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21 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Maynardgreen2 sentences2015See also Maynard, 359 Md. at 389-90 , 754 A.2d at 385 (quoting Barkens v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 293 Md. 620, 626 , 446 A.2d 1136, 1138-39 (1982)) (explaining that the purpose of the notice requirement of the predecessor to the LGTCA was “to protect the municipalities and counties of the State from meretricious claimants and exaggerated claims by providing a mechanism whereby the municipality or county would be apprised of its possible liability at a time when it could conduct its own investigation”). 2015See also Maynard, 359 Md. at 389-90 , 754 A.2d at 385 (quoting Barkens v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 293 Md. 620, 626 , 446 A.2d 1136, 1138-39 (1982)) (explaining that the purpose of the notice requirement of the predecessor to the LGTCA was “to protect the municipalities and counties of the State from meretricious claimants and exaggerated claims by providing a mechanism whereby the municipality or county would be apprised of its possible liability at a time when it could conduct its own investigation”). | 4 | 5 |
Bartens v. Mayor of Baltimoregreen2 sentences2015See also Maynard, 359 Md. at 389-90 , 754 A.2d at 385 (quoting Barkens v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 293 Md. 620, 626 , 446 A.2d 1136, 1138-39 (1982)) (explaining that the purpose of the notice requirement of the predecessor to the LGTCA was “to protect the municipalities and counties of the State from meretricious claimants and exaggerated claims by providing a mechanism whereby the municipality or county would be apprised of its possible liability at a time when it could conduct its own investigation”). 2015See also Maynard, 359 Md. at 389-90 , 754 A.2d at 385 (quoting Barkens v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 293 Md. 620, 626 , 446 A.2d 1136, 1138-39 (1982)) (explaining that the purpose of the notice requirement of the predecessor to the LGTCA was “to protect the municipalities and counties of the State from meretricious claimants and exaggerated claims by providing a mechanism whereby the municipality or county would be apprised of its possible liability at a time when it could conduct its own investigation”). | 3 | 4 |
Forrester v. Wardengreen2 sentences2009The Court of Appeals has stated that the purpose of the notice requirement is “to have the claimant furnish the municipal body with sufficient information to permit it to make an investigation in due time, sufficient to ascertain the character and extent of the injury and its responsibility in connection with it.” Jackson v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 233 Md. 164, 167 , 195 A.2d 693 (1963). 2002In support, he directs our attention to a sentence in Jackson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 233 Md. 164, 168 , 195 A.2d 693, 695 (1963): "If the purpose of the statute is fulfilled, the manner of the accomplishment of the fulfillment has not generally been tested too technically." Petitioner underscores that the purpose of the notice requirement is to give the municipality notice sufficient to allow it ample time to conduct its own investigation. | 2 | 3 |
Jackson v. Board of County Commissionersgreen2 sentences2009The Court of Appeals has stated that the purpose of the notice requirement is “to have the claimant furnish the municipal body with sufficient information to permit it to make an investigation in due time, sufficient to ascertain the character and extent of the injury and its responsibility in connection with it.” Jackson v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 233 Md. 164, 167 , 195 A.2d 693 (1963). 2002In support, he directs our attention to a sentence in Jackson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 233 Md. 164, 168 , 195 A.2d 693, 695 (1963): "If the purpose of the statute is fulfilled, the manner of the accomplishment of the fulfillment has not generally been tested too technically." Petitioner underscores that the purpose of the notice requirement is to give the municipality notice sufficient to allow it ample time to conduct its own investigation. | 1 | 3 |
