limited exclusionary rule (California) · Go Syfert
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limited exclusionary rule in California

6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1983–1986 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
Luce v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1984 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985
2 sentences

1985Both the probationer and the state have an interest in full truthful disclosure at the revocation hearing, whether it is exculpatory or involves incriminating admissions coupled with mitigating evidence. ( Coleman, at pp. 873-874.) Accordingly, the Supreme Court declared a limited exclusionary rule, precluding subsequent prosecutorial use of a probationer's evidence or its fruits, except for clear impeachment or rebuttal. ( Coleman, at p. 889; Jasper , at p. 933; People v. Samuels, supra, 147 Cal. App.3d 1108 ; and see Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802 [ 210 Cal. Rptr. 204 , 693

1985Both the probationer and the state have an interest in full truthful disclosure at the revocation hearing, whether it is exculpatory or involves incriminating admissions coupled with mitigating evidence. ( Coleman, at pp. 873-874.) Accordingly, the Supreme Court declared a limited exclusionary rule, precluding subsequent prosecutorial use of a probationer's evidence or its fruits, except for clear impeachment or rebuttal. ( Coleman, at p. 889; Jasper , at p. 933; People v. Samuels, supra, 147 Cal. App.3d 1108 ; and see Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802 [ 210 Cal. Rptr. 204 , 693

22
People v. Jacobsgreen
calctapp · 1984 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
2 sentences

1986(At p. 894.) Evidence Code section 940 includes within its parameters existing judicial decisions relating to its statutory privilege. “[T]he language of [section 940] is purposefully broad, and is meant to include within its reach judicial decisions relating to the privilege against self-incrimination. ” (Ramona R. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 808 , see also People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936, 942-945 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Barrios, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at pp. 742-743, People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740, 750-751 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) In People v. Wea

1986(At p. 894.) Evidence Code section 940 includes within its parameters existing judicial decisions relating to its statutory privilege. “[T]he language of [section 940] is purposefully broad, and is meant to include within its reach judicial decisions relating to the privilege against self-incrimination. ” (Ramona R. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 808 , see also People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936, 942-945 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Barrios, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at pp. 742-743, People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740, 750-751 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) In People v. Wea

11
People v. Navarezgreen
calctapp · 1985 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
2 sentences

1986(At p. 894.) Evidence Code section 940 includes within its parameters existing judicial decisions relating to its statutory privilege. “[T]he language of [section 940] is purposefully broad, and is meant to include within its reach judicial decisions relating to the privilege against self-incrimination. ” (Ramona R. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 808 , see also People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936, 942-945 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Barrios, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at pp. 742-743, People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740, 750-751 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) In People v. Wea

1986(At p. 894.) Evidence Code section 940 includes within its parameters existing judicial decisions relating to its statutory privilege. “[T]he language of [section 940] is purposefully broad, and is meant to include within its reach judicial decisions relating to the privilege against self-incrimination. ” (Ramona R. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 808 , see also People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936, 942-945 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Barrios, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at pp. 742-743, People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740, 750-751 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) In People v. Wea

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Ramona R. v. Superior Court green
cal · 1985
2 sentences

1986(At p. 894.) Evidence Code section 940 includes within its parameters existing judicial decisions relating to its statutory privilege. “[T]he language of [section 940] is purposefully broad, and is meant to include within its reach judicial decisions relating to the privilege against self-incrimination. ” (Ramona R. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 808 , see also People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936, 942-945 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Barrios, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at pp. 742-743, People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740, 750-751 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) In People v. Wea

1985Both the probationer and the state have an interest in full truthful disclosure at the revocation hearing, whether it is exculpatory or involves incriminating admissions coupled with mitigating evidence. ( Coleman, at pp. 873-874.) Accordingly, the Supreme Court declared a limited exclusionary rule, precluding subsequent prosecutorial use of a probationer's evidence or its fruits, except for clear impeachment or rebuttal. ( Coleman, at p. 889; Jasper , at p. 933; People v. Samuels, supra, 147 Cal. App.3d 1108 ; and see Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802 [ 210 Cal. Rptr. 204 , 693

