duty-to-preserve test in California

1989To meet this standard of constitutional materiality [citation], evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." (467 U.S. at pp. 488-489 [ 81 L.Ed.2d at p. 422 ], fn. omitted.) Although we have acknowledged that the Trombetta formulation of the duty-to-preserve test differs substantially from our Hitch standard ( supra, 12 Cal.3d 641 ), we have never squarely decided whether Hitch has "survived" Trombetta .

1989To meet this standard of constitutional materiality [citation], evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” (467 U.S. at pp. 488-489 [ 81 L.Ed.2d at p. 422 ], fn. omitted.) Although we have acknowledged that the Trombetta formulation of the duty-to-preserve test differs substantially from our Hitch standard (supra, 12 Cal.3d 641 ), we have never squarely decided whether Hitch has “survived” Trombetta .

1989(See In re Michael L. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 81, 86 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 140 , 702 P.2d 222 ].) The Court of Appeal, however, was forced to decide this question in People v. Trombetta (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1093 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 637 ] where upon remand of the case from the United States Supreme Court, it held that California v. Trombetta supersedes Hitch .

1989(See In re Michael L. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 81, 86 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 140 , 702 P.2d 222 ].) The Court of Appeal, however, was forced to decide this question in People v. Trombetta (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1093 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 637 ] where upon remand of the case from the United States Supreme Court, it held that California v. Trombetta supersedes Hitch .

1989To meet this standard of constitutional materiality [citation], evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." (467 U.S. at pp. 488-489 [ 81 L.Ed.2d at p. 422 ], fn. omitted.) Although we have acknowledged that the Trombetta formulation of the duty-to-preserve test differs substantially from our Hitch standard ( supra, 12 Cal.3d 641 ), we have never squarely decided whether Hitch has "survived" Trombetta .

1989To meet this standard of constitutional materiality [citation], evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” (467 U.S. at pp. 488-489 [ 81 L.Ed.2d at p. 422 ], fn. omitted.) Although we have acknowledged that the Trombetta formulation of the duty-to-preserve test differs substantially from our Hitch standard (supra, 12 Cal.3d 641 ), we have never squarely decided whether Hitch has “survived” Trombetta .

1986The California Supreme Court has stated “[i]t is apparent that the Trombetta formulation of the duty-to-preserve test differs substantially from our own Hitch standard.” (In re Michael L. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 81, 86 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 140 , 702 P.2d 222 ].) In People v. Tierce (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 256 , at pages 262-263 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 325 ], this court concluded that the truth-in-evidence provision (Cal. Const., art.

1986The California Supreme Court has stated “[i]t is apparent that the Trombetta formulation of the duty-to-preserve test differs substantially from our own Hitch standard.” (In re Michael L. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 81, 86 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 140 , 702 P.2d 222 ].) In People v. Tierce (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 256 , at pages 262-263 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 325 ], this court concluded that the truth-in-evidence provision (Cal. Const., art.