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28 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1954–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ambrose v. Thornton Township School Trusteesgreen2 sentences2013Ambrose v. Thornton Township School Trustees, 274 Ill. 2012Ambrose v. Thornton Township *439 School Trustees, 274 Ill.App.3d 676, 680 , 211 Ill.Dec. 83 , 654 N.E.2d 545 (1995). | 4 | 5 |
People v. Wardgreen2 sentences2013In sum, “[r]easonable suspicion is a less exacting standard than probable cause.” People v. Ward, 371 Ill. 2011In sum, “[r]easonable suspicion is a less exacting standard than probable cause.” People v. Ward, 371 Ill. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Edwardgreen2 sentences2019App. 3d 555, 562 , 930 N.E.2d 1077, 1083 (2010) (“It is well settled that the facts underlying a claim of reasonable suspicion need not rise to the level of probable cause and do not require an officer to actually witness a violation.”). ¶ 63 Although the cases cited by the parties are not directly on point, we find the case authority relied upon by the State is particularly instructive. 2011App.3d 555, 562 , 341 Ill.Dec. 563 , 930 N.E.2d 1077 (2010) ("It is well settled that the facts underlying a claim of reasonable suspicion need not rise to the level of probable cause and do not require an officer to actually witness a violation."). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2026See id. ¶ 38 (finding that even though the defendant “obviously knew” of the facts underlying his claim prior to trial and the source of those facts, “the evidence in [one of the supporting] affidavit[s] was nevertheless unavailable at trial [citation], and the evidence thus qualified as newly discovered” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also People v. Wilson, 2025 IL App (1st) 230027, ¶ 47 (“Following Edwards, there can be no doubt that we look to whether the evidence, testimony, or witness in question is newly discovered, not whether any facts that such evidence tends to establish we | 1 | 1 |
Altair Corp. v. Grand Premier Trust and Investment, Inc.green1 sentence2025See Altair Corp. v. Grand Premier Trust & Investment, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d 57, 63 (2000) (holding that the application of res judicata was not fundamentally unfair when the party had learned of the facts underlying the claim at issue prior to the final judgment in the previous proceeding and had the opportunity to supplement its pleadings in that prior case but failed to do so). ¶ 30 Additionally, beyond the fact that the Loan Parties had the ability to raise all three claims in the prior action, they did in fact raise two of them, and those two were disposed of on the merits and found to ha | 1 | 1 |
People v. Edwardsgreen1 sentence2011People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 245 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Dayton Independent School District v. National Gypsum Co.green1 sentence1994Tex. 1988), 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1406 ("[i]n determining whether the claim is within coverage, the nature of the third party’s claim is determinative, and not the actual facts underlying that claim. [Citation.] A policyholder, therefore, does not have to prove its actual liability as a prerequisite to obtaining coverage.” (Emphasis in original.)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Bannister
green
2 sentences2025Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 66 . -4- ¶ 11 Rizwan has not demonstrated that his jury waiver was invalid. 2020Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 66 . ¶ 40 The record shows that, at a pretrial hearing on July 24, 2015, the trial court informed the defendant of his right to a jury trial, and the defendant twice affirmed that he understood what a jury trial was. | 2 | 2020–2025 |
People v. Jolly
green
2 sentences2018People v. Jolly , 2014 IL 117142 , ¶ 30, 389 Ill.Dec. 101 , 25 N.E.3d 1127 . 2018People v. Jolly , 2014 IL 117142 , ¶ 30, 389 Ill.Dec. 101 , 25 N.E.3d 1127 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Richardson
green
2 sentences2010People v. Richardson, 376 Ill. 2010People v. Richardson, 376 Ill. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Sweborg
green
2 sentences2003People v. Sweborg, 293 Ill. 2003People v. Sweborg , 293 Ill. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Jackson
green
2 sentences1990App. 3d 128 , 474 N.E.2d 466 , that the trial court erred in failing to examine the facts underlying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and in failing to make the initial determination as to whether the claim is meritorious thereby warranting appointment of counsel to assist him with a motion for a new trial. 1987App. 3d 128, 139 , 474 N.E.2d 466, 474 , it is not necessary to appoint new counsel every time a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged; rather, the trial court only needs to determine whether the facts underlying the claim of incompetency “have potential merit and to refuse to appoint new counsel if defendant’s claim is spurious or revolves simply around a matter of trial strategy or tactics.” A trial court’s determination that such a claim is spurious will not, as this court further stated in Jackson, be overturned on appeal unless it is manifestly erroneous. ( 131 Ill. | 2 | 1987–1990 |
People v. Coleman
green
1 sentence2022Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 82 ; 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016). ¶ 19 Here, defendant knew the basic facts underlying his claim—i.e., Burton’s grand jury testimony—long before he filed his first postconviction petition. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Jones
green
1 sentence2019First, in People v. Jones, 214 Ill. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Proctor v. Davis
green
1 sentence2012Ambrose v. Thornton Township *439 School Trustees, 274 Ill.App.3d 676, 680 , 211 Ill.Dec. 83 , 654 N.E.2d 545 (1995). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Crutcher
green
1 sentence1988People v. Crutcher (1979), 72 Ill. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Baldinelli
green
1 sentence1988Ed. 2d 257 , 99 S. Ct. 281 .) A defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on the law applicable to the facts underlying the defense. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Stephens v. McBride
green
2 sentences1983(See Stephens v. McBride (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 515, 524 , 455 N.E.2d 54 .) Moreover, once a complaint has been filed within the statutory notice period, the requirements of section 8 — 102 are met (Dunbar v. Reiser (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 230 , 356 N.E.2d 89 ), and defendants could have undertaken an investigation and pretrial discovery of the facts underlying the claim. 1983(See Stephens v. McBride (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 515, 524 , 455 N.E.2d 54 .) Moreover, once a complaint has been filed within the statutory notice period, the requirements of section 8 — 102 are met (Dunbar v. Reiser (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 230 , 356 N.E.2d 89 ), and defendants could have undertaken an investigation and pretrial discovery of the facts underlying the claim. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Dunbar v. Reiser
green
2 sentences1983(See Stephens v. McBride (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 515, 524 , 455 N.E.2d 54 .) Moreover, once a complaint has been filed within the statutory notice period, the requirements of section 8 — 102 are met (Dunbar v. Reiser (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 230 , 356 N.E.2d 89 ), and defendants could have undertaken an investigation and pretrial discovery of the facts underlying the claim. 1983(See Stephens v. McBride (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 515, 524 , 455 N.E.2d 54 .) Moreover, once a complaint has been filed within the statutory notice period, the requirements of section 8 — 102 are met (Dunbar v. Reiser (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 230 , 356 N.E.2d 89 ), and defendants could have undertaken an investigation and pretrial discovery of the facts underlying the claim. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Kucala
green
1 sentence1976(People v. Fryman (1954), 4 Ill. 2d 224 , 122 N.E.2d 573 ; People v. Kucala (1st Dist. 1972), 7 Ill. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
People v. Fryman
green
2 sentences1976(People v. Fryman (1954), 4 Ill. 2d 224 , 122 N.E.2d 573 ; People v. Kucala (1st Dist. 1972), 7 Ill. 1976(People v. Fryman (1954), 4 Ill. 2d 224 , 122 N.E.2d 573 ; People v. Kucala (1st Dist. 1972), 7 Ill. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
The People v. Young
neutral
1 sentence1954Although refusal of a tendered instruction is not error if covered by others which are given, (People v. Young, 398 Ill. 117 ,) yet the defendant is entitled to have the jury fully instructed as to the law applicable to the facts underlying his defense. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.