government contractor defense in California

2009In Jackson v. Deft, Inc. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1305 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 214 ] (Jackson), a case involving paint products, the appellate court stated “in this case, the evidence that the polyurethane produced by [the defendant] was also sold commercially does not absolutely foreclose application of the military contractor defense.” (Id. at p. 1319.) The court reasoned as follows: “In our view, if a product is produced according to military specifications and used by the military because of particular qualities which serve a military purpose, and is incidentally sold commercially as well, that produ

2009In Jackson v. Deft, Inc. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1305 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 214 ] (Jackson), a case involving paint products, the appellate court stated “in this case, the evidence that the polyurethane produced by [the defendant] was also sold commercially does not absolutely foreclose application of the military contractor defense.” (Id. at p. 1319.) The court reasoned as follows: “In our view, if a product is produced according to military specifications and used by the military because of particular qualities which serve a military purpose, and is incidentally sold commercially as well, that produ

2016Military contractor liability would conflict with this doctrine, the circuit court reasoned, since a pass-through of state tort liability costs in federal contracting would “ ‘defeat the purpose of the immunity for military accidents conferred upon the government itself.’ ” (Boyle, at p. 510, quoting Tozer v. LTV Corp. (4th Cir. 1986) 792 F.2d 403, 408 .) The Supreme Court rejected the Feres doctrine as the undergirding of the government contractor defense, however, on the ground it would produce results both too broad and too narrow.

2016Military contractor liability would conflict with this doctrine, the circuit court 5 Feres v. United States (1950) 340 U.S. 135 (Feres). 9 reasoned, since a pass-through of state tort liability costs in federal contracting would “ ‘defeat the purpose of the immunity for military accidents conferred upon the government itself.’ ” (Boyle, at p. 510, quoting Tozer v. LTV Corp. (4th Cir. 1986) 792 F.2d 403 , 408.) The Supreme Court rejected the Feres doctrine as the undergirding of the government contractor defense, however, on the ground it would produce results both too broad and too narrow.

2021Where the government hires a contractor to perform a given task, and specifies the manner in which the task is to be performed, and the contractor is later haled into court to answer for a harm that was caused by the contractor’s compliance with the government’s specifications, the contractor is entitled to the same immunity the government would enjoy, because the contractor is, under those circumstances, 2 Heimann was an inverse condemnation case and states immunity applies when “private property has been taken or damaged for a public use” ( Heimann, supra, 30 Cal.2d at pp. 749, 756), but cas

2016Kase relies on Hawaii, supra, 960 F.2d 806 , in which the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to allow defendants that had supplied asbestos insulation products to the Navy to assert the government contractor defense against state strict liability claims.

2016(See, e.g., In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litigation, supra, 971 F.2d at p. 839 ; Oxford, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at pp. 705-706.) 9 Metalclad also urges the government contractor defense as an alternative ground to affirm the summary judgment.

2016Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 181 , fn. omitted.) “Under the ‘warning defect’ theory of strict liability, a perfectly made product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous to place the product in the hands of a user without a suitable warning or if no warning is given.” (Oxford, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 717 .) “Conversely, to prevail on a claim for negligent failure to warn, the plaintiff must prove that the seller’s conduct fell below the standard of care. [Citation.] If a prudent seller would have acted reasonably in not giving a warning, the seller will not have been negligent.”

2016Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 181 , fn. omitted.) “Under the ‘warning defect’ theory of strict liability, a perfectly made product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous to place the product in the hands of a user without a suitable warning or if no warning is given.” (Oxford, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 717 .) “Conversely, to prevail on a claim for negligent failure to warn, the plaintiff must prove that the seller’s conduct fell below the standard of care. [Citation.] If a prudent seller would have acted reasonably in not giving a warning, the seller will not have been negligent.”

2016Military contractor liability would conflict with this doctrine, the circuit court 5 Feres v. United States (1950) 340 U.S. 135 (Feres). 9 reasoned, since a pass-through of state tort liability costs in federal contracting would “ ‘defeat the purpose of the immunity for military accidents conferred upon the government itself.’ ” (Boyle, at p. 510, quoting Tozer v. LTV Corp. (4th Cir. 1986) 792 F.2d 403 , 408.) The Supreme Court rejected the Feres doctrine as the undergirding of the government contractor defense, however, on the ground it would produce results both too broad and too narrow.

2016Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 181 , fn. omitted.) “Under the ‘warning defect’ theory of strict liability, a perfectly made product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous to place the product in the hands of a user without a suitable warning or if no warning is given.” (Oxford, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 717 .) “Conversely, to prevail on a claim for negligent failure to warn, the plaintiff must prove that the seller’s conduct fell below the standard of care. [Citation.] If a prudent seller would have acted reasonably in not giving a warning, the seller will not have been negligent.”

2016Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 181 , fn. omitted.) “Under the ‘warning defect’ theory of strict liability, a perfectly made product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous to place the product in the hands of a user without a suitable warning or if no warning is given.” (Oxford, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 717 .) “Conversely, to prevail on a claim for negligent failure to warn, the plaintiff must prove that the seller’s conduct fell below the standard of care. [Citation.] If a prudent seller would have acted reasonably in not giving a warning, the seller will not have been negligent.”

2009New York Asbestos Lit. (2d Cir. 1990) 897 F.2d 626, 631 .)]”].) 4 Defendant, in its reply brief, claims that the third prong of the Tate test is satisfied by the jury’s finding on the third prong of the Boyle test.

2009Foster Wheeler bears the burden of establishing each of these elements.” 3 Other courts have agreed with the Tate opinion: “It is also well established, however, that a defendant may not defeat a state failure-to-wam claim simply by establishing the elements of the government contractor defense with respect to a plaintiff’s design defect claim.” (Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp. (7th Cir. 1996) 96 F.3d 992, 1003 ; see also Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. (9th Cir. 1996) 89 F.3d 582, 586 [“ ‘In a failure-to-wam action, where no conflict exists between requirements imposed under a federal cont

1990Fla. 1989) 716 F.Supp. 589 also involved the application of the government contractor defense in a wrongful death action against the manufacturer of asbestos-containing products who sold materials to the Navy under government contracts.

1983(Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (3d Cir. 1982) 696 F.2d 246, 249 ; In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation (2d Cir. 1980) 635 F.2d 987 , cert, den., 454 *213 U.S. 1128 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 116 , 102 S.Ct. 980 ].) 1 It should also be noted that neither the federal nor state Legislatures have suggested as a matter of national or local policy that an exception to the general application of strict products liability should be made in favor of those manufacturers who happen to sell their products to the federal government.

1983I point out it has been held state law, not federal law, governs the status and nature of the government contractor defense (Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (3d Cir. 1982) 696 F.2d 246, 249 ).

1983(Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (3d Cir. 1982) 696 F.2d 246, 249 ; In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation (2d Cir. 1980) 635 F.2d 987 , cert, den., 454 *213 U.S. 1128 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 116 , 102 S.Ct. 980 ].) 1 It should also be noted that neither the federal nor state Legislatures have suggested as a matter of national or local policy that an exception to the general application of strict products liability should be made in favor of those manufacturers who happen to sell their products to the federal government.