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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tapia v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2002(See, e.g., Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 295-297 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 807 P.2d 434 ]; People v. Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th 737, 754, fn. 15 .) Our decision in Frazer makes it clear that the analysis in Collins regarding the proper scope of the federal ex post facto clause applies as well to the scope of the California ex post facto clause. 2002(See, e.g., Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 295-297 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 807 P.2d 434 ]; People v. Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th 737, 754, fn. 15 .) Our decision in Frazer makes it clear that the analysis in Collins regarding the proper scope of the federal ex post facto clause applies as well to the scope of the California ex post facto clause. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Grantgreen2 sentences2014I, § 9). 3 The United States Supreme Court expressed the principles underlying the federal ex post facto clause in Beazell v. Ohio (1925) 269 U.S. 167 , 169-170 *589 [ 70 L.Ed. 216 , 46 S.Ct. 68 ]: “It is settled . . . that any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with [a] crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.” The California Supreme Court discussed th 1999(People v. Grant (1999) 20 Cal.4th 150, 158 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 295 , 973 P.2d 72 ]; People v. McVickers (1992) 4 Cal.4th 81, 86 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 850 , 840 P.2d 955 ]; Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 295-296 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 807 P.2d 434 ].) 'More than 200 years ago, in Calder v. Bull (1798) 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 , 390 [ 1 L.Ed. 648, 650 ], the United States Supreme Court discussed the meaning of the federal ex post facto clause: “The prohibition, in the letter, is not to pass any law concerning, and after the fact; but the plain and obvious meaning and intention of the prohibit | 1 | 2 |
Weaver v. Grahamred2 sentences1983Stanworth notes at page 180 that the United States Supreme Court in Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24 [ 67 L.Ed.2d 17 , 101 S.Ct. 960 ], analyzed the federal ex post facto clause within the context of a statute which altered the availability of “gain time for good conduct.” The Florida courts had denied Weaver habeas corpus relief on the ground that the allowance of such time “ ‘is an act of grace rather than a vested right and may be withdrawn, modified, or denied.’” (Id., at p. 28 [ 67 L.Ed.2d at p. 22 , 101 S.Ct. at p. 963 ], quoting Harris v. Wainwright (Fla. 1979) 376 So.2d 855, 856 .) 1983Stanworth notes at page 180 that the United States Supreme Court in Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24 [ 67 L.Ed.2d 17 , 101 S.Ct. 960 ], analyzed the federal ex post facto clause within the context of a statute which altered the availability of “gain time for good conduct.” The Florida courts had denied Weaver habeas corpus relief on the ground that the allowance of such time “ ‘is an act of grace rather than a vested right and may be withdrawn, modified, or denied.’” (Id., at p. 28 [ 67 L.Ed.2d at p. 22 , 101 S.Ct. at p. 963 ], quoting Harris v. Wainwright (Fla. 1979) 376 So.2d 855, 856 .) | 1 | 2 |
Collins v. Youngbloodgreen2 sentences2014First, it assures ‘that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.’ (Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 [ 67 L.Ed.2d 17 , 101 S.Ct. 960 ].) Second, the rule ‘restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.’ (Id. at p. 29.) Thus, the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal Constitutions are ‘aimed a laws that “retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase punishment for criminal acts.” ’ (California Dept, of Corrections v. Morales (1995) 514 U 2014First, it assures ‘that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.’ (Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 [ 67 L.Ed.2d 17 , 101 S.Ct. 960 ].) Second, the rule ‘restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.’ (Id. at p. 29.) Thus, the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal Constitutions are ‘aimed a laws that “retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase punishment for criminal acts.” ’ (California Dept, of Corrections v. Morales (1995) 514 U | 1 | 1 |
In re Vicksgreen2 sentences2014First, it assures ‘that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.’ (Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 [ 67 L.Ed.2d 17 , 101 S.Ct. 960 ].) Second, the rule ‘restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.’ (Id. at p. 29.) Thus, the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal Constitutions are ‘aimed a laws that “retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase punishment for criminal acts.” ’ (California Dept, of Corrections v. Morales (1995) 514 U 2014First, it assures ‘that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.’ (Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 [ 67 L.Ed.2d 17 , 101 S.Ct. 960 ].) Second, the rule ‘restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.’ (Id. at p. 29.) Thus, the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal Constitutions are ‘aimed a laws that “retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase punishment for criminal acts.” ’ (California Dept, of Corrections v. Morales (1995) 514 U | 1 | 1 |
California Department of Corrections v. Moralesgreen2 sentences2014First, it assures ‘that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.’ (Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 [ 67 L.Ed.2d 17 , 101 S.Ct. 960 ].) Second, the rule ‘restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.’ (Id. at p. 29.) Thus, the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal Constitutions are ‘aimed a laws that “retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase punishment for criminal acts.” ’ (California Dept, of Corrections v. Morales (1995) 514 U 2014First, it assures ‘that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.’ (Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 [ 67 L.Ed.2d 17 , 101 S.Ct. 960 ].) Second, the rule ‘restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.’ (Id. at p. 29.) Thus, the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal Constitutions are ‘aimed a laws that “retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase punishment for criminal acts.” ’ (California Dept, of Corrections v. Morales (1995) 514 U | 1 | 1 |
