somewhat similar claim in Connecticut

1993In rejecting the claim, this court noted its treatment of a somewhat similar claim in State v. Cots, 126 Conn. 48, 59 , 9 A.2d 138 (1939): “The answer to it depends rather upon the principles of the law of criminal conspiracy than of statutory construction.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the passage from State v. Cots, supra, 59 , to which the court referred in Parham is as follows: “In so far as the guilt of Cots is concerned, the controlling question is not whether Weaver’s malice and premeditation are imputable to him under the statutes, but rather whether the existence of the conspiracy for

1993In rejecting the claim, this court noted its treatment of a somewhat similar claim in State v. Cots, 126 Conn. 48, 59 , 9 A.2d 138 (1939): “The answer to it depends rather upon the principles of the law of criminal conspiracy than of statutory construction.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the passage from State v. Cots, supra, 59 , to which the court referred in Parham is as follows: “In so far as the guilt of Cots is concerned, the controlling question is not whether Weaver’s malice and premeditation are imputable to him under the statutes, but rather whether the existence of the conspiracy for

2017A somewhat similar claim was raised and rejected by our Supreme Court in State v. Rivera , 223 Conn. 41 , 612 A.2d 749 (1992). 17 In Rivera , the defendant claimed "that it was unreasonable as a matter of law for the jury to request, and the court to order, a replay of [a witness'] direct examination but not her cross-examination.

2017A somewhat similar claim was raised and rejected by our Supreme Court in State v. Rivera , 223 Conn. 41 , 612 A.2d 749 (1992). 17 In Rivera , the defendant claimed "that it was unreasonable as a matter of law for the jury to request, and the court to order, a replay of [a witness'] direct examination but not her cross-examination.

1994In Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1991), the court considered the defendant’s motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850, based on a claim of newly discovered evidence indicating his innocence in fact.

1985In Meriden Record Co. v. Browning, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 633 , 294 A.2d 646 (1971), a town clerk and registrar of vital statistics refused to provide a newspaper with a certified copy of an individual’s death record.

1985In Meriden Record Co. v. Browning, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 633 , 294 A.2d 646 (1971), a town clerk and registrar of vital statistics refused to provide a newspaper with a certified copy of an individual’s death record.

1948Co., 106 Colo. 317, 318 , 104 P. 2d 897 .

1948Co., 106 Colo. 317, 318 , 104 P. 2d 897 .

1935In Spencer v. Waterman, 36 Conn. 342, 344 , in answer to a somewhat similar claim, we said: “It is manifest that the land cannot be divided, for the mortgagee has the right to the whole as security for his claim, and he cannot be compelled to take a portion of the land in payment, for he has the right to the whole unless his claim is paid in money.” In Andreas v. Hubbard, supra, p. 370 , we stated that “a first mortgagee can never be required to submit to an apportionment of his debt.” It is true that in the last mentioned case we said (p. 369) that there was “a certain degree of justice” in t

1935In Spencer v. Waterman, 36 Conn. 342, 344 , in answer to a somewhat similar claim, we said: “It is manifest that the land cannot be divided, for the mortgagee has the right to the whole as security for his claim, and he cannot be compelled to take a portion of the land in payment, for he has the right to the whole unless his claim is paid in money.” In Andreas v. Hubbard, supra, p. 370 , we stated that “a first mortgagee can never be required to submit to an apportionment of his debt.” It is true that in the last mentioned case we said (p. 369) that there was “a certain degree of justice” in t

1935In Spencer v. Waterman, 36 Conn. 342, 344 , in answer to a somewhat similar claim, we said: “It is manifest that the land cannot be divided, for the mortgagee has the right to the whole as security for his claim, and he cannot be compelled to take a portion of the land in payment, for he has the right to the whole unless his claim is paid in money.” In Andreas v. Hubbard, supra, p. 370 , we stated that “a first mortgagee can never be required to submit to an apportionment of his debt.” It is true that in the last mentioned case we said (p. 369) that there was “a certain degree of justice” in t

1935In Spencer v. Waterman, 36 Conn. 342, 344 , in answer to a somewhat similar claim, we said: “It is manifest that the land cannot be divided, for the mortgagee has the right to the whole as security for his claim, and he cannot be compelled to take a portion of the land in payment, for he has the right to the whole unless his claim is paid in money.” In Andreas v. Hubbard, supra, p. 370 , we stated that “a first mortgagee can never be required to submit to an apportionment of his debt.” It is true that in the last mentioned case we said (p. 369) that there was “a certain degree of justice” in t