purpose of the notice requirement in New York

2020The purpose of the notice requirement is to give a defendant an opportunity, prior to trial, to investigate the circumstances of the evidence procured by the state and prepare the defense accordingly, as well as to permit an orderly pretrial resolution of the admissibility of such evidence, thereby preventing the subsequent interruption of trial ( see People v Pacquette , 25 NY3d 575, 579 ; People v Briggs , 38 NY2d 319, 322-323 ).

2018"The purpose of the notice requirement is twofold: it provides the defense [*2]with an opportunity, prior to trial, to investigate the circumstances of the [evidence procured by the state] and prepare the defense accordingly' and permits an orderly hearing and determination of the issue of the fact . . . thereby preventing the interruption of trial to challenge initially the admission into evidence of the [identification]' " ( Pacquette , 25 NY3d at 579 , quoting People v Briggs , 38 NY2d 319, 323 [1975]).

2024"The obvious purpose of the statute is to afford a defendant adequate time in preparing his case in respect to the voluntariness of a [statement]" ( People v Greer , 42 NY2d 170, 178 [1977]; People v Briggs , 38 NY2d 319, 323 [1975]).

2024"The obvious purpose of the statute is to afford a defendant adequate time in preparing his case in respect to the voluntariness of a [statement]" ( People v Greer , 42 NY2d 170, 178 [1977]; People v Briggs , 38 NY2d 319, 323 [1975]).

2013Thus, the purpose of the notice requirement is to “ensure counsel’s opportunity to frame intelligent suggestions for the fairest and least prejudicial response ... to the jury” (Kisoon, 8 NY3d at 134 ; see O’Rama, 78 NY2d at 277-278 ).

2013Thus, the purpose of the notice requirement is to “ensure counsel’s opportunity to frame intelligent suggestions for the fairest and least prejudicial response ... to the jury” (Kisoon, 8 NY3d at 134 ; see O’Rama, 78 NY2d at 277-278 ).

2013Where a jury note “contain[s] a substantive inquiry, the [trial court]’s failure to provide counsel an opportunity to participate meaningfully in formulating its response [constitutes] a mode of proceedings error that requires reversal,” even in the absence of preservation (People v Stocks, 101 AD3d 1049, 1051 [2012]; see People v Tabb, 13 NY3d 852, 852 [2009]).

2013Where a jury note “contain[s] a substantive inquiry, the [trial court]’s failure to provide counsel an opportunity to participate meaningfully in formulating its response [constitutes] a mode of proceedings error that requires reversal,” even in the absence of preservation (People v Stocks, 101 AD3d 1049, 1051 [2012]; see People v Tabb, 13 NY3d 852, 852 [2009]).

1992The purpose of the notice requirement is to protect a defendant by providing a pretrial ruling at a Wade hearing on the admissibility of identification evidence (People v Laing, 79 NY2d 166, 170 [1992]; People v O’Doherty, 70 NY2d 479, 488 [1987]).

1988If, as the Baris and O’Doherty courts reasoned, the purpose behind the 15-day notice requirement was to require "the defendant to make substantially all pretrial motions at one time, on one set of papers before one Judge, within 45 days after arraignment” (People v O’Doherty, supra, at 488), a holding that the arraignment referred to in the statute was a defendant’s initial arraignment before a local criminal court would defeat the purpose of the notice requirement since, where, as here, the defendants are charged with crimes requiring prosecution by indictment, any suppression motions must be

2013Where a jury note “contain[s] a substantive inquiry, the [trial court]’s failure to provide counsel an opportunity to participate meaningfully in formulating its response [constitutes] a mode of proceedings error that requires reversal,” even in the absence of preservation (People v Stocks, 101 AD3d 1049, 1051 [2012]; see People v Tabb, 13 NY3d 852, 852 [2009]).

2013Where a jury note “contain[s] a substantive inquiry, the [trial court]’s failure to provide counsel an opportunity to participate meaningfully in formulating its response [constitutes] a mode of proceedings error that requires reversal,” even in the absence of preservation (People v Stocks, 101 AD3d 1049, 1051 [2012]; see People v Tabb, 13 NY3d 852, 852 [2009]).

2018"Thus, the statute contemplates pretrial resolution of the admissibility of identification testimony where it is alleged that an improper procedure occurred' " ( id. , quoting People v Rodriguez , 79 NY2d 445, 452 [1992]).

2015Thus, the statute contemplates “pretrial resolution of the admissibility of identification testimony where it is alleged that an improper procedure occurred” (People v Rodriguez, 79 NY2d 445, 452 [1992]).

2015The purpose of the notice requirement is to “fairly apprise]] ] the public of the fundamental character of the proposed zoning change” in a manner that “describes the proposed change with reasonable precision” and does “not mislead interested parties into foregoing attendance at the public hearing” (Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d 668, 678 [1996]; accord Interlaken Homeowners’ Assn. v City of Saratoga Springs, 267 AD2d 842, 845-846 [1999]; see Town Law § 264 [1]).

2015The purpose of the notice requirement is to “fairly apprise]] ] the public of the fundamental character of the proposed zoning change” in a manner that “describes the proposed change with reasonable precision” and does “not mislead interested parties into foregoing attendance at the public hearing” (Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d 668, 678 [1996]; accord Interlaken Homeowners’ Assn. v City of Saratoga Springs, 267 AD2d 842, 845-846 [1999]; see Town Law § 264 [1]).

