bill analysis in California

2004Appeals Bd. (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 363 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 267 ].

2004Appeals Bd. (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 363 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 267 ].

2025Bill 81, as amended Apr. 27, 2021, at pp. 5–6, citing rule 4.405(3); Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894 , 898–899; and People v. Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 101 .) “After making that distinction, the bill analysis states, in no uncertain terms, that ‘[t]he presumption created by this bill applies to enhancements … but does not encompass alternative penalty schemes.’ ” (Olay, at p. 67; Assem.

2024Bill No. 81, supra, as amended Apr. 27, 2021, at pp. 5-6, citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.405(3), Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894 , 898-899 [citations], and People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 101 [citations].) After making that distinction, the bill analysis states, in no uncertain terms, that ‘[t]he presumption created by this bill applies to enhancements . . . but does not encompass alternative penalty schemes.’ (Assem.

2023The Legislature’s solution was to “ ‘deputize and incentivize employees uniquely positioned to detect and prosecute . . . violations.’ ” (Medina v. Vander Poel (E.D.Cal. 2015) 523 B.R. 820 , 824–825.) Effective January 2004, PAGA declared it was “in the public interest to allow aggrieved employees, acting as private attorneys general, to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations, with the understanding that labor law enforcement agencies were to retain primacy over private enforcement efforts.” (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 980 (Arias).) 5 This bill analysis is cited

2023The Legislature’s solution was to “ ‘deputize and incentivize employees uniquely positioned to detect and prosecute . . . violations.’ ” (Medina v. Vander Poel (E.D.Cal. 2015) 523 B.R. 820 , 824–825.) Effective January 2004, PAGA declared it was “in the public interest to allow aggrieved employees, acting as private attorneys general, to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations, with the understanding that labor law enforcement agencies were to retain primacy over private enforcement efforts.” (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 980 (Arias).) 5 This bill analysis is cited

2022This act is intended only to recognize legitimate contractual relationships of licensees when applying the provisions of the Labor Code, Revenue and Taxation Code, and the Insurance Code to the broker-salesperson relationship and not to increase or decrease any existing obligations of a real estate broker regarding liability or workers compensation insurance, nor shall it be interpreted or applied to affect the holding in Gipson[, supra,] 215 Cal.App.2d 190 , that real estate salespersons cannot be classified as independent contractors [for purposes of tort liability] and that any contract whi

2022This act is intended only to recognize legitimate contractual relationships of licensees when applying the provisions of the Labor Code, Revenue and Taxation Code, and the Insurance Code to the broker-salesperson relationship and not to increase or decrease any existing obligations of a real estate broker regarding liability or workers compensation insurance, nor shall it be interpreted or applied to affect the holding in Gipson[, supra,] 215 Cal.App.2d 190 , that real estate salespersons cannot be classified as independent contractors [for purposes of tort liability] and that any contract whi

2019The addition of the word “person” was one among several changes. ( Jones, supra, 42 Cal.4th 1158 at p. 1169 .) The Legislative Counsel’s Digest described certain of the amendments but did not refer to the section at issue in the case; “[i]nstead, it said only, ‘The bill would, in addition, make various technical and conforming changes to the act.’ ” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court therefore interpreted the addition of the word as a technical change to “conform[] to the use of the word in describing some of the unlawful employment practices the retaliation provision references.” (Id. at p. 1170.) A b

2019The addition of the word “person” was one among several changes. ( Jones, supra, 42 Cal.4th 1158 at p. 1169 .) The Legislative Counsel’s Digest described certain of the amendments but did not refer to the section at issue in the case; “[i]nstead, it said only, ‘The bill would, in addition, make various technical and conforming changes to the act.’ ” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court therefore interpreted the addition of the word as a technical change to “conform[] to the use of the word in describing some of the unlawful employment practices the retaliation provision references.” (Id. at p. 1170.) A b

2026At that point, the parties were married.” (Chaney, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 66 , italics added.) Parties who wrongly state that they are “living together as spouses” (§ 500) still appear to comply with the essential components of a confidential marriage as outlined in Chaney. 31 In addition, in Cantarella, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th 916 , the Court of Appeal concluded that “[w]e do not believe the Legislature intended a marriage to be . . . rendered invalid,” even “where a party failed to register public evidence of the marriage.” (Id. at p. 924, first italics omitted and second italics added.)

2026At that point, the parties were married.” (Chaney, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 66 , italics added.) Parties who wrongly state that they are “living together as spouses” (§ 500) still appear to comply with the essential components of a confidential marriage as outlined in Chaney. 31 In addition, in Cantarella, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th 916 , the Court of Appeal concluded that “[w]e do not believe the Legislature intended a marriage to be . . . rendered invalid,” even “where a party failed to register public evidence of the marriage.” (Id. at p. 924, first italics omitted and second italics added.)

