51 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2025 17 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People of Michigan v. Christopher Duran Headgreen2 sentences2025“The purpose of the notice requirement is to provide the accused with notice, at an early stage in the proceedings, of the potential consequences should the accused be convicted of the underlying offense.” People v Head, 323 Mich App 526, 543 ; 917 NW2d 752 (2018) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 2025“The purpose of the notice requirement is to provide the accused with notice, at an early stage in the proceedings, of the potential consequences should the accused be convicted of the underlying offense.” People v Head, 323 Mich App 526, 543 ; 917 NW2d 752 (2018) (quotation marks and citations omitted). | 5 | 13 |
Neal v. Oakwood Hospital Corp.green2 sentences2010The purpose of the notice requirement was explained in Neal v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 226 Mich App 701 ; 575 NW2d 68 (1997), as follows: The purpose of the notice requirement is to promote settlement without the need for formal litigation and reduce the cost of medical malpractice litigation while still providing compensation for meritorious medical malpractice claims that might otherwise be precluded from recovery because of litigation costs. [Id. at 705, citing Senate Legislative Analysis, SB 270, August 11, 1993; House Legislative Analysis, HB 4403-4406, March 22, 1993.] See, also, Bush v Shabah 2010The purpose of the notice requirement was explained in Neal v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 226 Mich App 701 ; 575 NW2d 68 (1997), as follows: The purpose of the notice requirement is to promote settlement without the need for formal litigation and reduce the cost of medical malpractice litigation while still providing compensation for meritorious medical malpractice claims that might otherwise be precluded from recovery because of litigation costs. [Id. at 705, citing Senate Legislative Analysis, SB 270, August 11, 1993; House Legislative Analysis, HB 4403-4406, March 22, 1993.] See, also, Bush v Shabah | 2 | 7 |
Decker v. Rochowiakgreen1 sentence2023As the Court of Appeals has previously stated, “The purpose of the notice requirement—to promote settlement without the need for formal litigation—cannot be realized when the litigation has already been commenced.” Decker, 287 Mich App at 681 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Manninggreen2 sentences2018See also Manning, 163 Mich App at 644-645 (despite a late amendment, the defendant was provided notice beforehand that the prosecution sought to sentence him as a fourth-offense habitual offender, and thus the purpose of the notice rule had been effectuated); and Ellis, 224 Mich App at 757 (finding that a late amendment was impermissible because it materially altered the potential consequences the defendant faced upon conviction). 2018See also Manning, 163 Mich App at 644-645 (despite a late amendment, the defendant was provided notice beforehand that the prosecution sought to sentence him as a fourth-offense habitual offender, and thus the purpose of the notice rule had been effectuated); and Ellis, 224 Mich App at 757 (finding that a late amendment was impermissible because it materially altered the potential consequences the defendant faced upon conviction). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ellisgreen2 sentences2018See also Manning, 163 Mich App at 644-645 (despite a late amendment, the defendant was provided notice beforehand that the prosecution sought to sentence him as a fourth-offense habitual offender, and thus the purpose of the notice rule had been effectuated); and Ellis, 224 Mich App at 757 (finding that a late amendment was impermissible because it materially altered the potential consequences the defendant faced upon conviction). 2018See also Manning, 163 Mich App at 644-645 (despite a late amendment, the defendant was provided notice beforehand that the prosecution sought to sentence him as a fourth-offense habitual offender, and thus the purpose of the notice rule had been effectuated); and Ellis, 224 Mich App at 757 (finding that a late amendment was impermissible because it materially altered the potential consequences the defendant faced upon conviction). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Terry Alexandergreen2 sentences1981See, e.g., People v Terry Alexander, 82 Mich App 621, 627 ; 267 NW2d 466 (1978), lv den 406 Mich 936 (1979). 1981See, e.g., People v Terry Alexander, 82 Mich App 621, 627 ; 267 NW2d 466 (1978), lv den 406 Mich 936 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Carter v. Kelsey-Hayes Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mohawk Lumber & Supply Co. v. Petixgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Whitley v. Chrysler Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Banks v. Packard Motor Car Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Morales
