parole revocation hearing in Utah

2016See, e.g., Spencer, 623 U.S. at 8-16, 118 S.Ct. 978 (declining to presume collateral consequences in a parole revocation challenge); Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 631-34 , 102 S.Ct. 1322 , 71 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982) (declining to presume collateral consequences in the context of challenges to *370 petitioners’ sentences, not underlying convictions). ¶29 In Allen and Warner , however, neither appellant challenged his underlying conviction; instead both challenged the legality of their probation revocations and resulting incarcerations.

2016See, e.g., Spencer, 623 U.S. at 8-16, 118 S.Ct. 978 (declining to presume collateral consequences in a parole revocation challenge); Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 631-34 , 102 S.Ct. 1322 , 71 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982) (declining to presume collateral consequences in the context of challenges to *370 petitioners’ sentences, not underlying convictions). ¶29 In Allen and Warner , however, neither appellant challenged his underlying conviction; instead both challenged the legality of their probation revocations and resulting incarcerations.

2003While a prisoner facing an original parole grant hearing is not necessarily entitled to judicial review under the terms of the United States Constitution, a parolee who is facing a parole revocation hearing is entitled to judicial review in order " 'to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated. " Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489 , 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1261 , 63 LEd.2d 552 (1980) (citation omitted). 1 14 We accordingly conclude that, under the terms of the United States Constitution's Due Process Clause, judicial review of the Board's revocations decisions is authorized and t

2003While a prisoner facing an original parole grant hearing is not necessarily entitled to judicial review under the terms of the United States Constitution, a parolee who is facing a parole revocation hearing is entitled to judicial review in order " 'to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated. " Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489 , 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1261 , 63 LEd.2d 552 (1980) (citation omitted). 1 14 We accordingly conclude that, under the terms of the United States Constitution's Due Process Clause, judicial review of the Board's revocations decisions is authorized and t

2003IL Linden's Revocation 115 In Black v. Romano, the United States Supreme Court set forth the terms of the constitutionally mandated revocation analysis as follows: In identifying the procedural requirements of due process, we have observed that the decision to revoke probation typically involves two distinct components: (1) a retrospective factual question whether the probationer has violated a condition of probation; and (2) a discretionary determination by the sentencing authority whether violation of a condition warrants revocation of probation. 471 U.S. 606, 611 , 105 S.Ct. 2254, 2257 , 85

2003IL Linden's Revocation 115 In Black v. Romano, the United States Supreme Court set forth the terms of the constitutionally mandated revocation analysis as follows: In identifying the procedural requirements of due process, we have observed that the decision to revoke probation typically involves two distinct components: (1) a retrospective factual question whether the probationer has violated a condition of probation; and (2) a discretionary determination by the sentencing authority whether violation of a condition warrants revocation of probation. 471 U.S. 606, 611 , 105 S.Ct. 2254, 2257 , 85

1986Admittedly, this distinction is important in determining what procedural elements are necessary to satisfy due process, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 489 , 92 S.Ct. at 2604 ; however, once that issue has been resolved, the distinction is no longer pertinent.

1986Admittedly, this distinction is important in determining what procedural elements are necessary to satisfy due process, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 489 , 92 S.Ct. at 2604 ; however, once that issue has been resolved, the distinction is no longer pertinent.

1969This being so the courts have been virtually unanimous in holding that there is no constitutional right to retained' or appointed counsel at a parole revocation hearing. [Citations omitted.] Nor does the most recent case of Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 , 88 S.Ct. 254 , 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967) require a different result.

1969This being so the courts have been virtually unanimous in holding that there is no constitutional right to retained' or appointed counsel at a parole revocation hearing. [Citations omitted.] Nor does the most recent case of Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 , 88 S.Ct. 254 , 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967) require a different result.

1969As we observed in Williams v. Patterson, supra, 389 F.2d 374, p. 375 , Mempa dealt with the right to “counsel 'at the time of sentencing where the sentencing has been deferred subject to probation,’ ” none of which is here involved. * * * * * Despite disagreement among the circuits, we are satisfied that if we were' only confronted with the construction of the statutory "opportunity to appear” we would have no difficulty affirming the District Court in light of our position in Lavendera v. Taylor, supra, 347 F.2d 989 adopting Judge Goodrich’s view in Washington v. Hagan, supra, 287 F.2d 332 p.

1969As we observed in Williams v. Patterson, supra, 389 F.2d 374, p. 375 , Mempa dealt with the right to “counsel 'at the time of sentencing where the sentencing has been deferred subject to probation,’ ” none of which is here involved. * * * * * Despite disagreement among the circuits, we are satisfied that if we were' only confronted with the construction of the statutory "opportunity to appear” we would have no difficulty affirming the District Court in light of our position in Lavendera v. Taylor, supra, 347 F.2d 989 adopting Judge Goodrich’s view in Washington v. Hagan, supra, 287 F.2d 332 p.

1969As we observed in Williams v. Patterson, supra, 389 F.2d 374, p. 375 , Mempa dealt with the right to “counsel 'at the time of sentencing where the sentencing has been deferred subject to probation,’ ” none of which is here involved. * * * * * Despite disagreement among the circuits, we are satisfied that if we were' only confronted with the construction of the statutory "opportunity to appear” we would have no difficulty affirming the District Court in light of our position in Lavendera v. Taylor, supra, 347 F.2d 989 adopting Judge Goodrich’s view in Washington v. Hagan, supra, 287 F.2d 332 p.

1969As we observed in Williams v. Patterson, supra, 389 F.2d 374, p. 375 , Mempa dealt with the right to “counsel 'at the time of sentencing where the sentencing has been deferred subject to probation,’ ” none of which is here involved. * * * * * Despite disagreement among the circuits, we are satisfied that if we were' only confronted with the construction of the statutory "opportunity to appear” we would have no difficulty affirming the District Court in light of our position in Lavendera v. Taylor, supra, 347 F.2d 989 adopting Judge Goodrich’s view in Washington v. Hagan, supra, 287 F.2d 332 p.

1969As we observed in Williams v. Patterson, supra, 389 F.2d 374, p. 375 , Mempa dealt with the right to “counsel 'at the time of sentencing where the sentencing has been deferred subject to probation,’ ” none of which is here involved. * * * * * Despite disagreement among the circuits, we are satisfied that if we were' only confronted with the construction of the statutory "opportunity to appear” we would have no difficulty affirming the District Court in light of our position in Lavendera v. Taylor, supra, 347 F.2d 989 adopting Judge Goodrich’s view in Washington v. Hagan, supra, 287 F.2d 332 p.

1969As we observed in Williams v. Patterson, supra, 389 F.2d 374, p. 375 , Mempa dealt with the right to “counsel 'at the time of sentencing where the sentencing has been deferred subject to probation,’ ” none of which is here involved. * * * * * Despite disagreement among the circuits, we are satisfied that if we were' only confronted with the construction of the statutory "opportunity to appear” we would have no difficulty affirming the District Court in light of our position in Lavendera v. Taylor, supra, 347 F.2d 989 adopting Judge Goodrich’s view in Washington v. Hagan, supra, 287 F.2d 332 p.