parole revocation hearing in California

2025(See generally Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 488-489 [discussing minimum due process requirements at a parole revocation hearing, including notice of the claimed violation, disclosure of the evidence, and the opportunity to be heard].) We therefore 10 must reverse unless we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2022Code, §§ 1200, subds. (a) & (b), 1201.) However, at probation or parole revocation hearings, hearsay “that bears a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness is admissible . . . . ‘In general, the court will find hearsay evidence trustworthy when there are sufficient “indicia of reliability.” ’ [Citation.]” 6 (People v. Buell (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 682, 689 .) “[T]he revocation of parole [or probation] is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole [or probation] revocations.” (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408

2023(See Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778, 790 [although there is no absolute constitutional right to counsel at parole revocation 10 hearings, “the decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis”; sometimes “fundamental fairness—the touchstone of due process—will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees”].) The California Supreme Court has held a due process right to counsel should be presumed at a parole revocation hearing when the parolee contests the violation occurred.

1986We are talking about “fundamental fairness—the touchstone of due process . . . .” (Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, 411 U.S. 778, 790 [ 36 L.Ed.2d 656, 666 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 ].) If it is assumed the presence of counsel at the parole revocation hearing is for the purpose of giving aid/assistance to the parolee who lacks poise and the skill to present his or her case effectively, the court’s reasons for denying the right to counsel are irrelevant to the issue of due process.

1975The Supreme Court of the United States in Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 488 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 498 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ] speaking of due process at a parole revocation hearing stated: “The parolee must have an opportunity to be heard and to show, if he can, that he did not violate the conditions, or if he did, that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation does not warrant revocation.” Our Supreme Court in People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 460 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 305 , 503 P.2d 1313 ], applies substantially the same principle to a probation violation.

1975The Supreme Court of the United States in Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 488 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 498 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ] speaking of due process at a parole revocation hearing stated: “The parolee must have an opportunity to be heard and to show, if he can, that he did not violate the conditions, or if he did, that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation does not warrant revocation.” Our Supreme Court in People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 460 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 305 , 503 P.2d 1313 ], applies substantially the same principle to a probation violation.

2023(In re Love (1974) 11 Cal.3d 179, 186 .) When the right to appointed counsel is constitutionally required as a matter of federal due process, it includes the right to effective assistance of counsel.

1986(In re Love, supra, 11 Cal.3d 179, 189 .) No specific provision was made by the Legislature for right to counsel at a parole revocation hearing.

2019As in Lucido , the policies underlying collateral estoppel-public confidence in the judicial system, judicial economy, and preventing harassment through vexatious litigation-would not be served by its application. ( Lucido , at pp. 343, 348, 351, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 795 P.2d 1223 .) In short, the sentencing court's determination in the underlying case that Lisa was never a protected party did not modify condition 25 or have preclusive effect on Lisa's status as a crime victim at the parole revocation hearing. b.

2019As in Lucido , the policies underlying collateral estoppel-public confidence in the judicial system, judicial economy, and preventing harassment through vexatious litigation-would not be served by its application. ( Lucido , at pp. 343, 348, 351, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 795 P.2d 1223 .) In short, the sentencing court's determination in the underlying case that Lisa was never a protected party did not modify condition 25 or have preclusive effect on Lisa's status as a crime victim at the parole revocation hearing. b.

2019Bill No. 1023].) "Together, sections 1203.2 and 3000.08 establish a statutory framework for parole revocation." ( DeLeon , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 647 , 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 784 , 399 P.3d 13 .) If a person violates the conditions of his or her parole, the parole authority may impose additional conditions of supervision and "intermediate sanctions" without court intervention. (§ 3000.08, subd. (d).) But if intermediate sanctions are inappropriate, it may petition to revoke parole. (§ 3000.08, subd. (f).) At a parole revocation hearing, if a court finds a parole violation, it has the option to "[r]e

2019Bill No. 1023].) "Together, sections 1203.2 and 3000.08 establish a statutory framework for parole revocation." ( DeLeon , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 647 , 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 784 , 399 P.3d 13 .) If a person violates the conditions of his or her parole, the parole authority may impose additional conditions of supervision and "intermediate sanctions" without court intervention. (§ 3000.08, subd. (d).) But if intermediate sanctions are inappropriate, it may petition to revoke parole. (§ 3000.08, subd. (f).) At a parole revocation hearing, if a court finds a parole violation, it has the option to "[r]e