green
2 sentences2022“The purpose of the notice requirement ‘is to provide the accused with notice, at an early stage in the proceedings, of the potential consequences should the accused be convicted of the underlying offense.’” Head, 323 Mich App at 543 ,quoting People v Morales, 240 Mich App 571, 582 ; 618 NW2d 10 (2000). 2022“The purpose of the notice requirement ‘is to provide the accused with notice, at an early stage in the proceedings, of the potential consequences should the accused be convicted of the underlying offense.’” Head, 323 Mich App at 543 ,quoting People v Morales, 240 Mich App 571, 582 ; 618 NW2d 10 (2000). | 13 | 2018–2022 |
Dollar Rent-A-Car Systems v. Nodel Construction
green
2 sentences2023In Perry, this Court, citing Wood v DAIIE, 413 Mich 573, 583-584 ; 321 NW2d 653 (1982) and Dollar Rent-A-Car Systems v Nodel Const, 172 Mich App 738 ; 432 NW2d 423 (1988), stated: The purpose of the notice requirement is to apprise the defaulting party of the possibility of entry of judgment so that he may have an opportunity to participate in any hearing necessary to ascertain the amount of damages or other form of remedy to be granted . . . . 2023In Perry, this Court, citing Wood v DAIIE, 413 Mich 573, 583-584 ; 321 NW2d 653 (1982) and Dollar Rent-A-Car Systems v Nodel Const, 172 Mich App 738 ; 432 NW2d 423 (1988), stated: The purpose of the notice requirement is to apprise the defaulting party of the possibility of entry of judgment so that he may have an opportunity to participate in any hearing necessary to ascertain the amount of damages or other form of remedy to be granted . . . . | 3 | 1989–2023 |
Burise v. City of Pontiac
green
2 sentences2023The purpose of the notice requirement is “to provide the governmental agency with an opportunity to investigate the claim while the evidentiary [trail] is still fresh and, additionally, to remedy the defect before other persons are injured.” Burise v City of Pontiac, 282 Mich App 646, 652 ; 766 NW2d 311 (2009), (alteration in original); quoting Hussey v City of Muskegon Hts, 36 Mich App 264, 267-268 ; 193 NW2d 421 (1971). 2023The purpose of the notice requirement is “to provide the governmental agency with an opportunity to investigate the claim while the evidentiary [trail] is still fresh and, additionally, to remedy the defect before other persons are injured.” Burise v City of Pontiac, 282 Mich App 646, 652 ; 766 NW2d 311 (2009), (alteration in original); quoting Hussey v City of Muskegon Hts, 36 Mich App 264, 267-268 ; 193 NW2d 421 (1971). | 3 | 2017–2023 |
People v. Hawkins
green
2 sentences2024In People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 453-455 ; 628 NW2d 105 (2001), this Court explained the purpose of the notice requirement: (1) to force the prosecutor to identify and seek admission only of prior bad acts evidence that passes the relevancy threshold, (2) to ensure that the defendant has an opportunity to object to and defend against this sort of evidence, and (3) to facilitate a thoughtful ruling by the trial court that either admits or excludes this evidence and is grounded in an adequate record. [Id. at 454-455.] This Court held that, although the prosecution’s failure to provide noti 2024In People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 453-455 ; 628 NW2d 105 (2001), this Court explained the purpose of the notice requirement: (1) to force the prosecutor to identify and seek admission only of prior bad acts evidence that passes the relevancy threshold, (2) to ensure that the defendant has an opportunity to object to and defend against this sort of evidence, and (3) to facilitate a thoughtful ruling by the trial court that either admits or excludes this evidence and is grounded in an adequate record. [Id. at 454-455.] This Court held that, although the prosecution’s failure to provide noti | 2 | 2021–2024 |
Wood v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange
green
