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8 California opinions name it 1 courts 1995–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Marshallgreen2 sentences1996(People v. Dominguez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 410, 419 .) Dominguez reasoned that because carjacking is “an aggravated violation of the unlawful driving and taking of a motor vehicle as defined in Vehicle Code section 10851” (id., at p. 418), and it is well settled that unlawful driving is not included within robbery (People v. Marshall (1957) 48 Cal.2d 394, 397-399 [ 309 P.2d 456 ]; People v. Randle (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1027-1028 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 804 ]; People v. Aho (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 658, 664 [199 CalJRptr. 671]), it follows that robbery and carjacking are not lesser offenses include 1996(People v. Dominguez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 410, 419 .) Dominguez reasoned that because carjacking is “an aggravated violation of the unlawful driving and taking of a motor vehicle as defined in Vehicle Code section 10851” (id., at p. 418), and it is well settled that unlawful driving is not included within robbery (People v. Marshall (1957) 48 Cal.2d 394, 397-399 [ 309 P.2d 456 ]; People v. Randle (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1027-1028 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 804 ]; People v. Aho (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 658, 664 [199 CalJRptr. 671]), it follows that robbery and carjacking are not lesser offenses include | 2 | 2 |
People v. Dominguezgreen2 sentences2003Code, § 209). ( People v. Perez (2000) 84 Cal. App.4th 856 . 860-861. 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 .) [5] The court in People v. Dominguez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 410 , 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 153 stated that carjacking "is nothing more than an aggravated violation of the unlawful driving and taking of a motor vehicle as defined in Vehicle Code section 10851" thus "making an analogy to robbery ... inappropriate." (Id. at pp. 418-419, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 153 .) We must respectfully disagree with this conclusion because it pays insufficient attention to the fact that both robbery and carjacking, unlike a violation of V 2003(People v. Perez (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 856, 860-861 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 ].) The court in People v. Dominguez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 410 stated that carjacking “is nothing more than an aggravated violation of the unlawful driving and taking of a motor vehicle as defined in Vehicle Code section 10851” thus “making an analogy to robbery . . . inappropriate.” (Id. at pp. 418-419.) We must respectfully disagree with this conclusion because it pays insufficient attention to the fact that both robbery and carjacking, unlike a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, require the presence of a victim | 1 | 3 |
People v. Perezgreen2 sentences2003(People v. Perez (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 856, 860-861 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 ].) The court in People v. Dominguez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 410 stated that carjacking “is nothing more than an aggravated violation of the unlawful driving and taking of a motor vehicle as defined in Vehicle Code section 10851” thus “making an analogy to robbery . . . inappropriate.” (Id. at pp. 418-419.) We must respectfully disagree with this conclusion because it pays insufficient attention to the fact that both robbery and carjacking, unlike a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, require the presence of a victim 2003(People v. Perez (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 856, 860-861 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 ].) The court in People v. Dominguez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 410 stated that carjacking “is nothing more than an aggravated violation of the unlawful driving and taking of a motor vehicle as defined in Vehicle Code section 10851” thus “making an analogy to robbery . . . inappropriate.” (Id. at pp. 418-419.) We must respectfully disagree with this conclusion because it pays insufficient attention to the fact that both robbery and carjacking, unlike a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, require the presence of a victim | 1 | 2 |
People v. Fryegreen2 sentences2003(People v. Perez (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 856, 860-861 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 ].) The court in People v. Dominguez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 410 stated that carjacking “is nothing more than an aggravated violation of the unlawful driving and taking of a motor vehicle as defined in Vehicle Code section 10851” thus “making an analogy to robbery . . . inappropriate.” (Id. at pp. 418-419.) We must respectfully disagree with this conclusion because it pays insufficient attention to the fact that both robbery and carjacking, unlike a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, require the presence of a victim 2003(People v. Perez (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 856, 860-861 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 ].) The court in People v. Dominguez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 410 stated that carjacking “is nothing more than an aggravated violation of the unlawful driving and taking of a motor vehicle as defined in Vehicle Code section 10851” thus “making an analogy to robbery . . . inappropriate.” (Id. at pp. 418-419.) We must respectfully disagree with this conclusion because it pays insufficient attention to the fact that both robbery and carjacking, unlike a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, require the presence of a victim | 1 | 2 |
