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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chavez v. Indymac Mortgage Servicesgreen1 sentence2023(See ibid. [“the trial court’s failure to adopt grounds for summary judgment or summary adjudication urged by the respondent does not constitute an error from an appellant’s point of view,” and the “appellant therefore need not address them in its opening brief”].) 19 contract or where unjust enrichment would result if a party who has received the benefits of the other’s performance were allowed to invoke the statute.”’” (Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 935, 944 ; accord, Day v. Greene (1963) 59 Cal.2d 404, 410 ; see Tukes v. Richard (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1 , 25 [“‘[t]he doctrine | 1 | 1 |
Tukes v. Richardgreen1 sentence2023(See ibid. [“the trial court’s failure to adopt grounds for summary judgment or summary adjudication urged by the respondent does not constitute an error from an appellant’s point of view,” and the “appellant therefore need not address them in its opening brief”].) 19 contract or where unjust enrichment would result if a party who has received the benefits of the other’s performance were allowed to invoke the statute.”’” (Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 935, 944 ; accord, Day v. Greene (1963) 59 Cal.2d 404, 410 ; see Tukes v. Richard (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1 , 25 [“‘[t]he doctrine | 1 | 1 |
Byrne v. Lauragreen1 sentence2023(See ibid. [“the trial court’s failure to adopt grounds for summary judgment or summary adjudication urged by the respondent does not constitute an error from an appellant’s point of view,” and the “appellant therefore need not address them in its opening brief”].) 19 contract or where unjust enrichment would result if a party who has received the benefits of the other’s performance were allowed to invoke the statute.”’” (Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 935, 944 ; accord, Day v. Greene (1963) 59 Cal.2d 404, 410 ; see Tukes v. Richard (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1 , 25 [“‘[t]he doctrine | 1 | 1 |
Day v. Greenegreen1 sentence2023(See ibid. [“the trial court’s failure to adopt grounds for summary judgment or summary adjudication urged by the respondent does not constitute an error from an appellant’s point of view,” and the “appellant therefore need not address them in its opening brief”].) 19 contract or where unjust enrichment would result if a party who has received the benefits of the other’s performance were allowed to invoke the statute.”’” (Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 935, 944 ; accord, Day v. Greene (1963) 59 Cal.2d 404, 410 ; see Tukes v. Richard (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1 , 25 [“‘[t]he doctrine | 1 | 1 |
Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Ass'ngreen1 sentence2013Under Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18 (Tenzer), “[t]he doctrine of estoppel to plead the statute of frauds may be applied where necessary to prevent either unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment.” (Id. at p. 27; see also Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Assn. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1169, 1183 (Riverisland).) HDN argues that, even if Veta’s claims based on the alleged oral promises are not barred by the statute of frauds, those claims are barred under the parol evidence rule. | 1 | 1 |
Carruth v. Fritchgreen2 sentences1997Estoppel Barr and Wills alternatively argue summary judgment was imprudently granted because there remain triable issues of fact as to whether AC&S and Kaiser were estopped to assert the statute of limitations as a bar to the second suits. 12 The doctrine of estoppel to plead the statute of limitations as a defense may be properly invoked where a defendant by his or her conduct induces a plaintiff to forbear from pursuit of a timely claim. (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Actions, § 685, pp. 872-873.) In a general sense the defense of estoppel has been described as follows: “ ‘One cannot just 1997Estoppel Barr and Wills alternatively argue summary judgment was imprudently granted because there remain triable issues of fact as to whether AC&S and Kaiser were estopped to assert the statute of limitations as a bar to the second suits. 12 The doctrine of estoppel to plead the statute of limitations as a defense may be properly invoked where a defendant by his or her conduct induces a plaintiff to forbear from pursuit of a timely claim. (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Actions, § 685, pp. 872-873.) In a general sense the defense of estoppel has been described as follows: “ ‘One cannot just | 1 | 1 |
