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6 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhousegreen1 sentence2021See Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 190 Ariz. 6, 38 (App. 1996) (as corrected) ("Confusion of the jury is a proper basis for concluding that a verdict 'is not justified by the evidence or is 5 The product recall endorsement was provided by Truck Insurance to Patisserie retroactively in 2016, was not part of the insurance policy in 2014, and provided $100,000 in coverage for expenses incurred for certain product recalls. 14 TRUCK v. TEIXIDOR, et al. | 1 | 1 |
Gipson v. Kaseygreen2 sentences2014See generally Gipson v. Kasey, 214 Ariz. 141, 143, ¶ 9 , 150 P.3d 228, 230 (2007) (breach is factual issue usually decided by jury). 3 II. 2014See generally Gipson v. Kasey, 214 Ariz. 141, 143, ¶ 9 , 150 P.3d 228, 230 (2007) (breach is factual issue usually decided by jury). 3 II. | 1 | 1 |
Millers National Insurance v. Taylor Freeman Insurance Agencygreen2 sentences2014The Wilkses’ professional negligence claim rests on the Agency’s alleged failure to obtain the UIM coverage Lesley requested and the Agency said it would procure, see supra ¶ 3, not on any alleged failure to offer or explain UIM coverage. 6 Although A.R.S. § 20-259.01 establishes a method by which insurers may satisfy the statutory requirements to “make available” and “by written notice offer” UM/ UIM coverage, it has not abolished all tort law claims and certainly not the type of professional negligence claim at issue here. ¶ 18 Finally, citing Millers National Insurance Co. v. Taylor Freeman 2014The Wilkses’ professional negligence claim rests on the Agency’s alleged failure to obtain the UIM coverage Lesley requested and the Agency said it would procure, see supra ¶ 3, not on any alleged failure to offer or explain UIM coverage. 6 Although A.R.S. § 20-259.01 establishes a method by which insurers may satisfy the statutory requirements to “make available” and “by written notice offer” UM/ UIM coverage, it has not abolished all tort law claims and certainly not the type of professional negligence claim at issue here. ¶ 18 Finally, citing Millers National Insurance Co. v. Taylor Freeman | 1 | 1 |
Sensing v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2009The Court is not so persuaded and finds that plaintiffs claim is barred. ¶ 6 Owner timely appeals, and we have jurisdiction in accordance with A.R.S. § 12-2101 (2003). *436 ANALYSIS ¶ 7 “In reviewing motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we assume that the allegations in the complaint are true and determine if the plaintiff is entitled to relief under any theory of law.” Sensing v. Harris, 217 Ariz. 261, 262, ¶ 2 , 172 P.3d 856, 857 (App.2007). 2009The Court is not so persuaded and finds that plaintiffs claim is barred. ¶ 6 Owner timely appeals, and we have jurisdiction in accordance with A.R.S. § 12-2101 (2003). *436 ANALYSIS ¶ 7 “In reviewing motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we assume that the allegations in the complaint are true and determine if the plaintiff is entitled to relief under any theory of law.” Sensing v. Harris, 217 Ariz. 261, 262, ¶ 2 , 172 P.3d 856, 857 (App.2007). | 1 | 1 |
Napier v. Bertramgreen2 sentences2008Clients are best positioned and should be empowered to decide whether to value that relationship above the benefits they could obtain from assigning a professional negligence claim. 2. ¶ 28 Gittlen also contends that allowing assignment conflicts with this Court’s decision in Napier v. Bertram, which held that a taxicab company’s insurance agent did not owe a passenger the duty to secure uninsured motorist insurance for the company. 191 Ariz. 238 , 244 ¶¶ 20-21, 954 P.2d 1389, 1395 (1998). 2008Clients are best positioned and should be empowered to decide whether to value that relationship above the benefits they could obtain from assigning a professional negligence claim. 2. ¶ 28 Gittlen also contends that allowing assignment conflicts with this Court’s decision in Napier v. Bertram, which held that a taxicab company’s insurance agent did not owe a passenger the duty to secure uninsured motorist insurance for the company. 191 Ariz. 238 , 244 ¶¶ 20-21, 954 P.2d 1389, 1395 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
FLAGSTAFF AFFORDABLE HOUSING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. Design Alliance Inc.
