inquiry notice standard in California

2017It is consistent with the principle that "statutes of limitations are intended to run against those who fail to exercise reasonable care in the protection and enforcement of their rights; therefore, those statutes should not be interpreted so as to bar a victim of wrongful conduct from asserting a cause of action before he [or she] could *361 reasonably be expected to discover its existence. [Citations.]" ( Saliter v. Pierce Brothers Mortuaries (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 292 , 297, 146 Cal.Rptr. 271 .) Applying the inquiry notice rule here also promotes the policy of preventing the unfairness of "re

2017It is consistent with the principle that "statutes of limitations are intended to run against those who fail to exercise reasonable care in the protection and enforcement of their rights; therefore, those statutes should not be interpreted so as to bar a victim of wrongful conduct from asserting a cause of action before he [or she] could *361 reasonably be expected to discover its existence. [Citations.]" ( Saliter v. Pierce Brothers Mortuaries (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 292 , 297, 146 Cal.Rptr. 271 .) Applying the inquiry notice rule here also promotes the policy of preventing the unfairness of "re

2017Moreover, here, as was true in Deveny , the "discovery" language of *54 section 22008 first appearing in its predecessor statute in 1988 13 was created long after "other statutes of *363 limitations that included the term 'discovery' and that had been judicially construed as establishing an inquiry notice standard. [Citations.] 'Given the Legislature's presumed understanding of the judicial interpretation of the term "discovery" in other statutes of limitation, it is reasonable to assume that it would have used a word other than "discovery" if it intended for the limitations period to commence

2017Moreover, here, as was true in Deveny , the "discovery" language of *54 section 22008 first appearing in its predecessor statute in 1988 13 was created long after "other statutes of *363 limitations that included the term 'discovery' and that had been judicially construed as establishing an inquiry notice standard. [Citations.] 'Given the Legislature's presumed understanding of the judicial interpretation of the term "discovery" in other statutes of limitation, it is reasonable to assume that it would have used a word other than "discovery" if it intended for the limitations period to commence

2017Moreover, here, as was true in Deveny , the "discovery" language of *54 section 22008 first appearing in its predecessor statute in 1988 13 was created long after "other statutes of *363 limitations that included the term 'discovery' and that had been judicially construed as establishing an inquiry notice standard. [Citations.] 'Given the Legislature's presumed understanding of the judicial interpretation of the term "discovery" in other statutes of limitation, it is reasonable to assume that it would have used a word other than "discovery" if it intended for the limitations period to commence

2017Moreover, here, as was true in Deveny , the "discovery" language of *54 section 22008 first appearing in its predecessor statute in 1988 13 was created long after "other statutes of *363 limitations that included the term 'discovery' and that had been judicially construed as establishing an inquiry notice standard. [Citations.] 'Given the Legislature's presumed understanding of the judicial interpretation of the term "discovery" in other statutes of limitation, it is reasonable to assume that it would have used a word other than "discovery" if it intended for the limitations period to commence

2017Moreover, here, as was true in Deveny, the “discovery” language of section 22008 first appearing in its predecessor statute in 198813 was created long after “other statutes of limitations that included the term ‘discovery’ and that had been judicially construed as establishing an inquiry notice standard. [Citations.] ‘Given the Legislature’s presumed understanding of the judicial interpretation of the term “discovery” in other statutes of limitation, it is reasonable to assume that it would have used a word other than “discovery” if it intended for the limitations period to commence only upon

2017Moreover, here, as was true in Deveny , the "discovery" language of *54 section 22008 first appearing in its predecessor statute in 1988 13 was created long after "other statutes of *363 limitations that included the term 'discovery' and that had been judicially construed as establishing an inquiry notice standard. [Citations.] 'Given the Legislature's presumed understanding of the judicial interpretation of the term "discovery" in other statutes of limitation, it is reasonable to assume that it would have used a word other than "discovery" if it intended for the limitations period to commence

2017Cal. 1998) 19 F.Supp.2d 1070 . . . rejects the argument that there is an inquiry notice standard [citation], and acknowledges that the Lewis opinion sets forth California’s rule on good faith [citation].

2008First, the Supreme Court made it clear that “the legislative history does not support. . . plaintiffs’ claim that the ‘otherwise on notice’ language imposes a duty of inquiry . . . .” (Doe, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 548 .) Further, the high court made it clear that the purpose of the “otherwise on notice” language was to “prevent a nonperpetrator defendant from disclaiming knowledge of the unlawful sexual conduct of the perpetrator on the grounds that it had not been notified of this conduct through a formal complaint process where the evidence demonstrates that some other form of notice was pro

2008In their supplemental briefing, respondents seek to take advantage of the Supreme Court’s decision not to “determine the precise contours” of the phrase “otherwise on notice.” (Doe, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 548 .) Respondents argue that this phrase should be further interpreted to incorporate the “should have known” standard set forth in the Restatement Second of Agency, section 213, or “some form of the inquiry notice standard of Civil Code section 19.” We reject this argument.