2 sentences2023In Perry, this Court, citing Wood v DAIIE, 413 Mich 573, 583-584 ; 321 NW2d 653 (1982) and Dollar Rent-A-Car Systems v Nodel Const, 172 Mich App 738 ; 432 NW2d 423 (1988), stated: The purpose of the notice requirement is to apprise the defaulting party of the possibility of entry of judgment so that he may have an opportunity to participate in any hearing necessary to ascertain the amount of damages or other form of remedy to be granted . . . . 2023In Perry, this Court, citing Wood v DAIIE, 413 Mich 573, 583-584 ; 321 NW2d 653 (1982) and Dollar Rent-A-Car Systems v Nodel Const, 172 Mich App 738 ; 432 NW2d 423 (1988), stated: The purpose of the notice requirement is to apprise the defaulting party of the possibility of entry of judgment so that he may have an opportunity to participate in any hearing necessary to ascertain the amount of damages or other form of remedy to be granted . . . . | 2 | 1997–2023 |
Bush v. Shabahang
green
2 sentences2010The purpose of the notice requirement was explained in Neal v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 226 Mich App 701 ; 575 NW2d 68 (1997), as follows: The purpose of the notice requirement is to promote settlement without the need for formal litigation and reduce the cost of medical malpractice litigation while still providing compensation for meritorious medical malpractice claims that might otherwise be precluded from recovery because of litigation costs. [Id. at 705, citing Senate Legislative Analysis, SB 270, August 11, 1993; House Legislative Analysis, HB 4403-4406, March 22, 1993.] See, also, Bush v Shabah 2010The purpose of the notice requirement was explained in Neal v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 226 Mich App 701 ; 575 NW2d 68 (1997), as follows: The purpose of the notice requirement is to promote settlement without the need for formal litigation and reduce the cost of medical malpractice litigation while still providing compensation for meritorious medical malpractice claims that might otherwise be precluded from recovery because of litigation costs. [Id. at 705, citing Senate Legislative Analysis, SB 270, August 11, 1993; House Legislative Analysis, HB 4403-4406, March 22, 1993.] See, also, Bush v Shabah | 2 | 2010–2023 |
South MacOmb Disposal Authority v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences2022In People v Cobley, 463 Mich 893 ; 618 NW2d 768 (2000), our Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s sentence and ordered that he be resentenced because the prosecutor failed to prove that the notice of sentence enhancement was served on the defendant within 21 days after the defendant was arraigned. 2019Defendant relies upon the Michigan Supreme Court’s orders in People v Cobley, 463 Mich 893 (2000), and People v Muhammad, 498 Mich 909 (2015), for the contention that MCL 769.13(2) is mandatory and not permissive, and that anything less than strict compliance with the statute warrants reversal. | 2 | 2019–2022 |
Drago Kostadinovski v. Steven D Harrington Md
green
2 sentences2023Plaintiff appealed, primarily arguing that MCL 600.2912b simply requires the service of an NOI before suit is filed and that once this is accomplished through the service of a proper and compliant NOI, as judged at the time suit is filed and by the language in the original complaint, the requirements of the statute have been satisfied, absent the need to revisit the NOI even if a new theory of negligence or causation is later developed that was not included in the NOI and that forms the basis of an amended complaint.[3] The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s argument, explaining that it was 2023Plaintiff appealed, primarily arguing that MCL 600.2912b simply requires the service of an NOI before suit is filed and that once this is accomplished through the service of a proper and compliant NOI, as judged at the time suit is filed and by the language in the original complaint, the requirements of the statute have been satisfied, absent the need to revisit the NOI even if a new theory of negligence or causation is later developed that was not included in the NOI and that forms the basis of an amended complaint.[3] The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s argument, explaining that it was | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Hussey v. City of Muskegon Heights
green