2019Bill No. 1023].) "Together, sections 1203.2 and 3000.08 establish a statutory framework for parole revocation." ( DeLeon , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 647 , 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 784 , 399 P.3d 13 .) If a person violates the conditions of his or her parole, the parole authority may impose additional conditions of supervision and "intermediate sanctions" without court intervention. (§ 3000.08, subd. (d).) But if intermediate sanctions are inappropriate, it may petition to revoke parole. (§ 3000.08, subd. (f).) At a parole revocation hearing, if a court finds a parole violation, it has the option to "[r]e

2019Bill No. 1023].) "Together, sections 1203.2 and 3000.08 establish a statutory framework for parole revocation." ( DeLeon , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 647 , 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 784 , 399 P.3d 13 .) If a person violates the conditions of his or her parole, the parole authority may impose additional conditions of supervision and "intermediate sanctions" without court intervention. (§ 3000.08, subd. (d).) But if intermediate sanctions are inappropriate, it may petition to revoke parole. (§ 3000.08, subd. (f).) At a parole revocation hearing, if a court finds a parole violation, it has the option to "[r]e

2019Bill No. 1023].) "Together, sections 1203.2 and 3000.08 establish a statutory framework for parole revocation." ( DeLeon , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 647 , 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 784 , 399 P.3d 13 .) If a person violates the conditions of his or her parole, the parole authority may impose additional conditions of supervision and "intermediate sanctions" without court intervention. (§ 3000.08, subd. (d).) But if intermediate sanctions are inappropriate, it may petition to revoke parole. (§ 3000.08, subd. (f).) At a parole revocation hearing, if a court finds a parole violation, it has the option to "[r]e

2019Bill No. 1023].) "Together, sections 1203.2 and 3000.08 establish a statutory framework for parole revocation." ( DeLeon , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 647 , 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 784 , 399 P.3d 13 .) If a person violates the conditions of his or her parole, the parole authority may impose additional conditions of supervision and "intermediate sanctions" without court intervention. (§ 3000.08, subd. (d).) But if intermediate sanctions are inappropriate, it may petition to revoke parole. (§ 3000.08, subd. (f).) At a parole revocation hearing, if a court finds a parole violation, it has the option to "[r]e

2006(Cal. Code Regs., *1154 tit. 15, §§ 2600, 2601; Swift v. Department of Corrections (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1371 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 406 ] [“parole agents are authorized to issue parole holds for the purpose of detaining a parolee prior to a parole revocation hearing”]; In re Law (1973) 10 Cal.3d 21, 24, fn. 2 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 573 , 513 P.2d 621 ] [describing that a parole hold occurs when “a parole agent . . . causes a parolee to be restrained in custody independent of any action by the decision-making component of the [predecessor to the Board of Prison Terms]”].) Unless the parole hold is e

2006(Cal. Code Regs., *1154 tit. 15, §§ 2600, 2601; Swift v. Department of Corrections (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1371 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 406 ] [“parole agents are authorized to issue parole holds for the purpose of detaining a parolee prior to a parole revocation hearing”]; In re Law (1973) 10 Cal.3d 21, 24, fn. 2 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 573 , 513 P.2d 621 ] [describing that a parole hold occurs when “a parole agent . . . causes a parolee to be restrained in custody independent of any action by the decision-making component of the [predecessor to the Board of Prison Terms]”].) Unless the parole hold is e

1986The court in Gee v. Brown (1975) 14 Cal.3d 571, 574-576 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 231 , 536 P.2d 1017 ] stated the criteria giving rise to a “presumptive right to counsel” to be: (1) denial of allegation; (2) complex matters in litigation; (3) intelligence/education levels of parolee.

1986The court in Gee v. Brown (1975) 14 Cal.3d 571, 574-576 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 231 , 536 P.2d 1017 ] stated the criteria giving rise to a “presumptive right to counsel” to be: (1) denial of allegation; (2) complex matters in litigation; (3) intelligence/education levels of parolee.

