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12 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1976–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Clarkgreen2 sentences1998In this sense, the ‘presumption of sanity’ is merely an expression we have used to describe both ‘the fact that a great majority of men are sane,’ Commonwealth v. Clark, 292 Mass. 409, 415 (1935), and the ‘probability that any particular man is sane,’ id., from which the jury may conclude that the defendant is sane.” Because there is no dispute that the defendant committed the act set out in the complaint, consideration of a request for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth’s case would have been inappropriate. 1998In this sense, the ‘presumption of sanity’ is merely an expression we have used to describe both ‘the fact that a great majority of men are sane,’ Commonwealth v. Clark, 292 Mass. 409, 415 (1935), and the ‘probability that any particular man is sane,’ id., from which the jury may conclude that the defendant is sane.” Because there is no dispute that the defendant committed the act set out in the complaint, consideration of a request for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth’s case would have been inappropriate. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Kostkagreen2 sentences2000We have said that the “presumption” “oper ates procedurally while the facts underlying it operate substantively”; that “the facts underlying the presumption and the inference that may be drawn from those facts provide a basis for the jury to determine that the defendant was sane beyond a reasonable doubt at the time the crime was committed”; and that “it is not the presumption itself that is weighed as evidence; rather, the jury weigh the facts underlying the presumption and the inferences that may follow from those facts.” Commonwealth v. Kostka, supra at 530-531 . 1977So his failure to tell and retell a consistent story of what he remembers must be weighed against his contention that he does [not-sic] recall the murders.” 5 Indeed, in his brief counsel for the defendant says that he did not press the defense of insanity in his considered judgment “since such a request could well have prompted a most damaging charge on the absence of evidence of insanity.” In another portion of his brief, however, the defendant argues that sanity was placed in issue by evidence apart from the rejected psychiatric testimony. 6 Even after the question of a defendant’s sanity i | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Hussaingreen1 sentence2023See, e.g., United States v. Hussain, 835 F.3d 307 , 316 n.8 (2d Cir. 2016). | 1 | 1 |
Gore v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc.green1 sentence2012Gore v. Daniel O’Connell Sons, Inc., 17 Mass.App.Ct. 645, 647 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Chu Tai v. City of Bostongreen1 sentence1999Tai v. Boston, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 220, 222 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Protective Life Insurance v. Sullivangreen1 sentence1997Protective Life Insurance Company v. Sullivan, 425 Mass. 615, 631 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,310 Joseph L. Maggio v. Gerard Freezer & Ice Co.green1 sentence1994Friedman v. Jablonski, 371 Mass. at 485-87 ; Frank Cooke, Inc. v. Hurwitz, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 99, 106-08 (1980); Maggio v. Gerard Freezer & Ice Co., 824 F.2d 123, 130 (1st Cir. 1987). | 1 | 1 |
Frank Cooke, Inc. v. Hurwitzgreen1 sentence1994Friedman v. Jablonski, 371 Mass. at 485-87 ; Frank Cooke, Inc. v. Hurwitz, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 99, 106-08 (1980); Maggio v. Gerard Freezer & Ice Co., 824 F.2d 123, 130 (1st Cir. 1987). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hosmangreen2 sentences1976See Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 386 (1926); United States v. Dube, 520 F.2d 250, 254-255 (1st Cir. 1975) (Campbell, J., concurring). 1976See Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 386 (1926); United States v. Dube, 520 F.2d 250, 254-255 (1st Cir.1975) (Campbell, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Leland v. Oregongreen2 sentences1976We do not attempt to denigrate the proof necessary to meet this standard by noting that at least twenty-three jurisdictions place the burden of persuasion on the issue on the defendant, but we do think that the existence of that practice is relevant to our conclusion that our practice does not violate “generally accepted concepts of basic standards of justice.” Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952) , 18 Because of our conclusion that the presumption of sanity, as used in Massachusetts, does not violate due process, we find no error in the trial judge’s refusal to direct a verdict of not g 1976Leland v. Oregon, supra at 798 . *534 It is true that only a minority of the jurisdictions requiring the prosecution to prove the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt — once the issue has been raised by sufficient evidence — allow the jury to consider the presumption or the facts underlying the presumption. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Roland William Dube, Jr.green2 sentences1976See Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 386 (1926); United States v. Dube, 520 F.2d 250, 254-255 (1st Cir. 1975) (Campbell, J., concurring). 1976See Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 386 (1926); United States v. Dube, 520 F.2d 250, 254-255 (1st Cir.1975) (Campbell, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Guertin v. McAvoy
neutral
2 sentences2009Plaintiff attempts to trigger the operation of the discovery rule to toll both the limitation and presentment periods by his statement that he “did not know why he had been harmed or what the cause of the harm was until the charges against him had been dismissed on December 6, 2006.” 1 “For purposes of the discovery rule ... it is the facts underlying the claim that must be inherently unknowable, not the fact of a breach of duty or the legal theory for the cause of action.” Guertin v. McAvoy, 19 Mass. L. 2009In particular, “[f]or purposes of the discovery rule ... it is the facts underlying the claim that must be inherently unknowable, not the fact of a breach of duty or the legal theory for the cause of action.” Guertin v. McAvoy, 19 Mass. L. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Commonwealth v. Keita
green
1 sentence2000Yet we have also said that the trier of fact may “consider” the “presumption” “as evidence.” Commonwealth v. Keita, supra at 846 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Fay v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n
green
1 sentence1996The plaintiff’s assertion of negligence as her sole cause of action had been so clear and unequivocal before trial that, at best, she should have been estopped from asserting the intentional tort of assault and battery at trial; at worst, she was playing “fast and loose” with the court, see Fay v. Federal National Mortgage Association, supra, and, therefore, should not prevail under principles of fundamental fairness, see Correia v. DeSimone, supra. In her assented-to motion to amend her first amended complaint, the plaintiff asserted that “[a]fter further investigation, and the receipt of inf | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Correia v. DeSimone
green
1 sentence1996The plaintiff’s assertion of negligence as her sole cause of action had been so clear and unequivocal before trial that, at best, she should have been estopped from asserting the intentional tort of assault and battery at trial; at worst, she was playing “fast and loose” with the court, see Fay v. Federal National Mortgage Association, supra, and, therefore, should not prevail under principles of fundamental fairness, see Correia v. DeSimone, supra. In her assented-to motion to amend her first amended complaint, the plaintiff asserted that “[a]fter further investigation, and the receipt of inf | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Friedman v. Jablonski
green
1 sentence1994Friedman v. Jablonski, 371 Mass. at 485-87 ; Frank Cooke, Inc. v. Hurwitz, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 99, 106-08 (1980); Maggio v. Gerard Freezer & Ice Co., 824 F.2d 123, 130 (1st Cir. 1987). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Davis v. United States
green
2 sentences1976But the practice draws support from the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895), a decision which is still frequently cited and which remains vital. 1976But the practice draws support from the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895), a decision which is still frequently cited and which remains vital. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.