focus of a competency inquiry in California

2020(Id. at p. 835; Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389 , 399-400 (Godinez).) “The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings. [Citation.] The purpose of the ‘knowing and voluntary’ inquiry, by contrast, is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.” ( Godinez, supra, at p. 401, fn. 12 .) As held in Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 (Edwards), state courts may, but need not, deny self

2020Nothing more was required of him in order to exercise his right of self-representation.” (Silfa, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1322 .) The court went on, “ ‘As the United States Supreme Court further clarified in Godinez [v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389 ], 12 . . . the trial court may not ascertain a defendant’s competence to waive counsel by evaluating the ability to represent himself or herself. [Citation.] In explaining the difference between the competence and waiver requirements, the high court stated: “The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is wheth

2020(Id. at p. 835; Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389 , 399-400 (Godinez).) “The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings. [Citation.] The purpose of the ‘knowing and voluntary’ inquiry, by contrast, is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.” ( Godinez, supra, at p. 401, fn. 12 .) As held in Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 (Edwards), state courts may, but need not, deny self

2020(Id. at p. 835; Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389 , 399-400 (Godinez).) “The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings. [Citation.] The purpose of the ‘knowing and voluntary’ inquiry, by contrast, is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.” ( Godinez, supra, at p. 401, fn. 12 .) As held in Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 (Edwards), state courts may, but need not, deny self

2020(Id. at p. 835; Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389 , 399-400 (Godinez).) “The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings. [Citation.] The purpose of the ‘knowing and voluntary’ inquiry, by contrast, is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.” ( Godinez, supra, at p. 401, fn. 12 .) As held in Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 (Edwards), state courts may, but need not, deny self

2020(Id. at p. 835; Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389 , 399-400 (Godinez).) “The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings. [Citation.] The purpose of the ‘knowing and voluntary’ inquiry, by contrast, is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.” ( Godinez, supra, at p. 401, fn. 12 .) As held in Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 (Edwards), state courts may, but need not, deny self

2001For his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.” (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 836 [ 95 S.Ct. at p. 2541 ], fn. omitted.) As our Supreme Court has pointed out in People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 733-734 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 , 976 P.2d 754 ], “As the United States Supreme Court further clarified in Godinez , however, the trial court may not ascertain a defendant’s competence to waive counsel by evaluating the ability to represent himself or herself. [Citation.] In explaining the differenc

1999See Faretta v. California, supra, [422 U.S.] at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (defendant waiving counsel must be `made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open"') ...; Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. [238,] 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (defendant pleading guilty must have `a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence')." ( Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 401, fn. 12 , 113 S.Ct. 2680 , italics in original.) As the above remarks and the refe

2013See Drope v. Missouri, supra, [ 420 U.S. at p. 171 ] (defendant is incompetent if he ‘lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him’) (emphasis added).

2001For his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.” (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 836 [ 95 S.Ct. at p. 2541 ], fn. omitted.) As our Supreme Court has pointed out in People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 733-734 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 , 976 P.2d 754 ], “As the United States Supreme Court further clarified in Godinez , however, the trial court may not ascertain a defendant’s competence to waive counsel by evaluating the ability to represent himself or herself. [Citation.] In explaining the differenc

2001For his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.” (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 836 [ 95 S.Ct. at p. 2541 ], fn. omitted.) As our Supreme Court has pointed out in People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 733-734 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 , 976 P.2d 754 ], “As the United States Supreme Court further clarified in Godinez , however, the trial court may not ascertain a defendant’s competence to waive counsel by evaluating the ability to represent himself or herself. [Citation.] In explaining the differenc