2026(People v. Osorio (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1409 , 1412, disapproved on other grounds in People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 646 ; 1 Prior to the parole revocation hearing, the trial court heard and denied Rood’s motion to substitute counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 . 2 Pen.

2019Bill No. 1023].) "Together, sections 1203.2 and 3000.08 establish a statutory framework for parole revocation." ( DeLeon , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 647 , 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 784 , 399 P.3d 13 .) If a person violates the conditions of his or her parole, the parole authority may impose additional conditions of supervision and "intermediate sanctions" without court intervention. (§ 3000.08, subd. (d).) But if intermediate sanctions are inappropriate, it may petition to revoke parole. (§ 3000.08, subd. (f).) At a parole revocation hearing, if a court finds a parole violation, it has the option to "[r]e

2023As defendant acknowledges, our Supreme Court applied the federal beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to assess prejudice from the erroneous admission of hearsay testimony in a 7 preliminary hearing transcript at a parole revocation hearing in People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144, 1161 .) The court found the error harmless because substantial evidence independent of the improperly admitted evidence established that the defendant “had violated his probation in several respects.” (Ibid.) So too here.

2022Code, §§ 1200, subds. (a) & (b), 1201.) However, at probation or parole revocation hearings, hearsay “that bears a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness is admissible . . . . ‘In general, the court will find hearsay evidence trustworthy when there are sufficient “indicia of reliability.” ’ [Citation.]” 6 (People v. Buell (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 682, 689 .) “[T]he revocation of parole [or probation] is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole [or probation] revocations.” (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408

2019Bill No. 1023].) "Together, sections 1203.2 and 3000.08 establish a statutory framework for parole revocation." ( DeLeon , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 647 , 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 784 , 399 P.3d 13 .) If a person violates the conditions of his or her parole, the parole authority may impose additional conditions of supervision and "intermediate sanctions" without court intervention. (§ 3000.08, subd. (d).) But if intermediate sanctions are inappropriate, it may petition to revoke parole. (§ 3000.08, subd. (f).) At a parole revocation hearing, if a court finds a parole violation, it has the option to "[r]e

2019Bill No. 1023].) "Together, sections 1203.2 and 3000.08 establish a statutory framework for parole revocation." ( DeLeon , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 647 , 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 784 , 399 P.3d 13 .) If a person violates the conditions of his or her parole, the parole authority may impose additional conditions of supervision and "intermediate sanctions" without court intervention. (§ 3000.08, subd. (d).) But if intermediate sanctions are inappropriate, it may petition to revoke parole. (§ 3000.08, subd. (f).) At a parole revocation hearing, if a court finds a parole violation, it has the option to "[r]e

2019(See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 , 889, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 ( Sheena K. ).) To withstand a vagueness challenge, a condition must be sufficiently precise for parolees to know what is required of them and whether the condition has been violated. ( Id. at p. 890, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 .) An overbreadth challenge considers whether limitations are narrowly tailored to their purpose. ( Ibid. ) *737 *788 2.

2019(See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 , 889, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 ( Sheena K. ).) To withstand a vagueness challenge, a condition must be sufficiently precise for parolees to know what is required of them and whether the condition has been violated. ( Id. at p. 890, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 .) An overbreadth challenge considers whether limitations are narrowly tailored to their purpose. ( Ibid. ) *737 *788 2.

2014The result of that hearing was the dismissal of all grounds for revoking his parole other than the conduct underlying his current conviction.” (Id. at p. 392 [citing Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1180 ].) Here, by contrast, defendant did not and has not presented any evidence showing that the conduct leading to his sentence was a dispositive cause of his parole hold.

2014The result of that hearing was the dismissal of all grounds for revoking his parole other than the conduct underlying his current conviction.” (Id. at p. 392 [citing Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1180 ].) Here, by contrast, defendant did not and has not presented any evidence showing that the conduct leading to his sentence was a dispositive cause of his parole hold.

2022(People v. Abrams (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 396, 405 (Abrams); see Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1157 .) On the other hand, at a parole revocation hearing, hearsay is admissible when confrontation will not materially aid the decisionmaker.

2022(People v. Abrams (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 396, 405 (Abrams); see Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1157 .) On the other hand, at a parole revocation hearing, hearsay is admissible when confrontation will not materially aid the decisionmaker.