2015The purpose of the notice requirement is to “fairly apprise]] ] the public of the fundamental character of the proposed zoning change” in a manner that “describes the proposed change with reasonable precision” and does “not mislead interested parties into foregoing attendance at the public hearing” (Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d 668, 678 [1996]; accord Interlaken Homeowners’ Assn. v City of Saratoga Springs, 267 AD2d 842, 845-846 [1999]; see Town Law § 264 [1]).

2015The purpose of the notice requirement is to “fairly apprise]] ] the public of the fundamental character of the proposed zoning change” in a manner that “describes the proposed change with reasonable precision” and does “not mislead interested parties into foregoing attendance at the public hearing” (Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d 668, 678 [1996]; accord Interlaken Homeowners’ Assn. v City of Saratoga Springs, 267 AD2d 842, 845-846 [1999]; see Town Law § 264 [1]).

2004Trust Co. v Williams, 133 Misc 2d 746, 753 [Civ Ct, NY County 1986], affd, 142 Misc 2d 4 [App Term, 1st Dept 1988], quoting First Bank & Trust Co. of Ithaca v Mitchell, 123 Misc 2d 386, 393 [Sup Ct, Tompkins County 1984].) “The notification must be reasonable as to the manner in which it is sent, its timeliness (i.e., a reasonable time before the disposition is to take place), and its content.” (UCC 9-611, Comment 2.) The notification must be “authenticated,” as that term is defined (see UCC 9-102 [a] [7]), a requirement not in issue here. “[W]hether a notification is sent within a reasonable

1986The purpose of the notice requirement is "to give the debtor an opportunity to protect his interest in the collateral by exercising any right of redemption or by bidding at the sale, to challenge any aspect of the disposition before it is made, or to interest potential purchasers in the sale, all to the end that the merchandise not be sacrificed by sale at less than the true value” (First Bank & Trust Co. v Mitchell, 123 Misc 2d 386, 393 ).

2014The purpose of the notice requirement is to protect the People from unfair surprise and to afford them “a sufficient opportunity to respond to the defendant’s suppression claims” (People v Mezon, 80 NY2d 155, 160 [1992]), and while a court may not “abrogate the written notice requirement of CPL 710.60 (1)” (id. at 159; e.g.

2014People v Deluca, 204 AD2d 655, 655-656 [1994] [the court “was without authority to entertain the oral suppression motion made by the defendant in violation of CPL 710.60 (1)”]), the Mezon Court deemed applicable to the statute “the general principle that the parties to a litigation may adopt their own rules by the simple expedient of failing to object” ( 80 NY2d at 160 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2014People v Deluca, 204 AD2d 655, 655-656 [1994] [the court “was without authority to entertain the oral suppression motion made by the defendant in violation of CPL 710.60 (1)”]), the Mezon Court deemed applicable to the statute “the general principle that the parties to a litigation may adopt their own rules by the simple expedient of failing to object” ( 80 NY2d at 160 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2010Further, as the purpose of the notice requirement is to enable defendant to challenge the voluntariness of his statements before trial (see People v Borthwick, 51 AD3d 1211, 1215 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 734 [2008]), defendant waived his objection to the adequacy of the notice by making his suppression motion (see People v Trimmer, 30 AD3d 820, 822 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 818 [2006]; People v Merrill, 226 AD2d 1045, 1045 [1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 1022 [1996]).

2010Further, as the purpose of the notice requirement is to enable defendant to challenge the voluntariness of his statements before trial (see People v Borthwick, 51 AD3d 1211, 1215 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 734 [2008]), defendant waived his objection to the adequacy of the notice by making his suppression motion (see People v Trimmer, 30 AD3d 820, 822 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 818 [2006]; People v Merrill, 226 AD2d 1045, 1045 [1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 1022 [1996]).

2010Further, as the purpose of the notice requirement is to enable defendant to challenge the voluntariness of his statements before trial (see People v Borthwick, 51 AD3d 1211, 1215 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 734 [2008]), defendant waived his objection to the adequacy of the notice by making his suppression motion (see People v Trimmer, 30 AD3d 820, 822 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 818 [2006]; People v Merrill, 226 AD2d 1045, 1045 [1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 1022 [1996]).

2004Trust Co. v Williams, 133 Misc 2d 746, 753 [Civ Ct, NY County 1986], affd, 142 Misc 2d 4 [App Term, 1st Dept 1988], quoting First Bank & Trust Co. of Ithaca v Mitchell, 123 Misc 2d 386, 393 [Sup Ct, Tompkins County 1984].) “The notification must be reasonable as to the manner in which it is sent, its timeliness (i.e., a reasonable time before the disposition is to take place), and its content.” (UCC 9-611, Comment 2.) The notification must be “authenticated,” as that term is defined (see UCC 9-102 [a] [7]), a requirement not in issue here. “[W]hether a notification is sent within a reasonable

1993This calculated conduct precluded a finding that there was a reasonable excuse for the delay and defeated the purpose of the notice requirement, i.e., providing the municipality "with an adequate opportunity to timely and effectively investigate the circumstances surrounding” the incident (Braverman v City of White Plains, 115 AD2d 689, 691 ; see also, Matter of Perry v City of New York, 133 AD2d 692 ).