facts underlying claim in Texas

2026With regard to Health Care Liability Claims, the Texas Supreme Court has specifically said that if the facts underlying a claim could support an HCLC, then the claim already is one: “claims premised on facts that could support claims against a physician . . . for departures from accepted standards of medical care . . . are HCLCs, regardless of whether the plaintiff alleges the defendant is liable for breach 1 See Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248 , 255–56 (Tex. 2012); In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416 , 421–22 (Tex. 2008). 3 of any of those standards.” Loasiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 255 (Tex. 20

2026With regard to Health Care Liability Claims, the Texas Supreme Court has specifically said that if the facts underlying a claim could support an HCLC, then the claim already is one: “claims premised on facts that could support claims against a physician . . . for departures from accepted standards of medical care . . . are HCLCs, regardless of whether the plaintiff alleges the defendant is liable for breach 1 See Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248 , 255–56 (Tex. 2012); In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416 , 421–22 (Tex. 2008). 3 of any of those standards.” Loasiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 255 (Tex. 20

2021When considering whether a claim is an HCLC, we “focus[] on the facts underlying the claim, not the form of, or artfully-phrased language in, the plaintiff’s pleadings describing the facts or legal theories asserted.” Id. at 255 (citing Yamada v. Friend, 335 S.W.3d 192 , 196–97 (Tex. 2010)).

2017Analysis of a claim under the second element to determine if it involves health or medical care focuses on “the facts underlying the claim, not the form of, or artfully-phrased language in, the plaintiffs pleadings describing the facts or legal theories asserted.” Loaisiga, 379 S.W.3d at 255 (citing Yamada v. Friend, 335 S.W.3d 192, 196-97 (Tex. 2010); Diversicare Gen.

2007Co. v. Cowan , 945 S.W.2d 819, 821-22 (Tex. 1997) (in contrast to the duty to defend, whose existence is controlled by whether the pleaded factual allegations, liberally construed, potentially assert a covered claim, the existence of a duty to indemnify depends upon the true facts underlying a claim); but see GuideOne Elite Ins.

2007Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 821-22 (Tex. 1997) (in contrast to the duty to defend, whose existence is controlled by whether the pleaded factual allegations, liberally construed, potentially assert a covered claim, the existence of a duty to indemnify depends upon the true facts underlying a claim); but see GuideOne Elite Ins.

2006See e.g., Pegasus Energy Group , Inc. v. Cheyenne Petroleum Co. , 3 S.W.3d 112, 131 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied) (wherein the court recognized that the facts underlying the claim of fraud were intertwined with those underlying the claim of breached contract).

2003See e.g., Pegasus Energy Group , Inc. v. Cheyenne Petroleum Co. , 3 S.W.3d 112, 131 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied) (wherein the court recognized that the facts underlying the claim of fraud were intertwined with those underlying the claim of breached contract).

2023See Hollander v. State, 414 S.W.3d 746, 750 (Tex. Crim.

2016See Tex. Penal Code § 2.05(a)(2); see , e.g., Hollander, 414 S.W.3d at 750 (“Nowhere did the jury charge specifically inform the jurors of the degree of confidence to which they must be convinced of the facts underlying the presumption before they could return a guilty verdict.”).

2015See Southland Life, 159 S.W.2d at 857 .

2013See Southland, Life, 159 S.W.2d at 857 .

2015In Ross, the Texas Supreme Court also recognized and reiterated its holding in Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. 2012), when it stated that “if the facts underlying a claim could support claims against a physician or health care provider for departures from accepted standards of medical care, health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care, the claims are HCLCs regardless of whether plaintiff alleged the defendants were liable for breach of the standards.” Ross, 462 S.W.3d at 503 (emphasis in original)(citing Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d

2015In Ross, the Texas Supreme Court placed its “substantive nexus” statement in the context of the existing and still valid concept that “if the facts underlying a claim could support claims against a physician or health care provider for departures from accepted standards of medical care health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care, the claims are HCLCs regardless of whether plaintiff alleged defendants were liable for breach of the standards.” Id. at 503 (emphasis in original)(citing Loaisiga, 379 S.W.3d at 255 ).

2011See Inman, 252 S.W.3d at 305 (“A plaintiff does not lack standing simply because he cannot prevail on the merits of his claim[.]”).

2011See Inman, 252 S.W.3d at 305 (―A plaintiff does not lack standing simply because he cannot prevail on the merits of his claim[.]‖).

