Garrett claim in California

2025(See Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 193 ; see also Lawson, supra, at p. 1003 [admitted evidence was “highly relevant” and “probative of [the defendant’s] state of mind regarding the shooting”].) Thus, Garrett has not shown the admission of Detective Woods’s testimony violated the RJA.7 7 Because Garrett’s claim of RJA error fails on its merits, his related ineffective assistance of counsel claim also necessarily fails.

2018While the court generally assumes on a motion for class certification that plaintiffs' claims have merit (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1023 ), no such assumption applies to the issues in dispute on such a motion: numerosity, ascertainability, commonality, and superiority.

2014In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held imposition of punishment for crimes committed as a juvenile constitutes a task “demanding individualized sentencing . . . .” (Miller, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [ 132 S.Ct. at p. 2467 ].) After noting its earlier decisions requiring consideration of the mitigating and aggravating factors unique to each case of sentencing for crimes committed as a minor, the Miller court emphasized that, “[o]f special pertinence here, we insisted in these rulings that a sentencer have the ability to consider the ‘mitigating qualities of youth.’ ” (Id. at p. ___ [ 1

2014In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held imposition of punishment for crimes committed as a juvenile constitutes a task “demanding individualized sentencing . . . .” (Miller, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [ 132 S.Ct. at p. 2467 ].) After noting its earlier decisions requiring consideration of the mitigating and aggravating factors unique to each case of sentencing for crimes committed as a minor, the Miller court emphasized that, “[o]f special pertinence here, we insisted in these rulings that a sentencer have the ability to consider the ‘mitigating qualities of youth.’ ” (Id. at p. ___ [ 1

2014In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held imposition of punishment for crimes committed as a juvenile constitutes a task “demanding individualized sentencing . . . .” (Miller, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [ 132 S.Ct. at p. 2467 ].) After noting its earlier decisions requiring consideration of the mitigating and aggravating factors unique to each case of sentencing for crimes committed as a minor, the Miller court emphasized that, “[o]f special pertinence here, we insisted in these rulings that a sentencer have the ability to consider the ‘mitigating qualities of youth.’ ” (Id. at p. ___ [ 1

1998Nothing in the 1977 legislation indicates an intent to abrogate Garrett’s analysis of unjustified late fees as unenforceable penalties, an analysis that has been cited and followed in several post-1977 decisions (see, e.g., Perdue v. Crocker National Bank, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 931 ; Baypoint Mortgage Corp. v. Crest Premium Real Estate etc. Trust, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at pp. 829-830) and which reflects as well the longstanding and still operative principle of allowing relief from contractual forfeitures.

1995Code, § 1801 et seq.) because the issuing bank “has no interest in any particular product." ( 556 F.Supp. at p. 1111 ) In the present context, however, as between the bank and cardholder there is a particular service in which the bank has an interest, the convenience service. 11 As for Garrett’s claim of unprofitability, the court found otherwise. 12 The court also ruled in the statement of decision that FICAL did not use the unit cost grids or Price Waterhouse study “to perform the kind of analysis required by Garrett and Beasley”—i.e., there was no motivation and purpose of estimating fair c

1991If, to paraphrase the Bondanza opinion, the amount of a collection agency fee may have no relationship to the actual expense required to collect a late balance, the fee does not necessarily represent Wells Fargo’s “actual damages resulting from [the borrower’s] default” within the meaning of the Garrett standard ( 9 Cal.3d at p. 741 ), even though the bank actually paid the fees.

1991If, to paraphrase the Bondanza opinion, the amount of a collection agency fee may have no relationship to the actual expense required to collect a late balance, the fee does not necessarily represent Wells Fargo’s “actual damages resulting from [the borrower’s] default” within the meaning of the Garrett standard ( 9 Cal.3d at p. 741 ), even though the bank actually paid the fees.