green
2 sentences2011P’ship v. Design Alliance, Inc., 221 Ariz. 433 , 212 P.3d 125 (App.2009) {“Flagstaff I”), wherein we held that the ELR did not apply to a professional negligence claim against an architect, and the superior court granted the parties leave to file supplemental memoranda addressing that decision. 2011P’ship v. Design Alliance, Inc., 221 Ariz. 433 , 212 P.3d 125 (App.2009) {“Flagstaff I”), wherein we held that the ELR did not apply to a professional negligence claim against an architect, and the superior court granted the parties leave to file supplemental memoranda addressing that decision. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Smith Ex Rel. Boston v. Arthur Andersen LLP
green
1 sentence2009In its response, Owner agreed to withdraw its breach of contract claim because of the statute of repose, but argued that the economic loss doctrine did not apply to professional negligence claims. ¶ 5 The trial court granted Architect’s motion to dismiss, explaining in part as follows: Plaintiff relies on Donnelly Construction Company v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 139 Ariz. 184 , 677 P.2d 1292 (1984) and Smith v. [Arthur] Anderson [Andersen] L.L.P., 175 F.Supp.2d 1180 (D.Ariz.2001) for its argument that professional negligence claims between contracting parties are not barred by the economic loss r | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Wojtunik v. Kealy
green
1 sentence2009Judge Rosenblatt’s ... decision in Wojtunik v. Kealy, 394 F.Supp.2d 1149 (D.Ariz.2005) is more persuasive, even though it is based on a claim of negligent misrepresentation, not professional negligence____ Plaintiff attempts to distinguish its professional negligence claim from a claim of negligent misrepresentation and relies on the “special relationship between the parties” to support its position that a professional negligence claim is an exception to the economic loss rulé. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Donnelly Const. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland
green
2 sentences2009In its response, Owner agreed to withdraw its breach of contract claim because of the statute of repose, but argued that the economic loss doctrine did not apply to professional negligence claims. ¶ 5 The trial court granted Architect’s motion to dismiss, explaining in part as follows: Plaintiff relies on Donnelly Construction Company v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 139 Ariz. 184 , 677 P.2d 1292 (1984) and Smith v. [Arthur] Anderson [Andersen] L.L.P., 175 F.Supp.2d 1180 (D.Ariz.2001) for its argument that professional negligence claims between contracting parties are not barred by the economic loss r 2009In its response, Owner agreed to withdraw its breach of contract claim because of the statute of repose, but argued that the economic loss doctrine did not apply to professional negligence claims. ¶ 5 The trial court granted Architect’s motion to dismiss, explaining in part as follows: Plaintiff relies on Donnelly Construction Company v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 139 Ariz. 184 , 677 P.2d 1292 (1984) and Smith v. [Arthur] Anderson [Andersen] L.L.P., 175 F.Supp.2d 1180 (D.Ariz.2001) for its argument that professional negligence claims between contracting parties are not barred by the economic loss r | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Woodward v. Chirco Const. Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences1997Co., 141 Ariz. 520 , 687 P.2d 1275 (App.1984), regarding a professional negligence claim against the builder of a home damaged by soil subsidence, the court rejected the testimony of an engineer who was qualified as an expert on soil conditions but not on construction practices. 1997Co., 141 Ariz. 520 , 687 P.2d 1275 (App.1984), regarding a professional negligence claim against the builder of a home damaged by soil subsidence, the court rejected the testimony of an engineer who was qualified as an expert on soil conditions but not on construction practices. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.