Fifth Amendment takings clause (California) · Go Syfert
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Fifth Amendment takings clause in California

6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2017 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

CaseFollowedCited
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angelesgreen
scotus · 1987 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–1997
2 sentences

1997R’d v. Chicago (1897) 166 U.S. 226, 239 [ 17 S.Ct. 581, 585 , 41 L.Ed. 979 ]), provides, inter alia, that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation.” Article I, section 19 contains a similar command, providing inter alia, “Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner.” When the government fails to meet its constitutional obligation under these provisions, an action in inverse condemnation lies against the government to recover “

1997R’d v. Chicago (1897) 166 U.S. 226, 239 [ 17 S.Ct. 581, 585 , 41 L.Ed. 979 ]), provides, inter alia, that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation.” Article I, section 19 contains a similar command, providing inter alia, “Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner.” When the government fails to meet its constitutional obligation under these provisions, an action in inverse condemnation lies against the government to recover “

22
Nollan v. California Coastal Commissiongreen
scotus · 1987 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013(Nollan v. California Coastal Com’n (1987) 483 U.S. 825, 839 [easement allowing public access across private beach to connect two public beaches lacked essential nexus to stated government interest in reducing blockage of public view of ocean].) Then in 1994, the high court addressed the issue left open in Nollan: “If we find that a nexus exists, we must then decide the required degree of connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development.” (Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 386 .) The property owner in Dolan applied to the city for a permit to replace an existing

11
Palazzolo v. Rhode Islandgreen
scotus · 2001 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005(Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606, 617 [ 150 L.Ed.2d 592, 606 , 121 S.Ct. 2448 ]; Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 761, 773 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 941 P.2d 851 ] (Kavanau).) The California Constitution also requires just compensation when private property is “damaged for public use.” (Cal. Const., art.

2005(Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606, 617 [ 150 L.Ed.2d 592, 606 , 121 S.Ct. 2448 ]; Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 761, 773 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 941 P.2d 851 ] (Kavanau).) The California Constitution also requires just compensation when private property is “damaged for public use.” (Cal. Const., art.

11
Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Boardgreen
cal · 1997 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005(Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606, 617 [ 150 L.Ed.2d 592, 606 , 121 S.Ct. 2448 ]; Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 761, 773 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 941 P.2d 851 ] (Kavanau).) The California Constitution also requires just compensation when private property is “damaged for public use.” (Cal. Const., art.

2005(Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606, 617 [ 150 L.Ed.2d 592, 606 , 121 S.Ct. 2448 ]; Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 761, 773 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 941 P.2d 851 ] (Kavanau).) The California Constitution also requires just compensation when private property is “damaged for public use.” (Cal. Const., art.

11
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicagogreen
scotus · 1897 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
2 sentences

1997R’d v. Chicago (1897) 166 U.S. 226, 239 [ 17 S.Ct. 581, 585 , 41 L.Ed. 979 ]), provides, inter alia, that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation.” Article I, section 19 contains a similar command, providing inter alia, “Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner.” When the government fails to meet its constitutional obligation under these provisions, an action in inverse condemnation lies against the government to recover “

1997R’d v. Chicago (1897) 166 U.S. 226, 239 [ 17 S.Ct. 581, 585 , 41 L.Ed. 979 ]), provides, inter alia, that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation.” Article I, section 19 contains a similar command, providing inter alia, “Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner.” When the government fails to meet its constitutional obligation under these provisions, an action in inverse condemnation lies against the government to recover “

11
Customer Co. v. City of Sacramentogreen
cal · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
2 sentences

1997R’d v. Chicago (1897) 166 U.S. 226, 239 [ 17 S.Ct. 581, 585 , 41 L.Ed. 979 ]), provides, inter alia, that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation.” Article I, section 19 contains a similar command, providing inter alia, “Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner.” When the government fails to meet its constitutional obligation under these provisions, an action in inverse condemnation lies against the government to recover “

1997R’d v. Chicago (1897) 166 U.S. 226, 239 [ 17 S.Ct. 581, 585 , 41 L.Ed. 979 ]), provides, inter alia, that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation.” Article I, section 19 contains a similar command, providing inter alia, “Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner.” When the government fails to meet its constitutional obligation under these provisions, an action in inverse condemnation lies against the government to recover “

11
United States v. General Motors Corp.green
scotus · 1945 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
2 sentences

1997(U.S. v. General Motors Corp. (1945) 323 U.S. 373, 378 [ 65 S.Ct. 357, 359 , 89 L.Ed. 311 , 156 A.L.R. 390 ].) That the Fifth Amendment takings clause applies to restrictions imposed by rent control ordinances has been acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court since at least 1921.