2026At that point, the parties were married.” (Chaney, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 66 , italics added.) Parties who wrongly state that they are “living together as spouses” (§ 500) still appear to comply with the essential components of a confidential marriage as outlined in Chaney. 31 In addition, in Cantarella, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th 916 , the Court of Appeal concluded that “[w]e do not believe the Legislature intended a marriage to be . . . rendered invalid,” even “where a party failed to register public evidence of the marriage.” (Id. at p. 924, first italics omitted and second italics added.)

2025(See Stiavetti, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 713; Sell, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 180 .) Moreover, as a bill analysis of a 2012 amendment to section 1370 explains: “mentally ill prison inmates are in very different circumstances than IST defendants.

2025(See Stiavetti, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 713; Sell, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 180 .) Moreover, as a bill analysis of a 2012 amendment to section 1370 explains: “mentally ill prison inmates are in very different circumstances than IST defendants.

2024(Id. at p. 66) The Olay court nevertheless “agree[d] with Burke’s ultimate conclusion—that section 1385, subdivision (c) does not apply to the Three Strikes law,” as it was “skeptical the Legislature would have expressed an intent to reject the well-established legal meaning of ‘enhancement’ in such a roundabout 70 manner by obliquely referencing ‘juvenile adjudications’ as one of the relevant mitigating circumstances.” (Id. at p. 67) It also concluded that “[t]he legislative history confirms the Legislature had no such intent. [Citation.] The June 2021 bill analysis of SB 81 by the Assembly C

2023Thus, we apply the rule that “upon remand for resentencing after reversal of one or more subordinate counts of a felony conviction, the trial court has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the defendant’s sentence on the counts that were affirmed, including the term imposed as the principal term.” (People v. Burbine (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1259 ; see also People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in l

2023Bill No. 2018 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 1, 2000, pp. 6-7; Albertson v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 796, 805 .) A bill analysis prepared for the Senate Health and Human Services Committee stated: “According to the sponsor, S.B. 2018 is intended to enable the district attorney to obtain current mental health evaluations in order to facilitate court actions in the sexually violent predator commitment process.

2023Thus, we apply the rule that “upon remand for resentencing after reversal of one or more subordinate counts of a felony conviction, the trial court has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the defendant’s sentence on the counts that were affirmed, including the term imposed as the principal term.” (People v. Burbine (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1259 ; see also People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in l

2023We are not convinced otherwise by defendant’s argument that the admission of the evidence “was not justified by the purposes behind Section 1109.” (Capitalization omitted.) He cites People v. Brown (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1333 , which references a bill analysis in the legislative history of section 1109 stating: “Proponents argue that in domestic violence cases, as in sexual offense cases, special evidentiary rules are justified because of the distinctive issues and difficulties of proof in this area.” Such difficulties of proof, defendant continues, are reflected by “ ‘uncooperative victi

2020(Sanchez, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 667 .) The Legislature eliminated the first Gingles precondition requiring plaintiffs to show they are sufficiently 5 large and geographically compact to enable a majority-minority district but retained geographical compactness as a consideration at the remedy stage. ( Sanchez, supra, at p. 669 .) Section 14028, subdivision (c) states that “[t]he fact that members of a protected class are not geographically compact or concentrated may not preclude a finding of racially polarized voting, or a violation of Section 14027 and this section . . . .” The intent

2020(Sanchez, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 667 .) The Legislature eliminated the first Gingles precondition requiring plaintiffs to show they are sufficiently 5 large and geographically compact to enable a majority-minority district but retained geographical compactness as a consideration at the remedy stage. ( Sanchez, supra, at p. 669 .) Section 14028, subdivision (c) states that “[t]he fact that members of a protected class are not geographically compact or concentrated may not preclude a finding of racially polarized voting, or a violation of Section 14027 and this section . . . .” The intent

2020Association (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 734 and In re Retirement Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 426 .” (Stats. 2012, ch. 297, § 2.) A bill analysis prepared in connection with the pre-PEPRA version of Assembly Bill 340 explained that the purpose of these changes was to circumscribe CERL’s “very broad and general definition of ‘compensation earnable’ ” in order to reduce pension “ ‘spik[ing],’ ” the manipulation of an employee’s pattern of work and pay to produce inflated compensation earnable during the final compensation period.

2020Association (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 734 and In re Retirement Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 426 .” (Stats. 2012, ch. 297, § 2.) A bill analysis prepared in connection with the pre-PEPRA version of Assembly Bill 340 explained that the purpose of these changes was to circumscribe CERL’s “very broad and general definition of ‘compensation earnable’ ” in order to reduce pension “ ‘spik[ing],’ ” the manipulation of an employee’s pattern of work and pay to produce inflated compensation earnable during the final compensation period.