2 sentences2023The purpose of the notice requirement is “to provide the governmental agency with an opportunity to investigate the claim while the evidentiary [trail] is still fresh and, additionally, to remedy the defect before other persons are injured.” Burise v City of Pontiac, 282 Mich App 646, 652 ; 766 NW2d 311 (2009), (alteration in original); quoting Hussey v City of Muskegon Hts, 36 Mich App 264, 267-268 ; 193 NW2d 421 (1971). 2023The purpose of the notice requirement is “to provide the governmental agency with an opportunity to investigate the claim while the evidentiary [trail] is still fresh and, additionally, to remedy the defect before other persons are injured.” Burise v City of Pontiac, 282 Mich App 646, 652 ; 766 NW2d 311 (2009), (alteration in original); quoting Hussey v City of Muskegon Hts, 36 Mich App 264, 267-268 ; 193 NW2d 421 (1971). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2022Importantly, although defense counsel objected to the testimony of certain witnesses on the second day of trial, counsel did not indicate that he did not have notice that certain witnesses would be testifying about defendant having sexually assaulted them See People v Jackson, 498 Mich 246, 261 ; 869 NW2d 253 (2015) (the purpose of the notice requirement regarding other-acts evidence is “to promote reliable decision making, to prevent unfair surprise and to offer the defense the opportunity to marshal arguments regarding both relevancy and unfair prejudice”) (quotation marks and citation omitt 2022Importantly, although defense counsel objected to the testimony of certain witnesses on the second day of trial, counsel did not indicate that he did not have notice that certain witnesses would be testifying about defendant having sexually assaulted them See People v Jackson, 498 Mich 246, 261 ; 869 NW2d 253 (2015) (the purpose of the notice requirement regarding other-acts evidence is “to promote reliable decision making, to prevent unfair surprise and to offer the defense the opportunity to marshal arguments regarding both relevancy and unfair prejudice”) (quotation marks and citation omitt | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Gadomski
green
1 sentence2020Gadomski, 232 Mich App at 36 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Walker
green
2 sentences2020This Court has held that the prosecution’s “failure to file a proof of service of the notice of intent to enhance the defendant’s sentence may be harmless if the defendant received the notice of the prosecutor’s intent to seek an enhanced sentence and the defendant was not prejudiced in his ability to respond to the habitual-offender notification.” Head, -3- 323 Mich App at 543-544 ,1 citing People v Walker, 234 Mich App 299, 314-315 ; 593 NW2d 673 (1999) (citation omitted). 2020This Court has held that the prosecution’s “failure to file a proof of service of the notice of intent to enhance the defendant’s sentence may be harmless if the defendant received the notice of the prosecutor’s intent to seek an enhanced sentence and the defendant was not prejudiced in his ability to respond to the habitual-offender notification.” Head, -3- 323 Mich App at 543-544 ,1 citing People v Walker, 234 Mich App 299, 314-315 ; 593 NW2d 673 (1999) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Muhammad
green
1 sentence2019Defendant relies upon the Michigan Supreme Court’s orders in People v Cobley, 463 Mich 893 (2000), and People v Muhammad, 498 Mich 909 (2015), for the contention that MCL 769.13(2) is mandatory and not permissive, and that anything less than strict compliance with the statute warrants reversal. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Hornsby
green
1 sentence2018Instead, they provide that late amendments to a notice of intent or a felony information do not frustrate the purpose of the notice requirement contained in MCL 769.13 so long as they do not seek to impose “more severe adverse consequences.” Hornsby, 251 Mich App at 472 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Plunkett v. Department of Transportation
green
1 sentence2013Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Gulley-Reaves v. Baciewicz
green
1 sentence2010Further, in light of the purpose of the notice requirement to promote settlement without the need for formal litigation, “ [defendant hospital was not given the opportunity to engage in any type of settlement negotiation with regard to the anesthesia claims because it was not given notice of the existence of any such claim.” Id. at 488 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Perkins
green