2023“It is well settled that a health care liability claim cannot be recast as another cause of action to avoid the requirements of the [TMLA].” Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 851 . “[A] claim alleges a departure from accepted standards of health care if the act or omission complained of is an inseparable or integral part of the rendition of health care.” Tex. W.

2021Further, “a claim based on one set of facts cannot be spliced or divided into both an HCLC and another type of claim.” Id. (citing Yamada, 335 S.W.3d at 197 ; Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 854 ).

2026With regard to Health Care Liability Claims, the Texas Supreme Court has specifically said that if the facts underlying a claim could support an HCLC, then the claim already is one: “claims premised on facts that could support claims against a physician . . . for departures from accepted standards of medical care . . . are HCLCs, regardless of whether the plaintiff alleges the defendant is liable for breach 1 See Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248 , 255–56 (Tex. 2012); In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416 , 421–22 (Tex. 2008). 3 of any of those standards.” Loasiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 255 (Tex. 20

2026With regard to Health Care Liability Claims, the Texas Supreme Court has specifically said that if the facts underlying a claim could support an HCLC, then the claim already is one: “claims premised on facts that could support claims against a physician . . . for departures from accepted standards of medical care . . . are HCLCs, regardless of whether the plaintiff alleges the defendant is liable for breach 1 See Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248 , 255–56 (Tex. 2012); In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416 , 421–22 (Tex. 2008). 3 of any of those standards.” Loasiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 255 (Tex. 20

2026The reason behind this expansive reading, according to the Texas Supreme Court, is that that “artful pleading and recasting of claims is not permitted.” Yamada v. Friend, 335 S.W.3d 192, 196 (Tex. 2010). “[I]f the gravamen or essence of a cause of action is a health care liability claim, then allowing the claim to be split or spliced into a multitude of other causes of action with differing standards of care, damages, and procedures would contravene the Legislature’s explicit requirements.” Id. at 197 .2 “The gravamen of a claim is its true nature, as opposed to what is simply alleged or artfu

2022Oaks Hosp., LP v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171, 176 (Tex. 2012) (“Causes of action that are [health care liability claims] cannot be transmuted to avoid the strictures of the medical liability statute.”); Yamada v. Friend, 335 S.W.3d 192, 196 (Tex. 2010) (“Whether a claim is a health care liability claim depends on the underlying nature of the claim being made. . . .

2022See Bos v. Smith, 556 S.W.3d 293 , 305–06 (Tex. 2018) (“When, as here, no special exception is made, we liberally construe the pleadings in the pleader’s favor.”); see also Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000) (noting that a pleading need only provide fair and adequate notice of the facts underlying a claim such that an opposing party can ascertain the nature and basic issues of the controversy and what testimony will be relevant).

2022See Bos v. Smith, 556 S.W.3d 293 , 305–06 (Tex. 2018) (“When, as here, no special exception is made, we liberally construe the pleadings in the pleader’s favor.”); see also Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000) (noting that a pleading need only provide fair and adequate notice of the facts underlying a claim such that an opposing party can ascertain the nature and basic issues of the controversy and what testimony will be relevant).

2019Entm’t, Inc. v. Jones, 538 S.W.3d 781, 814 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. granted) (holding that Jones did not establish a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress because the facts underlying that claim were the same facts upon which he based his claim of defamation); Bilbrey v. Williams, No. 02-13-00332-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2359 , at *39-40 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 12, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding the same).

2014Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 255 (Tex. 2012); Groomes v. USH of Timberlawn, Inc., 170 S.W.3d 802, 805 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).

2013Specifically, a plaintiff must demonstrate that prison officials “‘refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.’” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Johnson, 759 F.2d at 1238 ); County of El Paso, 180 S.W.3d at 863.

2013“The facts underlying a claim of ‘deliberate indifference’ must clearly evince the medical need in question and the alleged official dereliction.” Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1981)); County of El Paso [v. Dorado], 180 S.W.3d [854,] 863 [(Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied)] (holding that an inmate must prove that a jail official was subjectively aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed and that the jail official actually drew such an inference).

2013Specifically, a plaintiff must demonstrate that prison officials “‘refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.’” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Johnson, 759 F.2d at 1238 ); County of El Paso, 180 S.W.3d at 863.

2013The jury charge did instruct the jury appropriately with respect to the State’s general burden to prove all of the constituent elements of the offense beyond a 12 Hollander, 406 S.W.3d at 578 . 13 Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 . 14 Warner v. State, 245 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex. Crim.

1984Cooper v. Hall, 489 S.W.2d 409 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see Colwell v. Blume, 456 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1970, writ ref’d n.r.e.).