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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rock v. Arkansasgreen2 sentences2013In applying its evidentiary rules a State must evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify the limitation imposed on the defendant’s constitutional right to testify.” (Rock v. Arkansas, supra, 483 U.S. at pp. 55–56.) In our view, the court’s response to defendant’s proposed testimony that Lopata pushed her down the stairs and later threatened her life was disproportionate to the purposes served by Evidence Code section 352. 2002The right “may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” ’ [Citations.] We have explained, for example, that ‘trial judges retain wide latitude’ to limit reasonably a defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness .... [10 ... [1|] [But] [Restrictions on a criminal defendant’s rights to confront adverse witnesses and to present evidence may not be ‘arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’ ” (Michigan v. Lucas (1991) 500 U.S. 145, 149-151 [ 111 S.Ct. 1743, 1746-1747 , 114 L.Ed.2d 205 ].) “In applying its | 2 | 4 |
Michigan v. Lucasgreen2 sentences2002The right “may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” ’ [Citations.] We have explained, for example, that ‘trial judges retain wide latitude’ to limit reasonably a defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness .... [10 ... [1|] [But] [Restrictions on a criminal defendant’s rights to confront adverse witnesses and to present evidence may not be ‘arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’ ” (Michigan v. Lucas (1991) 500 U.S. 145, 149-151 [ 111 S.Ct. 1743, 1746-1747 , 114 L.Ed.2d 205 ].) “In applying its 2002The right “may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” ’ [Citations.] We have explained, for example, that ‘trial judges retain wide latitude’ to limit reasonably a defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness .... [10 ... [1|] [But] [Restrictions on a criminal defendant’s rights to confront adverse witnesses and to present evidence may not be ‘arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’ ” (Michigan v. Lucas (1991) 500 U.S. 145, 149-151 [ 111 S.Ct. 1743, 1746-1747 , 114 L.Ed.2d 205 ].) “In applying its | 1 | 1 |
People v. Reberred2 sentences1997(See People v. Reber (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 523, 531-532 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 139 ]; see also State ex rel. 1997(See People v. Reber (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 523, 531-532 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 139 ]; see also State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Dallas v. Stanglin
green
2 sentences2001The Lemas Opinion We disagree with City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 879, 883-884 , 178 Cal.Rptr. 435 ( Lemas), in which the court held that Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(1), does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause because it is "procedurally fair and reasonably related to a proper legislative goal." That deferential standard of review, however, applies to legislation only if the legislation does not affect a fundamental right or create a suspect classification. ( Dallas v. Stanglin (1989) 490 U.S. 19, 23 , 109 S.Ct. 159 2001The Lemas Opinion We disagree with City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 879, 883-884 , 178 Cal.Rptr. 435 ( Lemas), in which the court held that Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(1), does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause because it is "procedurally fair and reasonably related to a proper legislative goal." That deferential standard of review, however, applies to legislation only if the legislation does not affect a fundamental right or create a suspect classification. ( Dallas v. Stanglin (1989) 490 U.S. 19, 23 , 109 S.Ct. 159 | 1 | 2001–2001 |
City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2001The Lemas Opinion We disagree with City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 879, 883-884 , 178 Cal.Rptr. 435 ( Lemas), in which the court held that Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(1), does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause because it is "procedurally fair and reasonably related to a proper legislative goal." That deferential standard of review, however, applies to legislation only if the legislation does not affect a fundamental right or create a suspect classification. ( Dallas v. Stanglin (1989) 490 U.S. 19, 23 , 109 S.Ct. 159 2001The Lemas Opinion We disagree with City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 879, 883-884 , 178 Cal.Rptr. 435 ( Lemas), in which the court held that Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(1), does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause because it is "procedurally fair and reasonably related to a proper legislative goal." That deferential standard of review, however, applies to legislation only if the legislation does not affect a fundamental right or create a suspect classification. ( Dallas v. Stanglin (1989) 490 U.S. 19, 23 , 109 S.Ct. 159 | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Edwards
red
2 sentences1994In applying its evidentiary rules, a State must evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify the limitation imposed on the defendant's constitutional right to testify." ( Rock v. Arkansas, supra, 483 U.S. at pp. 55-56 [ 97 L.Ed.2d at p. 49 ], fn. omitted.) The issue was raised in an analogous posture in Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787 . 1994In applying its evidentiary rules, a State must evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify the limitation imposed on the defendant’s constitutional right to testify.” (Rock v. Arkansas, supra, 483 U.S. at pp. 55-56 [ 97 L.Ed.2d at p. 49 ], fn. omitted.) The issue was raised in an analogous posture in Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Neku v. United States
green
1 sentence1993It reasoned that the value of the privileged communication “must be clear and substantial” to outweigh the interests served by the privilege. ( 620 A.2d at p. 263 .) Essential to that determination are both the intrinsic probative value of the information conveyed by the privileged communication and the alternative means open to the accused to otherwise make the same point. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.