2 sentences2004Defense counsel argued that our Supreme Court’s decision in People v Perkins, 424 Mich 302, 307-308 ; 379 NW2d 390 (1986), supported admitting evidence of consensual sex between defendant and the victim one week before the incident, because it was relevant and supported defendant’s theory that the sex was consensual in this instance. 2004Defense counsel argued that our Supreme Court’s decision in People v Perkins, 424 Mich 302, 307-308 ; 379 NW2d 390 (1986), supported admitting evidence of consensual sex between defendant and the victim one week before the incident, because it was relevant and supported defendant’s theory that the sex was consensual in this instance. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Roberts v. Mecosta County General Hospital
green
2 sentences2002Summary disposition based on any alleged defect in the notice of intent not raised by the defendant before the filing of the complaint is not appropriate. [ 240 Mich App 175, 184-186 ; 610 NW2d 285 (2000).] We granted defendants’ application for leave to appeal to consider the propriety of the Court of Appeals holding that a plaintiff’s noncompliance with the provisions of § 2912b is waived by a defendant if no objection is raised before the filing of the complaint. 2002Summary disposition based on any alleged defect in the notice of intent not raised by the defendant before the filing of the complaint is not appropriate. [ 240 Mich App 175, 184-186 ; 610 NW2d 285 (2000).] We granted defendants’ application for leave to appeal to consider the propriety of the Court of Appeals holding that a plaintiff’s noncompliance with the provisions of § 2912b is waived by a defendant if no objection is raised before the filing of the complaint. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Brown v. Manistee County Road Commission
red
2 sentences1998Cf. Brown v Manistee Co Rd Comm, 452 Mich 354, 366 ; 550 NW2d 215 (1996). 1998Cf. Brown v Manistee Co Rd Comm, 452 Mich 354, 366 ; 550 NW2d 215 (1996). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences1988People v Williams, 107 Mich App 798, 800 ; 310 NW2d 246 (1981), rev’d on other grounds 413 Mich 940 (1982). 1988People v Williams, 107 Mich App 798, 800 ; 310 NW2d 246 (1981), rev’d on other grounds 413 Mich 940 (1982). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Meyer v. Walker Land Reclamation, Inc
neutral
2 sentences1988White v Sadler, 350 Mich 511, 519 ; 87 NW2d 192 (1957); Meyer v Walker Land Reclamation, Inc, 103 Mich App 526, 540-541 ; 302 NW2d 906 (1981). 1988White v Sadler, 350 Mich 511, 519 ; 87 NW2d 192 (1957); Meyer v Walker Land Reclamation, Inc, 103 Mich App 526, 540-541 ; 302 NW2d 906 (1981). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
White v. Sadler
green
2 sentences1988White v Sadler, 350 Mich 511, 519 ; 87 NW2d 192 (1957); Meyer v Walker Land Reclamation, Inc, 103 Mich App 526, 540-541 ; 302 NW2d 906 (1981). 1988White v Sadler, 350 Mich 511, 519 ; 87 NW2d 192 (1957); Meyer v Walker Land Reclamation, Inc, 103 Mich App 526, 540-541 ; 302 NW2d 906 (1981). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Giuchici
green
2 sentences1987People v Giuchici, 118 Mich App 252, 263 ; 324 NW2d 593 (1982). 1987People v Giuchici, 118 Mich App 252, 263 ; 324 NW2d 593 (1982). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Carver v. McKernan red | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Lisee v. Secretary of State
green
2 sentences1974In Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich 96, 100 ; 211 NW2d 24 (1973), the Michigan Supreme Court declined to hold this notice provision unconstitutional, deciding that: "[W]e hold that only upon a showing of prejudice by failure to give such notice, may the claim against the fund be dismissed.” In the combined cases of Lisee v Secretary of State and Howell v Lazaruk, 388 Mich 32 ; 199 NW2d 188 (1972), the Supreme Court held that "the purpose of the notice requirement of § 18[MCLA 257.1118] was to afford the Secretary opportunity to investigate the claim so as to prepare his defense and to determine pos 1974In Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich 96, 100 ; 211 NW2d 24 (1973), the Michigan Supreme Court declined to hold this notice provision unconstitutional, deciding that: "[W]e hold that only upon a showing of prejudice by failure to give such notice, may the claim against the fund be dismissed.” In the combined cases of Lisee v Secretary of State and Howell v Lazaruk, 388 Mich 32 ; 199 NW2d 188 (1972), the Supreme Court held that "the purpose of the notice requirement of § 18[MCLA 257.1118] was to afford the Secretary opportunity to investigate the claim so as to prepare his defense and to determine pos | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Coates v. Continental Motors Corp. green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.