Faulk v. Ewinggreen2 sentences2013To fulfill that purpose, the notice must set forth the “ ‘facts and circumstances giving rise to the claim.’ ” Faulk v. Ewing, 371 Md. 284, 299 , 808 A.2d 1262 (2002) (quoting Condon v. Univ. of Maryland, 332 Md. 481, 496 , 632 A.2d 753 (1993)). 2013To fulfill that purpose, the notice must set forth the “ ‘facts and circumstances giving rise to the claim.’ ” Faulk v. Ewing, 371 Md. 284, 299 , 808 A.2d 1262 (2002) (quoting Condon v. Univ. of Maryland, 332 Md. 481, 496 , 632 A.2d 753 (1993)). | 1 | 2 |
Housing Authority v. Woodlandgreen1 sentence2016Woodland, 438 Md. at 428 (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Prince George's County v. Longtingreen2 sentences2015As we have previously stated, the purpose of the notice requirement is “to apprise a local government of its possible liability at a time when it could conduct its own investigation, i.e., while the evidence was still fresh and the recollection of the witnesses was undiminished by time, sufficient to ascertain the character and extent of the injury and *643 its responsibility in connection with it.” Longtin, 419 Md. at 466 , 19 A.3d at 869 (citation omitted). 2015As we have previously stated, the purpose of the notice requirement is “to apprise a local government of its possible liability at a time when it could conduct its own investigation, i.e., while the evidence was still fresh and the recollection of the witnesses was undiminished by time, sufficient to ascertain the character and extent of the injury and *643 its responsibility in connection with it.” Longtin, 419 Md. at 466 , 19 A.3d at 869 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Connecticut Sport Enterprises, Inc. v. Verrilligreen2 sentences2012See also Connecticut Sport Enterprises, Inc. v. Verrilli, 30 Conn.Supp. 365 , 317 A.2d 463, 466 (1974) (Obtaining signatures on a petition for referendum more than six months prior to the filing of the petition created an impermissible “possibility of staleness’'). 16 . 2012See also Connecticut Sport Enterprises, Inc. v. Verrilli, 30 Conn.Supp. 365 , 317 A.2d 463, 466 (1974) (Obtaining signatures on a petition for referendum more than six months prior to the filing of the petition created an impermissible “possibility of staleness’'). 16 . | 1 | 1 |
Keith Yazzie Mann v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2005We “are not free to enlarge that consent to be sued which the Government, through [the General Assembly] has undertaken to carefully limit.” Mann v. United States, 399 F.2d 672, 673 (9th Cir.1968). | 1 | 1 |
Dickerson Lumber Co. v. Hersongreen2 sentences1989Cf. Dickerson Lumber Co. v. Herson, 230 Md. 487, 491 , 187 A.2d 689 (1963) (“The Mechanics’ Lien Law seeks to protect materialmen who are not in a position to protect themselves if the owner negligently pays the contractor without first ascertaining that the materialmen have been paid”) (emphasis supplied; citations omitted). 1989Cf. Dickerson Lumber Co. v. Herson, 230 Md. 487, 491 , 187 A.2d 689 (1963) (“The Mechanics’ Lien Law seeks to protect materialmen who are not in a position to protect themselves if the owner negligently pays the contractor without first ascertaining that the materialmen have been paid”) (emphasis supplied; citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Huddleston Concrete Co. v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Americagreen2 sentences1989As the Court explained in Huddleston Concrete Co., “The purpose of the notice requirement is to protect the [general] contractor, so that he may with impunity pay subcontractors if no notice of claims by materialmen and suppliers has been filed.” Huddleston Concrete Co., supra, 186 Ga.App. at 533 , 368 S.E.2d 117 . 1989As the Court explained in Huddleston Concrete Co., “The purpose of the notice requirement is to protect the [general] contractor, so that he may with impunity pay subcontractors if no notice of claims by materialmen and suppliers has been filed.” Huddleston Concrete Co., supra, 186 Ga.App. at 533 , 368 S.E.2d 117 . | 1 | 1 |
