Immunity Statute bar in California

2004Because, as we have explained, the statutory immunity does not shield a tobacco company from liability for injuries or deaths caused by something not inherent in the product itself, the Immunity Statute does not bar these claims.” (Id. at p. 865.) At the same time, citing our opinion in American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at page 490 , footnote 5, the Supreme Court recognized that allegations that “defendants ‘controlled] the nicotine content of their cigarettes ... by developing high-nicotine tobacco and blended tobacco’ ” did not survive the statutory immunity.

2002But in American Tobacco, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d 480 , decided the year after the Surgeon General issued his report concluding that nicotine is addictive, the Court of Appeal soundly rejected essentially the same argument.

2004Because, as we have explained, the statutory immunity does not shield a tobacco company from liability for injuries or deaths caused by something not inherent in the product itself, the Immunity Statute does not bar these claims.” (Ibid.) In summary, Naegele concluded: “As we hold in the companion case of Myers, supra, 28 Cal.4th 828 , the Immunity Statute governs conduct of tobacco companies during the immunity period, which began on January 1, 1988, and ended on December 31, 1997.

2002As this court explained in Richards , the Legislature enacted the Immunity Statute to protect manufacturers and sellers of certain inherently dangerous products, including cigarettes, from liability for injuries caused by those products precisely because the Legislature itself had concluded “the public desires to buy and ingest [those products] despite general understanding of [their] inherent dangers.” (Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1000 .) According to the concurring and dissenting opinion, the Immunity Statute does not bar plaintiffs fraud claim based on allegations that defendant tobac

1994For instance, in Jenkins v. County of Orange, supra, the underlying proceeding was a dependency action in which the minor’s maternal grandfather was suspected of abusing the minor. ( 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 281 .) After the dependency petition was dismissed, not only the grandfather, but also the minor, his mother, and the maternal grandmother sued the county for damages for, inter alia, the social worker’s negligence.

1994(See, e.g., Jenkins v. County of Orange, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 283 .) Moreover, while most of the cases applying section 821.6 have been brought by targets of the former proceedings, the courts have also applied *1212 the immunity statute to bar claims made by other parties.