purpose of the notice requirement in Illinois

2010Mulligan Enterprises, Inc., 27 Ill.

2010Mulligan Enterprises, Inc., 27 Ill.

2007Gano, 260 Ill.App.3d at 95 , 197 Ill.Dec. 502 , 631 N.E.2d at 727 .

2007Gano, 260 Ill.

1999A.R., 295 Ill.App.3d at 533 , 230 Ill.Dec. 391 , 693 N.E.2d 869 , citing People v. Montanez, 273 Ill.App.3d 844 , 210 Ill.Dec. 295 , 652 N.E.2d 1271 (1995).

1999A.R., 295 Ill.

1999A.R., 295 Ill.App.3d at 533 , 230 Ill.Dec. 391 , 693 N.E.2d 869 , citing People v. Montanez, 273 Ill.App.3d 844 , 210 Ill.Dec. 295 , 652 N.E.2d 1271 (1995).

1999A.R., 295 Ill.App.3d at 533 , 230 Ill.Dec. 391 , 693 N.E.2d 869 , citing People v. Montanez, 273 Ill.App.3d 844 , 210 Ill.Dec. 295 , 652 N.E.2d 1271 (1995).

1993(INA Insurance Co. v. City of Chicago (1978), 62 Ill.

1985(Barrington Consolidated High School v. American Insurance Co. (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 278 , 319 N.E.2d 25 ; INA Insurance Co. v. City of Chicago (1978), 62 Ill.

1987(Saragusa v. City of Chicago (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 288, 293 , 348 N.E.2d 176, 179-80 .) Although there is a difference between the number of passengers served by the CTA and those served by defendant, such a difference justifies the shorter notice period applicable to the CTA, but not the elimination of the one-year notice requirement applicable to other public carriers.

1987(Saragusa v. City of Chicago (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 288, 293 , 348 N.E.2d 176, 179-80 .) Although there is a difference between the number of passengers served by the CTA and those served by defendant, such a difference justifies the shorter notice period applicable to the CTA, but not the elimination of the one-year notice requirement applicable to other public carriers.

1999The court said: “The time within which notice is required is determined by a standard of reasonableness, based upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. [Citations.] Actual prejudice to the insurer and due diligence of the insured are but factors to be considered in the propriety of the notice and do not conclusively establish the timeliness of the notice. [Citation.] The purpose of the notice requirement is to enable the insurer to make a timely and thorough investigation of the injury claim. [Citations.] The test is whether any reasonably prudent person could foresee a lawsuit u

1993(Nau, 153 Ill. 2d at 416 ; Splett, 143 Ill. 2d at 229 .) In both cases, the court found that the error was not reversible because the respondents received actual notice, which satisfied the purpose of the notice requirement.

1993(Nau, 153 Ill. 2d at 419 ; Splett, 143 Ill. 2d at 232 .) The respondent’s failure to object to a procedural defect “ ‘ “that could and should have been objected to immediately, could have been easily cured if timely objected to, and made no difference anyway” ’ ” waives the issue for review.

1993App. 3d 158, 162 , 453 N.E.2d 36, 39 .) The purpose of the notice requirement is to enable the insurer to make a timely and thorough investigation of the injury claim.

1993(Employers Casualty, 484 S.W.2d at 576 .) Therefore, the purpose of the notice requirement was fulfilled and the insurer was not prejudiced by any lack of notice.

1993(Nau, 153 Ill. 2d at 416 ; Splett, 143 Ill. 2d at 229 .) In both cases, the court found that the error was not reversible because the respondents received actual notice, which satisfied the purpose of the notice requirement.

1993(Nau, 153 Ill. 2d at 419 ; Splett, 143 Ill. 2d at 232 .) The respondent’s failure to object to a procedural defect “ ‘ “that could and should have been objected to immediately, could have been easily cured if timely objected to, and made no difference anyway” ’ ” waives the issue for review.

1988(Rauscher v. Albert (1986), 145 Ill.

1986App.3d 699, 704 , 458 N.E.2d 606, 610 , aff'd (1984), 104 Ill.2d 354 , 472 N.E.2d 421 .) The statute is to be liberally construed with respect to the sufficiency of the elements as set forth in the written notice.

1986App.3d 699, 704 , 458 N.E.2d 606, 610 , aff'd (1984), 104 Ill.2d 354 , 472 N.E.2d 421 .) The statute is to be liberally construed with respect to the sufficiency of the elements as set forth in the written notice.

1986The purpose of the notice requirement is to allow the governmental entity the opportunity to examine the location of the occurrence at an early date so that conditions do not change and evidence does not become stale, to plan its budget in light of prospective liabilities, to settle claims and avoid costly civil litigation, and to correct the alleged defective condition so that future injuries and liabilities may be avoided. ( Rio v. Edward Hospital (1983), 120 Ill.

1986(Rio v. Edward Hospital (1983), 120 Ill.

1985(Barrington Consolidated High School v. American Insurance Co. (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 278 , 319 N.E.2d 25 ; INA Insurance Co. v. City of Chicago (1978), 62 Ill.

1985(Barrington Consolidated High School v. American Insurance Co. (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 278 , 319 N.E.2d 25 ; INA Insurance Co. v. City of Chicago (1978), 62 Ill.

1982We agree with Dean Prosser that ‘[t]here is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according to the accident of a successful levy of execution, the existence of liability insurance, the plaintiffs whim or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes scot free.’ Prosser, Torts sec. 50, at 307 (4th ed. 1971).” The purpose of the notice requirement of the Tort Immunity Act has been succinctly stated in Helle v. Brush (1973)

1982We agree with Dean Prosser that ‘[t]here is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according to the accident of a successful levy of execution, the existence of liability insurance, the plaintiffs whim or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes scot free.’ Prosser, Torts sec. 50, at 307 (4th ed. 1971).” The purpose of the notice requirement of the Tort Immunity Act has been succinctly stated in Helle v. Brush (1973)

1982We agree with Dean Prosser that ‘[t]here is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according to the accident of a successful levy of execution, the existence of liability insurance, the plaintiffs whim or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes scot free.’ Prosser, Torts sec. 50, at 307 (4th ed. 1971).” The purpose of the notice requirement of the Tort Immunity Act has been succinctly stated in Helle v. Brush (1973)

1980(Dunbar v. Reiser (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 230, 237 .) We conclude that the purpose of the notice requirement of section 6(c) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Ill.

1980It must be remembered that the purpose of the notice requirement is not to escape liability but to facilitate prompt investigation.” ( 582 F.2d 1237, 1240 .) The court concluded that the carrier was not provided adequate notice allowing it to initiate an investigation.

1980(Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Industrial Com. (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 137, 143 .) Compliance with the requirement is accomplished by placing the employer in possession of the known facts related to the accident within the statutory period.

1977(Saragusa v. City of Chicago (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 288 , 348 N.E.2d 176 ; King v. Johnson (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 247 , 265 N.E.2d 874 .) The notice requirement of section 8—102 has been held to apply to all tort actions brought against local governments.

1977(Saragusa v. City of Chicago (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 288 , 348 N.E.2d 176 ; King v. Johnson (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 247 , 265 N.E.2d 874 .) The notice requirement of section 8—102 has been held to apply to all tort actions brought against local governments.