cluster 276844green1 sentence1976Wagner Tractor, Inc. v. Shields, 381 F. 2d 441, 445 (9th Cir. 1967). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Loewinger v. Prince George's Countygreen2 sentences2002See Williams v. Maynard, 359 Md. at 390 , 754 A.2d at 385 ; Grubbs v. Prince George’s County, 267 Md. 318, 325 , 297 A.2d 754, 758 , (1972); Jackson v. Board of County Commissioners, 233 Md. at 167-68 , 195 A.2d at 695 ; But see Loewinger v. Prince George’s County, 266 Md. 316 , 292 A.2d 67 (1972). 13 The LGTCA includes an exception to the notice requirement also. 2002See Williams v. Maynard, 359 Md. at 390 , 754 A.2d at 385 ; Grubbs v. Prince George’s County, 267 Md. 318, 325 , 297 A.2d 754, 758 , (1972); Jackson v. Board of County Commissioners, 233 Md. at 167-68 , 195 A.2d at 695 ; But see Loewinger v. Prince George’s County, 266 Md. 316 , 292 A.2d 67 (1972). 13 The LGTCA includes an exception to the notice requirement also. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Moore v. Norouzi
green
2 sentences2013A notice, may, if it substantial ly complies with the notice requirement, “satisfy the statute where the purpose of the notice requirement is fulfilled.” Moore v. Norouzi, 371 Md. 154, 168 , 807 A.2d 632 (2002). 2013A notice, may, if it substantial ly complies with the notice requirement, “satisfy the statute where the purpose of the notice requirement is fulfilled.” Moore v. Norouzi, 371 Md. 154, 168 , 807 A.2d 632 (2002). | 4 | 2002–2014 |
Carter v. State
green
2 sentences2022We noted that the “failure to provide notice impacts substantive rights and undermines completely the purpose of the notice requirement[,]” but “when there is a procedural defect with the notice, such as untimely notice or other defects, the enhancement is subject to harmless error analysis.” Id. at 701 . 2019Id. at 621 , 574 A.2d 305 . | 2 | 2019–2022 |
Condon v. State
green
2 sentences2013To fulfill that purpose, the notice must set forth the “ ‘facts and circumstances giving rise to the claim.’ ” Faulk v. Ewing, 371 Md. 284, 299 , 808 A.2d 1262 (2002) (quoting Condon v. Univ. of Maryland, 332 Md. 481, 496 , 632 A.2d 753 (1993)). 2013To fulfill that purpose, the notice must set forth the “ ‘facts and circumstances giving rise to the claim.’ ” Faulk v. Ewing, 371 Md. 284, 299 , 808 A.2d 1262 (2002) (quoting Condon v. Univ. of Maryland, 332 Md. 481, 496 , 632 A.2d 753 (1993)). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Rios v. Montgomery County
green
2 sentences2007See Faulk v. Ewing, 371 Md. 284, 298-99 , 808 A.2d 1262, 1272 (2002); Rios v. Montgomery County, supra, 386 Md. at 126-27 , 872 A.2d at 14 . 2007See Faulk v. Ewing, 371 Md. 284, 298-99 , 808 A.2d 1262, 1272 (2002); Rios v. Montgomery County, supra, 386 Md. at 126-27 , 872 A.2d at 14 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Grandison v. State
green
2 sentences2005The State urges us to rely on Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175 , 670 A.2d 398 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1027 , 117 S.Ct. 581 , 136 L.Ed.2d 512 (1996), to find that the purpose of the notice requirement in this case has been met, and that, therefore, the enhanced sentence may be imposed. 2005The State urges us to rely on Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175 , 670 A.2d 398 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1027 , 117 S.Ct. 581 , 136 L.Ed.2d 512 (1996), to find that the purpose of the notice requirement in this case has been met, and that, therefore, the enhanced sentence may be imposed. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Green v. Phoenix Institute for Research & Education, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2005The State urges us to rely on Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175 , 670 A.2d 398 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1027 , 117 S.Ct. 581 , 136 L.Ed.2d 512 (1996), to find that the purpose of the notice requirement in this case has been met, and that, therefore, the enhanced sentence may be imposed. 2005The State urges us to rely on Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175 , 670 A.2d 398 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1027 , 117 S.Ct. 581 , 136 L.Ed.2d 512 (1996), to find that the purpose of the notice requirement in this case has been met, and that, therefore, the enhanced sentence may be imposed. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J. M. Martinac & Co.
