perb analysis in California

2017Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1250 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 , 906 P.2d 1112 ].) Accordingly, we deny PERB’s motion to dismiss Proponents as real parties in interest from City’s writ proceeding.

2017Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1250 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 , 906 P.2d 1112 ].) Accordingly, we deny PERB’s motion to dismiss Proponents as real parties in interest from City’s writ proceeding.

2017(See generally Wood v. Georgia (1962) 370 U.S. 375, 394 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 569 , 82 S.Ct. 1364 ] [“petitioner was an elected official and had the right to enter the field of political controversy”]; Bond v. Floyd (1966) 385 U.S. 116, 136-137 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 235 , 87 S.Ct. 339 ].) Accordingly, common law principles of “apparent” agency or respondeat superior, which permit a third party to hold a principal liable for the wrongful acts of his agent, have no application here. 51 We note that, in this writ proceeding, PERB’s brief appeal's to focus almost exclusively on the foundational issue—whether there w

2017(See generally Wood v. Georgia (1962) 370 U.S. 375, 394 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 569 , 82 S.Ct. 1364 ] [“petitioner was an elected official and had the right to enter the field of political controversy”]; Bond v. Floyd (1966) 385 U.S. 116, 136-137 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 235 , 87 S.Ct. 339 ].) Accordingly, common law principles of “apparent” agency or respondeat superior, which permit a third party to hold a principal liable for the wrongful acts of his agent, have no application here. 51 We note that, in this writ proceeding, PERB’s brief appeal's to focus almost exclusively on the foundational issue—whether there w

2017(See generally Wood v. Georgia (1962) 370 U.S. 375, 394 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 569 , 82 S.Ct. 1364 ] [“petitioner was an elected official and had the right to enter the field of political controversy”]; Bond v. Floyd (1966) 385 U.S. 116, 136-137 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 235 , 87 S.Ct. 339 ].) Accordingly, common law principles of “apparent” agency or respondeat superior, which permit a third party to hold a principal liable for the wrongful acts of his agent, have no application here. 51 We note that, in this writ proceeding, PERB’s brief appeal's to focus almost exclusively on the foundational issue—whether there w

2017(See generally Wood v. Georgia (1962) 370 U.S. 375, 394 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 569 , 82 S.Ct. 1364 ] [“petitioner was an elected official and had the right to enter the field of political controversy”]; Bond v. Floyd (1966) 385 U.S. 116, 136-137 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 235 , 87 S.Ct. 339 ].) Accordingly, common law principles of “apparent” agency or respondeat superior, which permit a third party to hold a principal liable for the wrongful acts of his agent, have no application here. 51 We note that, in this writ proceeding, PERB’s brief appeal's to focus almost exclusively on the foundational issue—whether there w

1987(See fn. 7, ante, referring to San Diego Teachers Ass'n v. Superior Court, supra, 24 Cal.3d 1 .) As the decision of the administrative law judge points out, a considerable body of NLRA precedent protects supervisorial and managerial employees from having their career ladders blocked by antiunion discrimination.

1987Accordingly, under the statutory scheme of the EERA which reposes exclusive initial jurisdiction in PERB over such matters (see San Diego Teachers Ass'n v. Superior Court, supra, 24 Cal. 3d at p. 12; see generally discussion of preemption under the NLRA in such decisions as Belknap, Inc. v. Hale (1983) 463 U.S. 491 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 798 , 103 S.Ct. 3172 ] [dis. opn. of Brennan, J.]), we ought not resolve this matter absent PERB analysis and application of policies it finds relevant and appropriate in resolving the matter.

1987Accordingly, under the statutory scheme of the EERA which reposes exclusive initial jurisdiction in PERB over such matters (see San Diego Teachers Ass'n v. Superior Court, supra, 24 Cal. 3d at p. 12; see generally discussion of preemption under the NLRA in such decisions as Belknap, Inc. v. Hale (1983) 463 U.S. 491 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 798 , 103 S.Ct. 3172 ] [dis. opn. of Brennan, J.]), we ought not resolve this matter absent PERB analysis and application of policies it finds relevant and appropriate in resolving the matter.

1987Accordingly, under the statutory scheme of the EERA which reposes exclusive initial jurisdiction in PERB over such matters (see San Diego Teachers Ass'n v. Superior Court, supra, 24 Cal. 3d at p. 12; see generally discussion of preemption under the NLRA in such decisions as Belknap, Inc. v. Hale (1983) 463 U.S. 491 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 798 , 103 S.Ct. 3172 ] [dis. opn. of Brennan, J.]), we ought not resolve this matter absent PERB analysis and application of policies it finds relevant and appropriate in resolving the matter.

1981PERB's claim of constitutional authority under the general police power fails for the same reason. ".... .... .... ... "... [T]he act is constitutionally infirm in the particulars heretofore identified and, because the offending parts relating to wages and salaries are not susceptible to severability, the entire act must fall. ( In re Portnoy (1942) 21 Cal.2d 237, 242 [ 131 P.2d 1 ].) *209 "Ever since the 1913 statutory reform, the vitality of the California merit system has been intimately linked with the principle of like pay for like work.

1981PERB's claim of constitutional authority under the general police power fails for the same reason. ".... .... .... ... "... [T]he act is constitutionally infirm in the particulars heretofore identified and, because the offending parts relating to wages and salaries are not susceptible to severability, the entire act must fall. ( In re Portnoy (1942) 21 Cal.2d 237, 242 [ 131 P.2d 1 ].) *209 "Ever since the 1913 statutory reform, the vitality of the California merit system has been intimately linked with the principle of like pay for like work.