physical injury requirement in California

1998First, ‘the classification is both overinclusive and underinclusive when viewed in the light of its purported purpose of screening false claims.’ ( 27 Cal.3d at p. 928 .) It is overinclusive in that it permits recovery whenever the suffering accompanies or results in physical injury, no matter how trivial (ibid..), yet underinclusive in that it mechanically denies court access to potentially valid claims that could be proved if the plaintiffs were permitted to go to trial (id., at p. 929). [ft] Second, we observed that the physical injury requirement ‘encourages extravagant pleading and distor

1998First, ‘the classification is both overinclusive and underinclusive when viewed in the light of its purported purpose of screening false claims.’ ( 27 Cal.3d at p. 928 .) It is overinclusive in that it permits recovery whenever the suffering accompanies or results in physical injury, no matter how trivial (ibid..), yet underinclusive in that it mechanically denies court access to potentially valid claims that could be proved if the plaintiffs were permitted to go to trial (id., at p. 929). [ft] Second, we observed that the physical injury requirement ‘encourages extravagant pleading and distor

1993(Ibid.) Therefore, rather than adhere to what we perceived as an artificial and often arbitrary means of guarding against fraudulent claims, we acknowledged that “[t]he essential question is one of proof[.]” ( Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 929-930.) Thus, “ ‘[i]n cases other than where proof of mental distress is of a medically significant nature, [citations] the general standard of proof required to support a claim of mental distress is some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case. [Citation.]’ ” (Id., at p. 930, citing Rodrigues v. State (1970) 52 Hawaii 156, 173 [ 472 P.

1993(Ibid.) Therefore, rather than adhere to what we perceived as an artificial and often arbitrary means of guarding against fraudulent claims, we acknowledged that “[t]he essential question is one of proof[.]” ( Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 929-930.) Thus, “ ‘[i]n cases other than where proof of mental distress is of a medically significant nature, [citations] the general standard of proof required to support a claim of mental distress is some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case. [Citation.]’ ” (Id., at p. 930, citing Rodrigues v. State (1970) 52 Hawaii 156, 173 [ 472 P.

1992(See Holliday v. Jones (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 102, 114-115 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 448 ]; cf., Andalon, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 610, fn. 6 .) However, that does not end the matter.

1992(See Holliday v. Jones (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 102, 114-115 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 448 ]; cf., Andalon, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 610, fn. 6 .) However, that does not end the matter.

1992(See Holliday v. Jones (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 102, 114-115 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 448 ]; cf., Andalon, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 610, fn. 6 .) However, that does not end the matter.

1989(Id. at p. 344; see also Bowman v. Doherty (1984) 235 Kan. 870 [ 686 P.2d 112, 119 ], holding that a client-plaintiff must prove wanton or willful conduct by the criminal defense attorney to recover emotional distress damages for legal malpractice.) As we explained earlier, the physical injury requirement has been eliminated in California.

1989(Id. at p. 344; see also Bowman v. Doherty (1984) 235 Kan. 870 [ 686 P.2d 112, 119 ], holding that a client-plaintiff must prove wanton or willful conduct by the criminal defense attorney to recover emotional distress damages for legal malpractice.) As we explained earlier, the physical injury requirement has been eliminated in California.