green
2 sentences2005The State urges us to rely on Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175 , 670 A.2d 398 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1027 , 117 S.Ct. 581 , 136 L.Ed.2d 512 (1996), to find that the purpose of the notice requirement in this case has been met, and that, therefore, the enhanced sentence may be imposed. 2005The State urges us to rely on Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175 , 670 A.2d 398 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1027 , 117 S.Ct. 581 , 136 L.Ed.2d 512 (1996), to find that the purpose of the notice requirement in this case has been met, and that, therefore, the enhanced sentence may be imposed. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Grandison v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2005The State urges us to rely on Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175 , 670 A.2d 398 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1027 , 117 S.Ct. 581 , 136 L.Ed.2d 512 (1996), to find that the purpose of the notice requirement in this case has been met, and that, therefore, the enhanced sentence may be imposed. 2005The State urges us to rely on Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175 , 670 A.2d 398 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1027 , 117 S.Ct. 581 , 136 L.Ed.2d 512 (1996), to find that the purpose of the notice requirement in this case has been met, and that, therefore, the enhanced sentence may be imposed. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Grubbs v. Prince George's County
green
2 sentences2002See Williams v. Maynard, 359 Md. at 390 , 754 A.2d at 385 ; Grubbs v. Prince George’s County, 267 Md. 318, 325 , 297 A.2d 754, 758 , (1972); Jackson v. Board of County Commissioners, 233 Md. at 167-68 , 195 A.2d at 695 ; But see Loewinger v. Prince George’s County, 266 Md. 316 , 292 A.2d 67 (1972). 13 The LGTCA includes an exception to the notice requirement also. 2002See Williams v. Maynard, 359 Md. at 390 , 754 A.2d at 385 ; Grubbs v. Prince George’s County, 267 Md. 318, 325 , 297 A.2d 754, 758 , (1972); Jackson v. Board of County Commissioners, 233 Md. at 167-68 , 195 A.2d at 695 ; But see Loewinger v. Prince George’s County, 266 Md. 316 , 292 A.2d 67 (1972). 13 The LGTCA includes an exception to the notice requirement also. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Rushton v. Shea
green
1 sentence1994In an oft-quoted passage from Rushton v. Shea, 423 F.Supp. 468 (D.Del.1976), the Court analyzed the purpose of the notice requirement: The purpose of requiring notice is threefold. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Reed v. Mayor of Baltimore
green
2 sentences1993In Reed v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 323 Md. 175, 184 , 592 A.2d 173 (1991), the Court of Appeals stated that the purpose of the notice requirement is to “apprise the officer of the charges warranting disciplinary action in sufficient detail to enable the officer to marshal evidence and arguments in defense of the assertions.” In the instant case both appellants were served with a departmental charging document and departmental findings of fact, the first paragraph of which states: During the course of your employment with the Howard County Sheriffs Department, you have engaged in a 1993In Reed v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 323 Md. 175, 184 , 592 A.2d 173 (1991), the Court of Appeals stated that the purpose of the notice requirement is to “apprise the officer of the charges warranting disciplinary action in sufficient detail to enable the officer to marshal evidence and arguments in defense of the assertions.” In the instant case both appellants were served with a departmental charging document and departmental findings of fact, the first paragraph of which states: During the course of your employment with the Howard County Sheriffs Department, you have engaged in a | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Indiana Department of Public Welfare v. Clark
green
1 sentence1992In Clark , the Indiana Court of Appeals held that substantial compliance with the notice provisions of the Indiana Tort Claims Act would be sufficient: “Substantial compliance requires that the purpose of the notice requirement be served and that the claimant comply with his affirmative duty of delivering some writing to the agency. *245 The purpose of the [notice] requirement is to inform the state agency of the circumstances surrounding the incident so that it can investigate, determine its possible liability and prepare a defense to the claim.” Clark, 478 N.E.2d at 702-703 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Frericks v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence1977Judge Eldridge for the Court, aptly responded with the observation that “[i]n a case involving a personal injury to a non-buyer, the requirement [of § 2-607] would seem to serve no purpose, as it would be impossible to correct the defect or minimize damages after the injury has already occurred.” Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. at 313 . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.