purpose of the notice requirement in Texas

2022See id. §§ 2253.027(b), 2253.041; see also Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995) (“The purpose of the notice requirement is to ensure prompt reporting of claims in order to enable governmental units to gather information necessary to guard against unfounded claims, settle claims, and prepare for trial.”).

2019“The purpose of the notice requirement is to ensure prompt reporting of claims in order to enable governmental units to gather information necessary to guard against unfounded claims, settle claims, and prepare for trial.” Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995); see Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Simmons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 347 (Tex. 2004). 12 its agents, adjusters, damage claims coordinators, office of risk management personnel, and City program managers which reflect the City’s efforts to determine its liability for the respective claims.

2010As the Court notes, the purpose of the notice requirement “is to ensure prompt reporting of claims in order to enable governmental units to gather information necessary to guard against unfounded claims, settle claims, and prepare for trial.” Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex.1995) (citing City of Houston v. Torres, 621 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tex.1981)).

2010As the Court notes, the purpose of the notice requirement "is to ensure prompt reporting of claims in order to enable governmental units to gather information necessary to guard against unfounded claims, settle claims, and prepare for trial." Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex.1995) (citing City of Houston v. Torres, 621 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tex.1981)).

2016“The purpose of the notice requirement is to prevent the defendant from being surprised by the introduction of the outcry-hearsay testimony.” Gay v. State, 981 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d); see also Fetterolf v. State, 782 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, pet. ref’d).

2014“The purpose of the notice requirement is to prevent the defendant from being surprised by the introduction of the outcry-hearsay testimony.” Gay v. State, 981 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d). 7 First, to comply with article 38.072 the State on at least fourteen days before trial must provide the defendant with (1) written notice they intend to offer the hearsay statement; (2) provide the defendant “with the name of the witness through whom it intends to offer the statement”; and (3) provide the defendant with a written summary of the statement.

2016Any deficiency in notice is analyzed on how it affected a defendant’s “ability to prepare for the evidence.” Id.; see also Nance v. State, 946 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref’d) (explaining notice requirement avoids unfair surprise and trial by ambush).

2000See Nance v. State, 946 S.W.2d 490, 491-93 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref d) (finding that because the purpose of the notice requirement is to avoid unfair surprise and trial by ambush, given the circumstances, the notice provided was sufficient).

2021See Villarreal, 470 S.W.3d at 176 ; see also Blunt v. State, No. 05-19-00216-CR, 2020 WL 1672552 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 6, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (considering whether State’s notice provided pursuant to article 38.37 was adequate to prevent defendant from being surprised and for him to prepare adequate defense); Pratt, 2005 WL 3527128 , at *3 (“The purpose of the notice requirement[] in article[] . . . 38.37 is to prevent unfair surprise to the defendant and to apprise him of the extraneous offenses . . . the State plans to 41 introduce at trial.”); C

2003Cole v. State, 987 S.W.2d 893, 897 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).

2019App. 2005) (discussing the purpose of the notice requirement under Rule 404(b)); Roethel v. State, 80 S.W.3d 276 , (Tex. App.— Austin 2002, no pet.) (discussing the purpose of the notice requirement under article 37.07).

2016“The purpose of the notice requirement is to enable the defendant to prepare to meet the extraneous offense evidence.” Roethel v. State, 80 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (op. on reh’g).

2016The purpose of the notice requirement is to “discourage litigation and encourage settlements of consumer complaints.” Hines v. Hash, 843 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Tex. 1992).

2016The purpose of the notice requirement is to “discourage litigation and encourage settlements of consumer complaints.” Hines v. Hash, 843 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Tex.1992).

2012Worthy v. State, 312 S.W.3d 34, 38 (Tex. Crim.

2012Worthy v. State , 312 S.W.3d 34, 38 (Tex. Crim.

1984In Barnard v. Mecom, 650 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) the court stated that “Section 17.50A(a) does not require a complaining consumer to threaten suit under the DTPA or specify which section he thinks is violated.” The purpose of the notice requirement is to inform the seller of the consumer’s complaint and thus provide an opportunity for the parties to settle the matter without litigation.

1984In Barnard v. Mecom, 650 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) the court stated that "Section 17.50A(a) does not require a complaining consumer to threaten suit under the DTPA or specify which section he thinks is violated." The purpose of the notice requirement is to inform the seller of the consumer's complaint and thus provide an opportunity for the parties to settle the matter without litigation.

2023See Hernandez, 176 S.W.3d at 823 ; Apolinar v. State, 106 S.W.3d 407, 414 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003), aff’d, 155 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. Crim.

2023See Hernandez, 176 S.W.3d at 825 ; Burgess v. State, No. 02-12-00407-CR, 2014 WL 70090 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 9, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

1993Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Valencia, 679 S.W.2d 29, 36 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1984), affirmed as modified, 690 S.W.2d 239 (Tex.1985).

1991Given that the purpose of the notice requirement is to discourage litigation and encourage settlement of consumer complaints, Jim Walters Homes, Inc. v. Valencia, 690 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex.1985), it follows that there can be no opportunity for either unless a proper written notice is given.

2023See Hernandez, 176 S.W.3d at 823 ; Apolinar v. State, 106 S.W.3d 407, 414 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003), aff’d, 155 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. Crim.