People v. Frazerred2 sentences2002(See, e.g., Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 295-297 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 807 P.2d 434 ]; People v. Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th 737, 754, fn. 15 .) Our decision in Frazer makes it clear that the analysis in Collins regarding the proper scope of the federal ex post facto clause applies as well to the scope of the California ex post facto clause. 2002(See, e.g., Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 295-297 , 279 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 807 P.2d 434 ; People v. Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th 737, 754, fn. 15 , 88 Cal. Rptr.2d 312 , 982 P.2d 180 .) Our decision in Frazer makes it clear that the analysis in Collins regarding the proper scope of the federal ex post facto clause applies as well to the scope of the California ex post facto clause. | 1 | 1 |
People v. McVickersgreen2 sentences1999(People v. Grant (1999) 20 Cal.4th 150, 158 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 295 , 973 P.2d 72 ]; People v. McVickers (1992) 4 Cal.4th 81, 86 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 850 , 840 P.2d 955 ]; Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 295-296 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 807 P.2d 434 ].) 'More than 200 years ago, in Calder v. Bull (1798) 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 , 390 [ 1 L.Ed. 648, 650 ], the United States Supreme Court discussed the meaning of the federal ex post facto clause: “The prohibition, in the letter, is not to pass any law concerning, and after the fact; but the plain and obvious meaning and intention of the prohibit 1999(People v. Grant (1999) 20 Cal.4th 150, 158 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 295 , 973 P.2d 72 ]; People v. McVickers (1992) 4 Cal.4th 81, 86 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 850 , 840 P.2d 955 ]; Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 295-296 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 807 P.2d 434 ].) 'More than 200 years ago, in Calder v. Bull (1798) 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 , 390 [ 1 L.Ed. 648, 650 ], the United States Supreme Court discussed the meaning of the federal ex post facto clause: “The prohibition, in the letter, is not to pass any law concerning, and after the fact; but the plain and obvious meaning and intention of the prohibit | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Beazell v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2014I, § 9). 3 The United States Supreme Court expressed the principles underlying the federal ex post facto clause in Beazell v. Ohio (1925) 269 U.S. 167 , 169-170 *589 [ 70 L.Ed. 216 , 46 S.Ct. 68 ]: “It is settled . . . that any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with [a] crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.” The California Supreme Court discussed th 2014I, § 9). 3 The United States Supreme Court expressed the principles underlying the federal ex post facto clause in Beazell v. Ohio (1925) 269 U.S. 167 , 169-170 *589 [ 70 L.Ed. 216 , 46 S.Ct. 68 ]: “It is settled . . . that any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with [a] crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.” The California Supreme Court discussed th | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
green
1 sentence2004(Smith, supra, 538 U.S. 84 .) In reaching that conclusion, the high court majority relied heavily on the multifactor test set forth in Mendoza-Martinez, supra, 372 U.S. 144 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
In Re Reed
red
1 sentence2004(Smith v. Doe (2003) 538 U.S. 84 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 164 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 ] (Smith).) When Reed was decided, only five states, including California, “require[d] any kind of sex offender registration.” ( Reed, supra, 33 Cal.3d 914, 925 .) Since that time, virtually every one of the United States has enacted such a law. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Smith v. Doe
green
2 sentences2004(Smith v. Doe (2003) 538 U.S. 84 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 164 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 ] (Smith).) When Reed was decided, only five states, including California, “require[d] any kind of sex offender registration.” ( Reed, supra, 33 Cal.3d 914, 925 .) Since that time, virtually every one of the United States has enacted such a law. 2004(Smith v. Doe (2003) 538 U.S. 84 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 164 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 ] (Smith).) When Reed was decided, only five states, including California, “require[d] any kind of sex offender registration.” ( Reed, supra, 33 Cal.3d 914, 925 .) Since that time, virtually every one of the United States has enacted such a law. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Calder v. Bull
green
2 sentences1999(People v. Grant (1999) 20 Cal.4th 150, 158 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 295 , 973 P.2d 72 ]; People v. McVickers (1992) 4 Cal.4th 81, 86 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 850 , 840 P.2d 955 ]; Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 295-296 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 807 P.2d 434 ].) 'More than 200 years ago, in Calder v. Bull (1798) 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 , 390 [ 1 L.Ed. 648, 650 ], the United States Supreme Court discussed the meaning of the federal ex post facto clause: “The prohibition, in the letter, is not to pass any law concerning, and after the fact; but the plain and obvious meaning and intention of the prohibit 1999(People v. Grant (1999) 20 Cal.4th 150, 158 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 295 , 973 P.2d 72 ]; People v. McVickers (1992) 4 Cal.4th 81, 86 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 850 , 840 P.2d 955 ]; Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 295-296 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 807 P.2d 434 ].) 'More than 200 years ago, in Calder v. Bull (1798) 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 , 390 [ 1 L.Ed. 648, 650 ], the United States Supreme Court discussed the meaning of the federal ex post facto clause: “The prohibition, in the letter, is not to pass any law concerning, and after the fact; but the plain and obvious meaning and intention of the prohibit | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Harris v. Wainwright
green
1 sentence1983Stanworth notes at page 180 that the United States Supreme Court in Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24 [ 67 L.Ed.2d 17 , 101 S.Ct. 960 ], analyzed the federal ex post facto clause within the context of a statute which altered the availability of “gain time for good conduct.” The Florida courts had denied Weaver habeas corpus relief on the ground that the allowance of such time “ ‘is an act of grace rather than a vested right and may be withdrawn, modified, or denied.’” (Id., at p. 28 [ 67 L.Ed.2d at p. 22 , 101 S.Ct. at p. 963 ], quoting Harris v. Wainwright (Fla. 1979) 376 So.2d 855, 856 .) | 1 | 1983–1983 |
In Re Stanworth
green
1 sentence1983(In re Stanworth, supra, 33 Cal.3d 176 at p. 180 .) Quoting from Weaver : “The presence or absence of an affirmative, enforceable right is not relevant, . . . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.