last two factors in California

2021L.Rev. 1, 53–54, 56, 99–100 (Third Circuit Task Force Report); Lawson, supra, 291 P.3d at p. 695 ; Guilbert, supra, 49 A.3d at pp. 722–723; ante, at pp. 8–9.) The relevance of the last two factors, in turn, requires further understanding of the type of law enforcement conduct that may be suggestive or confirmatory.

2016Code, § 403, subd. (a).) Evidence of dog trailing was held to be admissible in Malgren, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d 234 only if the proponent made a sufficient showing as to five foundational requirements: (1) whether “the dog’s handler was qualified by training and experience to use the dog”; (2) whether “the dog was adequately trained in tracking humans”; (3) whether “the dog has been found to be reliable in tracking humans”; (4) whether the dog was “placed on the track where circumstances indicated the guilty party to have been”; and (5) that the source of the scent—whether it was left at a locat

2016(Ma lgren, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 239 .) As explained in a subsequent decision, the last two Malgren factors—whether the dog was placed on the trail where circumstances indicate the guilty party was and whether the trail has become stale or contaminated—“help to ensure the dog has a fresh scent, but they do not . . . corroborate that the person located is the person who was tracked.

2006(See People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th 395, 449 ; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 46 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710 , 96 P.3d 30 ].) Our attention, therefore, focuses on the two remaining factors—the “nature and extent of the media coverage” and the “size of the community.” The trial court described the media coverage of the murders and defendant’s arrest as “saturation, as much as they possibly can give,” but noted that such coverage was not unprecedented in Los Angeles County.

1998(McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. _ [ 117 S.Ct. at p. 1740 ].) The county’s payment of the sheriff’s salary did “not translate into control over him, since the county neither has the authority to change his salary nor the discretion to refuse payment completely.” (Ibid.) While the county commissions did have discretion to deny operational funds “beyond what is ‘reasonably necessary,’ ” (ibid.) “at most, this discretion would allow the commission to exert an attenuated and indirect influence over the sheriff’s operations.” (Ibid.) In response to the last two factors, the court

1998(McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. _ [ 117 S.Ct. at p. 1740 ].) The county’s payment of the sheriff’s salary did “not translate into control over him, since the county neither has the authority to change his salary nor the discretion to refuse payment completely.” (Ibid.) While the county commissions did have discretion to deny operational funds “beyond what is ‘reasonably necessary,’ ” (ibid.) “at most, this discretion would allow the commission to exert an attenuated and indirect influence over the sheriff’s operations.” (Ibid.) In response to the last two factors, the court

1967If the rule of prejudice per se is applied, the facts do not permit the People to invoke the exception thereto illustrated by People v. Jacobson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 319 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 515 , 405 P.2d 555 ], and People v. Cotter (1965) 63 Cal.2d 386 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 622 , 405 P.2d 862 ]. 6 In Jacobson the prosecution introduced a series of some ten separate confessions by the defendant; but the first eight of these were volunteered by him in circumstances which rendered them admissible, and only the last two were in violation of the Escobedo-Dorado rules.

1967If the rule of prejudice per se is applied, the facts do not permit the People to invoke the exception thereto illustrated by People v. Jacobson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 319 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 515 , 405 P.2d 555 ], and People v. Cotter (1965) 63 Cal.2d 386 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 622 , 405 P.2d 862 ]. 6 In Jacobson the prosecution introduced a series of some ten separate confessions by the defendant; but the first eight of these were volunteered by him in circumstances which rendered them admissible, and only the last two were in violation of the Escobedo-Dorado rules.

1967If the rule of prejudice per se is applied, the facts do not permit the People to invoke the exception thereto illustrated by People v. Jacobson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 319 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 515 , 405 P.2d 555 ], and People v. Cotter (1965) 63 Cal.2d 386 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 622 , 405 P.2d 862 ]. 6 In Jacobson the prosecution introduced a series of some ten separate confessions by the defendant; but the first eight of these were volunteered by him in circumstances which rendered them admissible, and only the last two were in violation of the Escobedo-Dorado rules.

1967If the rule of prejudice per se is applied, the facts do not permit the People to invoke the exception thereto illustrated by People v. Jacobson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 319 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 515 , 405 P.2d 555 ], and People v. Cotter (1965) 63 Cal.2d 386 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 622 , 405 P.2d 862 ]. 6 In Jacobson the prosecution introduced a series of some ten separate confessions by the defendant; but the first eight of these were volunteered by him in circumstances which rendered them admissible, and only the last two were in violation of the Escobedo-Dorado rules.