2020See Hernandez, 176 S.W.3d at 825 ; Apolinar v. State, 106 S.W.3d 407, 414 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2003), aff’d, 155 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Owens v. State, 119 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. App.--Tyler 2003, no pet.) (holding that notice provided on the same day as jury selection was sufficient to prevent trial by ambush because notice was provided immediately after the extraneous offense evidence was discovered); Henderson, 29 S.W.3d at 625 (it was not unreasonable for the State to provide notice of its intent to introduce extraneous offense evidence eight days before the witness testified because notice was given as soon as the State learned of the extraneous offense evidence).

2003Henderson v. State, 29 S.W.3d 616, 625 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).

2010See Hering v. Norbanco Austin I, 735 S.W.2d 638 , 641 n.5 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied).

2010See Hering v. Norbanco Austin I, 735 S.W.2d 638 , 641 n.5 (Tex. App.–Austin 1987, writ denied).

2005See Gottlich v. State , 822 S.W.2d 734, 737 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref’d); Brown v. State , 756 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d).

1998Gottlich v. State, 822 S.W.2d 734, 737 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1992, pet. refd).

2003Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995); see also Texana Cmty. MHMR Ctr. v. Silvas, 62 S.W.3d 317, 324-25 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).

2003Cathey v. Booth , 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995); see also Texana Cmty. MHMR Ctr. v. Silvas 62 S.W.3d 317, 324-25 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).

1993Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Valencia, 679 S.W.2d 29, 36 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1984), affirmed as modified, 690 S.W.2d 239 (Tex.1985).

1985See Barnard v. Mecom, 650 S.W.2d 123 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd. n.r.e.); See also Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Valencia, 679 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1984, aff'd.) 690 S.W.2d 239 (Tex.1985).

2008Wallace v. State , 135 S.W.3d 114, 120 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, no pet.); Burling , 83 S.W.3d at 203 ; Nance v. State , 946 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref’d).

2008Wallace v. State, 135 S.W.3d 114, 120 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, no pet.); Burling, 83 S.W.3d at 203 ; Nance v. State, 946 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref’d).

2021See Villarreal, 470 S.W.3d at 176 ; see also Blunt v. State, No. 05-19-00216-CR, 2020 WL 1672552 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 6, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (considering whether State’s notice provided pursuant to article 38.37 was adequate to prevent defendant from being surprised and for him to prepare adequate defense); Pratt, 2005 WL 3527128 , at *3 (“The purpose of the notice requirement[] in article[] . . . 38.37 is to prevent unfair surprise to the defendant and to apprise him of the extraneous offenses . . . the State plans to 41 introduce at trial.”); C

2012Hayden v. State, 66 S.W.3d 269, 272 (Tex. Crim.

2019“The purpose of the notice requirement is to ensure prompt reporting of claims in order to enable governmental units to gather information necessary to guard against unfounded claims, settle claims, and prepare for trial.” Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995); see Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Simmons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 347 (Tex. 2004). 12 its agents, adjusters, damage claims coordinators, office of risk management personnel, and City program managers which reflect the City’s efforts to determine its liability for the respective claims.

2013“The purpose of the notice requirement is to ensure prompt reporting of claims in order to enable governmental units to gather information necessary to guard against unfounded claims, settle claims, and prepare for trial.” Texas Department of Criminal Justice v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 344 (Tex.2004), quoting Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 340-41 (Tex.1995) (per curiam); see also City of Dallas v. Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d 537, 538 (Tex.2010).

2014“The purpose of the notice requirement is to ensure the prompt reporting of claims in order to enable governmental units to gather information necessary to guard against unfounded claims, settle claims, and prepare for trial.” Cathy v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995) (citation omitted); see Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d at 539 .

2014“But that is not the purpose of the notice requirement; all that is required is enough information for [the school] to investigate for the purpose of guarding against unfounded claims, settle claims, and prepare for trial.” City of Wichita Falls v. Jenkins, 307 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied); see Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d at 539 ; Booth, 900 S.W.2d at 341 .

2016“The purpose of the notice requirement is to prevent the defendant from being surprised by the introduction of the outcry-hearsay testimony.” Gay v. State, 981 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d); see also Fetterolf v. State, 782 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, pet. ref’d).

1995Gottlich v. State, 822 S.W.2d 734, 737 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref'd); Fetterolf v. State, 782 S.W.2d 927, 931 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, pet. ref'd); Brown v. State, 756 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd).

2019The court concluded that such is “not the purpose of the notice requirement,” rather, “all that is required is enough information for the City to investigate for the purpose of guarding against unfounded claims, settle claims, and prepare for trial.” And, the letter offered “enough information to allow the City to effect this purpose.” Id. (citing Richardson v. Allen, No. 05–96–00018–CV, 1997 WL 242812 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 13, 1997, no pet.) (not designated for 15 publication) (holding that “there is no requirement that a claimant describe in full medical detail the nature and extent

2014“But that is not the purpose of the notice requirement; all that is required is enough information for [the school] to investigate for the purpose of guarding against unfounded claims, settle claims, and prepare for trial.” City of Wichita Falls v. Jenkins, 307 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied); see Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d at 539 ; Booth, 900 S.W.2d at 341 .

2006See Kimball, 969 S.W.2d at 525 .

2004In re Kimball Hill, 969 S.W.2d at 525 .

2022Martin v. Martin, Martin, & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. 1998).

2015Id.