103 Cal. App.3d 34 , 162 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1980)] was that a constitutional distinction between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers would be improper.

1950B relies upon the case of Ross v. Johnson, 22 Wn. (2d) 275, 155 P. (2d) 486 , wherein we approved a somewhat similar instruction.

1935Stat., § 183-1 [P. C. § 8260], which, among other things, reads: “In every such action the jury may give such-damages as, under all circumstances of the case, may to them seem just.” A somewhat similar instruction was approved by this court in Aronson v. Everett, 136 Wash. 312 , 239 Pac. 1011 , where decedent left a husband and two minor children, one three and another six years of age, the court instructing the jury that they might award recovery for any pecuniary loss which a fair preponderance of the evidence showed the minor children would sustain by reason of “. . . the loss of the care,

1935Stat., § 183-1 [P. C. § 8260], which, among other things, reads: “In every such action the jury may give such-damages as, under all circumstances of the case, may to them seem just.” A somewhat similar instruction was approved by this court in Aronson v. Everett, 136 Wash. 312 , 239 Pac. 1011 , where decedent left a husband and two minor children, one three and another six years of age, the court instructing the jury that they might award recovery for any pecuniary loss which a fair preponderance of the evidence showed the minor children would sustain by reason of “. . . the loss of the care,

1935Stat., § 183-1 [P. C. § 8260], which, among other things, reads: “In every such action the jury may give such-damages as, under all circumstances of the case, may to them seem just.” A somewhat similar instruction was approved by this court in Aronson v. Everett, 136 Wash. 312 , 239 Pac. 1011 , where decedent left a husband and two minor children, one three and another six years of age, the court instructing the jury that they might award recovery for any pecuniary loss which a fair preponderance of the evidence showed the minor children would sustain by reason of “. . . the loss of the care,

1935Stat., § 183-1 [P. C. § 8260], which, among other things, reads: “In every such action the jury may give such-damages as, under all circumstances of the case, may to them seem just.” A somewhat similar instruction was approved by this court in Aronson v. Everett, 136 Wash. 312 , 239 Pac. 1011 , where decedent left a husband and two minor children, one three and another six years of age, the court instructing the jury that they might award recovery for any pecuniary loss which a fair preponderance of the evidence showed the minor children would sustain by reason of “. . . the loss of the care,

1932In McKeever, Cook & Co. v. Canonsburg Iron Co., *423 138 Pa. St. 184, 16 Atl. 97 , 20 Atl. 938 , there was drawn in question a somewhat similar claim of liability of a vendee under a contract reading: “We will agree to supply you with what coal you will require for your mill, for three years time from November first, 1882, at the following prices delivered at your works: [Here follow specified prices and kinds of coal.]” This proposal became the contract by its due acceptance.

1932In McKeever, Cook & Co. v. Canonsburg Iron Co., *423 138 Pa. St. 184, 16 Atl. 97 , 20 Atl. 938 , there was drawn in question a somewhat similar claim of liability of a vendee under a contract reading: “We will agree to supply you with what coal you will require for your mill, for three years time from November first, 1882, at the following prices delivered at your works: [Here follow specified prices and kinds of coal.]” This proposal became the contract by its due acceptance.