indefinite standard in California

2014(See, e.g., Fresno County, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 640 [affirming good cause finding based on “high risk” that minor would develop an attachment order]; A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1329-1330 [good cause to remain in non-preferred placement because removal posed a serious risk of harm].) An Arizona appellate opinion reflects our concern about holding a moving party to such a high standard: “We disagree with In re C.H. interpreting ICWA to require an expert to testify that trauma is certain to result from a transfer of custody or if a certain placement is or is not made cannot be in

2014(See, e.g., Fresno County, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 640 [affirming good cause finding based on “high risk” that minor would develop an attachment order]; A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1329-1330 [good cause to remain in nonpreferred placement because removal posed a serious risk of harm].) An Arizona appellate opinion reflects our concern about holding a moving party to such a high standard: “We disagree with In re C.H.

2019(See Sessions v. Dimaya (2018) --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1204 , 1214, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 ( Dimaya ) ["Many perfectly constitutional statutes use imprecise terms like 'serious potential risk' ... or 'substantial risk.' "].) In all, Johnson made clear that its holding that the residual clause was unconstitutionally vague resulted from both features it discussed.

2019(See Sessions v. Dimaya (2018) --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1204 , 1214, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 ( Dimaya ) ["Many perfectly constitutional statutes use imprecise terms like 'serious potential risk' ... or 'substantial risk.' "].) In all, Johnson made clear that its holding that the residual clause was unconstitutionally vague resulted from both features it discussed.

2019This holding condemns few laws, but, in my view, one of them is California second degree felony murder.” (Dis. opn. post, at p. 5, fn. omitted.) Also, “my view is that our second degree felony-murder law is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson because it has a defendant’s guilt depend on a court’s evaluation of a hypothetical risk posed by an abstract generic version of the offense.” (Dis. opn. post, at p. 18.) We respect his viewpoint but emphasize again that we limit this decision to this record presented before us in this case, which we hold does not support such a finding. 8 The dissent

2019This holding condemns few laws, but, in my view, one of them is California second degree felony murder.” (Dis. opn. post, at p. 5, fn. omitted.) Also, “my view is that our second degree felony-murder law is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson because it has a defendant’s guilt depend on a court’s evaluation of a hypothetical risk posed by an abstract generic version of the offense.” (Dis. opn. post, at p. 18.) We respect his viewpoint but emphasize again that we limit this decision to this record presented before us in this case, which we hold does not support such a finding. 8 The dissent