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6 California opinions name it 1 courts 1965–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hudsongreen1 sentence2015Preliminarily, we note that the CALCRIM No. 521 instruction given in this case correctly stated the law despite the omission of the sentence "all other murders are of the second degree." Davis argues that the court had a sua sponte duty to modify CALCRIM No. 521 in an attempt to circumvent the rule that " 'a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language.' " (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011-1012 (Hudson).) Here, as noted, d | 1 | 1 |
Covina Union High School v. California Interscholastic Federationgreen1 sentence2015(Covina Union High School v. California Interscholastic Federation (1934) 136 Cal.App. 588, 589-590 [an appeal from an order restraining conduct during a specified period becomes moot if that period elapses while the appeal is pending]; Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 132 [courts have a duty to refrain from giving opinions on moot questions].) However, Smirl contends that his right to due process was violated by Pfuhl’s intentional failure to serve him “important documents in an attempt to circumvent his defense.” Given this claim, we will address the merits of Smirl’s appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc.green1 sentence2015(Covina Union High School v. California Interscholastic Federation (1934) 136 Cal.App. 588, 589-590 [an appeal from an order restraining conduct during a specified period becomes moot if that period elapses while the appeal is pending]; Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 132 [courts have a duty to refrain from giving opinions on moot questions].) However, Smirl contends that his right to due process was violated by Pfuhl’s intentional failure to serve him “important documents in an attempt to circumvent his defense.” Given this claim, we will address the merits of Smirl’s appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Kachig v. Boothegreen2 sentences1977(See Kulchar v. Kulchar, supra, 1 Cal.3d 467, 472 ; Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra, 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 ; Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134 ; Kachig v. Boothe, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 640-641 .) In this respect, plaintiff’s bad faith suit is similar to the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action alleged by the plaintiffs in Kachig v. Boothe, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d 626 . 1977(See Kulchar v. Kulchar, supra, 1 Cal.3d 467, 472-473 ; Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra, 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 ; Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134 ; Kachig v. Boothe, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 632-633, 640-641 .) Plaintiff’s action represents nothing more than an attempt to circumvent the rule that equitable relief will not be granted against a final judgment infected with intrinsic fraud. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Galvangreen2 sentences1965The denial by the prosecution of an opportunity for the defendant to seek out the informer and to defend by these means, where the testimony of the informer would be material to the issues, is unfair and oppressive to the defendant, and deprives him of due process of law. [Citations.] ” The court in Kiihoa , however, was careful to point out (at p. 754), “It is not intended to hold that the mere unavailability of a material witness would necessarily result in a denial of due process in every case.” On the contrary, as stated in People v. Galvan, 208 Cal.App. 2d 443, 448 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 128 ], “ 1965The denial by the prosecution of an opportunity for the defendant to seek out the informer and to defend by these means, where the testimony of the informer would be material to the issues, is unfair and oppressive to the defendant, and deprives him of due process of law. [Citations.] ” The court in Kiihoa , however, was careful to point out (at p. 754), “It is not intended to hold that the mere unavailability of a material witness would necessarily result in a denial of due process in every case.” On the contrary, as stated in People v. Galvan, 208 Cal.App. 2d 443, 448 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 128 ], “ | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rios v. Allstate Insurancegreen1 sentence1979Co., supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at p. 819 .) We respectfully disagree with the Rios court’s conclusion and the extension of the doctrines of finality of judgments and res judicata that it represents. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kulchar v. Kulchar
green
2 sentences1977(See Kulchar v. Kulchar, supra, 1 Cal.3d 467, 472 ; Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra, 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 ; Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134 ; Kachig v. Boothe, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 640-641 .) In this respect, plaintiff’s bad faith suit is similar to the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action alleged by the plaintiffs in Kachig v. Boothe, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d 626 . 1977(See Kulchar v. Kulchar, supra, 1 Cal.3d 467, 472-473 ; Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra, 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 ; Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134 ; Kachig v. Boothe, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 632-633, 640-641 .) Plaintiff’s action represents nothing more than an attempt to circumvent the rule that equitable relief will not be granted against a final judgment infected with intrinsic fraud. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Pico v. Cohn
green
2 sentences1977(See Kulchar v. Kulchar, supra, 1 Cal.3d 467, 472 ; Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra, 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 ; Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134 ; Kachig v. Boothe, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 640-641 .) In this respect, plaintiff’s bad faith suit is similar to the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action alleged by the plaintiffs in Kachig v. Boothe, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d 626 . 1977(See Kulchar v. Kulchar, supra, 1 Cal.3d 467, 472-473 ; Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra, 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 ; Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134 ; Kachig v. Boothe, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 632-633, 640-641 .) Plaintiff’s action represents nothing more than an attempt to circumvent the rule that equitable relief will not be granted against a final judgment infected with intrinsic fraud. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen
green
2 sentences1977(See Kulchar v. Kulchar, supra, 1 Cal.3d 467, 472 ; Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra, 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 ; Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134 ; Kachig v. Boothe, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 640-641 .) In this respect, plaintiff’s bad faith suit is similar to the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action alleged by the plaintiffs in Kachig v. Boothe, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d 626 . 1977(See Kulchar v. Kulchar, supra, 1 Cal.3d 467, 472-473 ; Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra, 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 ; Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134 ; Kachig v. Boothe, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 632-633, 640-641 .) Plaintiff’s action represents nothing more than an attempt to circumvent the rule that equitable relief will not be granted against a final judgment infected with intrinsic fraud. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Kent v. Bartlett
green
2 sentences1975In an attempt to circumvent the requirement of privity, Bell and Collins cite Kent v. Bartlett, 49 Cal.App.3d 724 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 615 ], in which a defendant surveyor of the grantor’s land had negligently *782 mislocated a boundary line. 1975In an attempt to circumvent the requirement of privity, Bell and Collins cite Kent v. Bartlett, 49 Cal.App.3d 724 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 615 ], in which a defendant surveyor of the grantor’s land had negligently *782 mislocated a boundary line. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.