People v. Ahogreen1 sentence1996(People v. Dominguez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 410, 419 .) Dominguez reasoned that because carjacking is “an aggravated violation of the unlawful driving and taking of a motor vehicle as defined in Vehicle Code section 10851” (id., at p. 418), and it is well settled that unlawful driving is not included within robbery (People v. Marshall (1957) 48 Cal.2d 394, 397-399 [ 309 P.2d 456 ]; People v. Randle (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1027-1028 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 804 ]; People v. Aho (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 658, 664 [199 CalJRptr. 671]), it follows that robbery and carjacking are not lesser offenses include | 1 | 1 |
People v. Randlegreen2 sentences1996(People v. Dominguez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 410, 419 .) Dominguez reasoned that because carjacking is “an aggravated violation of the unlawful driving and taking of a motor vehicle as defined in Vehicle Code section 10851” (id., at p. 418), and it is well settled that unlawful driving is not included within robbery (People v. Marshall (1957) 48 Cal.2d 394, 397-399 [ 309 P.2d 456 ]; People v. Randle (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1027-1028 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 804 ]; People v. Aho (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 658, 664 [199 CalJRptr. 671]), it follows that robbery and carjacking are not lesser offenses include 1996(People v. Dominguez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 410, 419 .) Dominguez reasoned that because carjacking is “an aggravated violation of the unlawful driving and taking of a motor vehicle as defined in Vehicle Code section 10851” (id., at p. 418), and it is well settled that unlawful driving is not included within robbery (People v. Marshall (1957) 48 Cal.2d 394, 397-399 [ 309 P.2d 456 ]; People v. Randle (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1027-1028 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 804 ]; People v. Aho (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 658, 664 [199 CalJRptr. 671]), it follows that robbery and carjacking are not lesser offenses include | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Gonzalez
green
2 sentences2026Our Supreme Court is currently reviewing these divided interpretations in People v. Eaton (Mar. 14, 2025, C096853) [nonpub. opn.], review granted May 14, 2025, S289903. 8 Defendant urges this Court to follow People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312 (Gonzalez) for the proposition that § 1172.75(d)(4) should be read as a restriction and not an exemption, such that only those who previously received the upper term where the aggravated factors were stipulated to or were proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact can receive the upper term at resentencing. 2026Defendant urges this Court to follow People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312 (Gonzalez) for the proposition that § 1172.75(d)(4) should be read as a restriction and not an exemption, such that only those who previously received the upper term where the aggravated factors were stipulated to or were proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact can receive the upper term at resentencing. | 2 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Berry
green
1 sentence2023Over defense counsel’s argument that the expungement was evidence Orozco had successfully completed his 10 The aggravated factors included the allegations that: (1) Orozco’s prior convictions as an adult and sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings were numerous or of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)); (2) Orozco suffered prior convictions (rule 4.408; People v. Berry (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 184, 191 ); (3) Orozco’s performance on probation or parole was unsatisfactory (rule 4.421(b)(5); and (4) Orozco was armed with or used a weapon at the time of the commission of the cr | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Neal v. State of California
yellow
1 sentence2014(People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1208 ; Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19 .) “Whether a course of conduct is indivisible depends upon the intent and objective of the actor. [Citation.] If all the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one. [Citation.]” (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 551 .) “On the other hand, if the evidence discloses that a defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished f | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Latimer
green
1 sentence2014(People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1208 ; Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19 .) “Whether a course of conduct is indivisible depends upon the intent and objective of the actor. [Citation.] If all the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one. [Citation.]” (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 551 .) “On the other hand, if the evidence discloses that a defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished f | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Perez
green
1 sentence2014(People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1208 ; Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19 .) “Whether a course of conduct is indivisible depends upon the intent and objective of the actor. [Citation.] If all the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one. [Citation.]” (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 551 .) “On the other hand, if the evidence discloses that a defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished f | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.