1997(U.S. v. General Motors Corp. (1945) 323 U.S. 373, 378 [ 65 S.Ct. 357, 359 , 89 L.Ed. 311 , 156 A.L.R. 390 ].) That the Fifth Amendment takings clause applies to restrictions imposed by rent control ordinances has been acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court since at least 1921.

11
Varjabedian v. City of Maderagreen
cal · 1977 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
2 sentences

1994While article I, section 19, protects a somewhat broader range of property values than does the Fifth Amendment takings clause (Varjabedian v. City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 298 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 429 , 572 P.2d 43 ]), that distinction is irrelevant to the issues in this case.

1994While article I, section 19, protects a somewhat broader range of property values than does the Fifth Amendment takings clause (Varjabedian v. City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 298 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 429 , 572 P.2d 43 ]), that distinction is irrelevant to the issues in this case.

11
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson Cityred
scotus · 1985 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
1 sentence

1991(Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, supra, 818 F.2d at p. 1456 , citing the Supreme Court in Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 199 [87 L.Ed.2d at pp. 146-147].) *1041 Even if a Fifth Amendment takings claim could arguably be recast as one sounding in substantive due process, it would be premature.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
Shoen v. Zacarias green
calctapp · 2015
2 sentences

2017Shoen cites the Fifth Amendment only as a reason why courts approach the imposition of an equitable easement with an abundance of caution. ( Shoen , supra , 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 21 , 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 560 .) But neither Shoen nor any other case requires a Fifth Amendment takings analysis in determining whether to impose an equitable easement.

2017Shoen cites the Fifth Amendment only as a reason why courts approach the imposition of an equitable easement with an abundance of caution. ( Shoen , supra , 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 21 , 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 560 .) But neither Shoen nor any other case requires a Fifth Amendment takings analysis in determining whether to impose an equitable easement.

12017–2017
Dolan v. City of Tigard green
scotus · 1994
1 sentence

2013(Nollan v. California Coastal Com’n (1987) 483 U.S. 825, 839 [easement allowing public access across private beach to connect two public beaches lacked essential nexus to stated government interest in reducing blockage of public view of ocean].) Then in 1994, the high court addressed the issue left open in Nollan: “If we find that a nexus exists, we must then decide the required degree of connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development.” (Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 386 .) The property owner in Dolan applied to the city for a permit to replace an existing

12013–2013
Block v. Hirsh green
scotus · 1921
2 sentences

1997In Block v. Hirsh (1921) 256 U.S. 135 [ 41 S.Ct. 458 , 65 L.Ed. 865 , 16 A.L.R. 165 ], the court upheld a rent control law applicable to the District of Columbia and made necessary by exigencies of the first World War.

1997In Block v. Hirsh (1921) 256 U.S. 135 [ 41 S.Ct. 458 , 65 L.Ed. 865 , 16 A.L.R. 165 ], the court upheld a rent control law applicable to the District of Columbia and made necessary by exigencies of the first World War.

11997–1997
HFH, LTD. v. Superior Court green
cal · 1975
2 sentences

1994Our conclusion that the prerequisites to an inverse condemnation action arising out of a regulatory taking do not deny landowners any rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution applies equally to rights claimed under article I, section 19. 5 In holding that compensation must be paid for a temporary taking prior to the invalidation of the ordinance, the court was careful to point out that its holding did not address the problem of normal delays in the permit process. ( 482 U.S. at p. 321 [96 L.Ed.2d at pp. 267-268].) 6 Plaintiff’s belief to the co

1994Our conclusion that the prerequisites to an inverse condemnation action arising out of a regulatory taking do not deny landowners any rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution applies equally to rights claimed under article I, section 19. 5 In holding that compensation must be paid for a temporary taking prior to the invalidation of the ordinance, the court was careful to point out that its holding did not address the problem of normal delays in the permit process. ( 482 U.S. at p. 321 [96 L.Ed.2d at pp. 267-268].) 6 Plaintiff’s belief to the co

11994–1994
Margaret Kinzli Evelyn Goossen Philip Kinzli Ernest Kinzli, Plaintiffs v. City of Santa Cruz green
ca9 · 1987
2 sentences

1991(Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, supra, 818 F.2d at p. 1456 .) And, there can be no denial of procedural due process, under the Fourteenth Amendment, until the substantive due process claim is ripe.

1991(Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, supra, 818 F.2d at p. 1456 , citing the Supreme Court in Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 199 [87 L.Ed.2d at pp. 146-147].) *1041 Even if a Fifth Amendment takings claim could arguably be recast as one sounding in substantive due process, it would be premature.

11991–1991

Where else courts name it

CA 6 (1991–2017) TX 4 (2002–2019) NJ 4 (1993–2026) CO 2 (2010–2013) OR 2 (2010–2017) WY 2 (2017–2017) NM 2 (2006–2006) WI 2 (2005–2026) RI 2 (1997–2000)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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