Monarco v. Lo Grecogreen2 sentences1985(M onarco v. Lo Greco (1950) 35 Cal.2d 621, 623-624 [ 220 P.2d 737 ].) On the basis of the factual contentions advanced in Tenzer’s papers, Superscope has received the benefit of Tenzer’s performance but relies upon the statute of frauds to avoid paying the agreed-upon price. 1985(M onarco v. Lo Greco (1950) 35 Cal.2d 621, 623-624 [ 220 P.2d 737 ].) On the basis of the factual contentions advanced in Tenzer’s papers, Superscope has received the benefit of Tenzer’s performance but relies upon the statute of frauds to avoid paying the agreed-upon price. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022Recognizing this, Tukes asserted in her petition that the Bennett Trustee “is estopped from asserting the statute of frauds due to the unconscionable injury [Tukes] will suffer or the unjust enrichment that the Trustee will retain if [she] is not paid a finder’s fee.” Tenzer indeed recognizes that “[t]he doctrine of estoppel to plead the statute of frauds may be applied where necessary to prevent either unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment” and may be invoked by an unlicensed finder. ( Tenzer, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 24, 27.) The question is thus 30 whether Tukes’s allegations adequately 2013Under Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18 (Tenzer), “[t]he doctrine of estoppel to plead the statute of frauds may be applied where necessary to prevent either unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment.” (Id. at p. 27; see also Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Assn. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1169, 1183 (Riverisland).) HDN argues that, even if Veta’s claims based on the alleged oral promises are not barred by the statute of frauds, those claims are barred under the parol evidence rule. | 3 | 2013–2022 |
Orange Cnty. Water Dist. v. Sabic Innovative Plastics United States, LLC
green
1 sentence2023(See ibid. [“the trial court’s failure to adopt grounds for summary judgment or summary adjudication urged by the respondent does not constitute an error from an appellant’s point of view,” and the “appellant therefore need not address them in its opening brief”].) 19 contract or where unjust enrichment would result if a party who has received the benefits of the other’s performance were allowed to invoke the statute.”’” (Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 935, 944 ; accord, Day v. Greene (1963) 59 Cal.2d 404, 410 ; see Tukes v. Richard (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1 , 25 [“‘[t]he doctrine | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Jones v. Wachovia Bank
green
1 sentence2023(See ibid. [“the trial court’s failure to adopt grounds for summary judgment or summary adjudication urged by the respondent does not constitute an error from an appellant’s point of view,” and the “appellant therefore need not address them in its opening brief”].) 19 contract or where unjust enrichment would result if a party who has received the benefits of the other’s performance were allowed to invoke the statute.”’” (Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 935, 944 ; accord, Day v. Greene (1963) 59 Cal.2d 404, 410 ; see Tukes v. Richard (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1 , 25 [“‘[t]he doctrine | 1 | 2023–2023 |
California Savings & Loan Society v. Culver
green
2 sentences1997Estoppel Barr and Wills alternatively argue summary judgment was imprudently granted because there remain triable issues of fact as to whether AC&S and Kaiser were estopped to assert the statute of limitations as a bar to the second suits. 12 The doctrine of estoppel to plead the statute of limitations as a defense may be properly invoked where a defendant by his or her conduct induces a plaintiff to forbear from pursuit of a timely claim. (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Actions, § 685, pp. 872-873.) In a general sense the defense of estoppel has been described as follows: “ ‘One cannot just 1997Estoppel Barr and Wills alternatively argue summary judgment was imprudently granted because there remain triable issues of fact as to whether AC&S and Kaiser were estopped to assert the statute of limitations as a bar to the second suits. 12 The doctrine of estoppel to plead the statute of limitations as a defense may be properly invoked where a defendant by his or her conduct induces a plaintiff to forbear from pursuit of a timely claim. (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Actions, § 685, pp. 872-873.) In a general sense the defense of estoppel has been described as follows: “ ‘One cannot just | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.