31985–1986
People v. Coleman green
cal · 1975
2 sentences

1986(At p. 894.) Evidence Code section 940 includes within its parameters existing judicial decisions relating to its statutory privilege. “[T]he language of [section 940] is purposefully broad, and is meant to include within its reach judicial decisions relating to the privilege against self-incrimination. ” (Ramona R. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 808 , see also People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936, 942-945 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Barrios, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at pp. 742-743, People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740, 750-751 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) In People v. Wea

1986(At p. 894.) Evidence Code section 940 includes within its parameters existing judicial decisions relating to its statutory privilege. “[T]he language of [section 940] is purposefully broad, and is meant to include within its reach judicial decisions relating to the privilege against self-incrimination. ” (Ramona R. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 808 , see also People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936, 942-945 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Barrios, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at pp. 742-743, People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740, 750-751 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) In People v. Wea

21983–1986
People v. Samuels green
calctapp · 1983
2 sentences

1985Both the probationer and the state have an interest in full truthful disclosure at the revocation hearing, whether it is exculpatory or involves incriminating admissions coupled with mitigating evidence. ( Coleman, at pp. 873-874.) Accordingly, the Supreme Court declared a limited exclusionary rule, precluding subsequent prosecutorial use of a probationer's evidence or its fruits, except for clear impeachment or rebuttal. ( Coleman, at p. 889; Jasper , at p. 933; People v. Samuels, supra, 147 Cal. App.3d 1108 ; and see Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802 [ 210 Cal. Rptr. 204 , 693

1985Both the probationer and the state have an interest in full truthful disclosure at the revocation hearing, whether it is exculpatory or involves incriminating admissions coupled with mitigating evidence. ( Coleman, at pp. 873-874.) Accordingly, the Supreme Court declared a limited exclusionary rule, precluding subsequent prosecutorial use of a probationer's evidence or its fruits, except for clear impeachment or rebuttal. ( Coleman, at p. 889; Jasper , at p. 933; People v. Samuels, supra, 147 Cal. App.3d 1108 ; and see Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802 [ 210 Cal. Rptr. 204 , 693

21985–1985
People v. Jasper green
cal · 1983
2 sentences

1983The court stated that this rule “. . . allows the state to continue to press for revocation of probation either before or after a probationer’s trial on related charges, ...” (Id., at p. 889.) In People v. Jasper (1983) 33 Cal.3d 931 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 648 , 663 P.2d 206 ], the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holdings in Coleman .

1983The court stated that this rule “. . . allows the state to continue to press for revocation of probation either before or after a probationer’s trial on related charges, ...” (Id., at p. 889.) In People v. Jasper (1983) 33 Cal.3d 931 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 648 , 663 P.2d 206 ], the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holdings in Coleman .

21983–1983
People v. Weaver green
cal · 1985
1 sentence

1986(At p. 894.) Evidence Code section 940 includes within its parameters existing judicial decisions relating to its statutory privilege. “[T]he language of [section 940] is purposefully broad, and is meant to include within its reach judicial decisions relating to the privilege against self-incrimination. ” (Ramona R. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 808 , see also People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936, 942-945 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Barrios, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at pp. 742-743, People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740, 750-751 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) In People v. Wea

11986–1986
People v. King neutral
calctapp · 1979
2 sentences

1983As stated in People v. King (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 506 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 566 ], rejecting a similar argument, “the taking of testimony of defense witnesses voluntarily called by the defendant at a revocation hearing cannot be equated with pretrial discovery in the sense that it is the result of a prosecution demand to compel the defense to produce anything or provide information.” (P. 510; accord Ryan v. State of Montana, supra, 580 F.2d at pp. 991-993.) Moreover, as Coleman itself acknowledges, the limited exclusionary rule fashioned by us in that case affords ample protection to a probationer wh

1983As stated in People v. King (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 506 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 566 ], rejecting a similar argument, “the taking of testimony of defense witnesses voluntarily called by the defendant at a revocation hearing cannot be equated with pretrial discovery in the sense that it is the result of a prosecution demand to compel the defense to produce anything or provide information.” (P. 510; accord Ryan v. State of Montana, supra, 580 F.2d at pp. 991-993.) Moreover, as Coleman itself acknowledges, the limited exclusionary rule fashioned by us in that case affords ample protection to a probationer wh

11983–1983

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Penal Code § 1203.2 (4) CA § Cal. Penal Code § 211 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 6 (1983–1986) VT 2 (2007–2007)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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