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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1890–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Pricegreen1 sentence2021(People v. Price (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 536, 542 [“actual prejudice must be shown”].) Prejudice from delay in conducting a hearing or trial typically arises when the delay “impair[s]” “the defense” through the loss of evidence or fading of memories (e.g., Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 532 ), but defendant has made no claim that the postponement of his hearing from May 15 to June 23 caused him any such prejudice. | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Schechtmangreen2 sentences1959(Estate of Armstrong, 8 Cal.2d 204, 206 [1] [ 64 P.2d 1093 ]; Estate of Schechtman, 45 Cal.2d 50, 54 [5] [ 286 P.2d 345 ]; Estate of Herrington, 79 Cal.App.2d 389, 390 [2] [ 179 P.2d 650 ].) The so-called “interlocutory judgment” was not a refusal to make an order mentioned in section 1240, Probate Code, but was merely a postponement of the hearing. 1959(Estate of Armstrong, 8 Cal.2d 204, 206 [1] [ 64 P.2d 1093 ]; Estate of Schechtman, 45 Cal.2d 50, 54 [5] [ 286 P.2d 345 ]; Estate of Herrington, 79 Cal.App.2d 389, 390 [2] [ 179 P.2d 650 ].) The so-called “interlocutory judgment” was not a refusal to make an order mentioned in section 1240, Probate Code, but was merely a postponement of the hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Herrington v. Herringtongreen2 sentences1959(Estate of Armstrong, 8 Cal.2d 204, 206 [1] [ 64 P.2d 1093 ]; Estate of Schechtman, 45 Cal.2d 50, 54 [5] [ 286 P.2d 345 ]; Estate of Herrington, 79 Cal.App.2d 389, 390 [2] [ 179 P.2d 650 ].) The so-called “interlocutory judgment” was not a refusal to make an order mentioned in section 1240, Probate Code, but was merely a postponement of the hearing. 1959(Estate of Armstrong, 8 Cal.2d 204, 206 [1] [ 64 P.2d 1093 ]; Estate of Schechtman, 45 Cal.2d 50, 54 [5] [ 286 P.2d 345 ]; Estate of Herrington, 79 Cal.App.2d 389, 390 [2] [ 179 P.2d 650 ].) The so-called “interlocutory judgment” was not a refusal to make an order mentioned in section 1240, Probate Code, but was merely a postponement of the hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Armstronggreen2 sentences1959(Estate of Armstrong, 8 Cal.2d 204, 206 [1] [ 64 P.2d 1093 ]; Estate of Schechtman, 45 Cal.2d 50, 54 [5] [ 286 P.2d 345 ]; Estate of Herrington, 79 Cal.App.2d 389, 390 [2] [ 179 P.2d 650 ].) The so-called “interlocutory judgment” was not a refusal to make an order mentioned in section 1240, Probate Code, but was merely a postponement of the hearing. 1959(Estate of Armstrong, 8 Cal.2d 204, 206 [1] [ 64 P.2d 1093 ]; Estate of Schechtman, 45 Cal.2d 50, 54 [5] [ 286 P.2d 345 ]; Estate of Herrington, 79 Cal.App.2d 389, 390 [2] [ 179 P.2d 650 ].) The so-called “interlocutory judgment” was not a refusal to make an order mentioned in section 1240, Probate Code, but was merely a postponement of the hearing. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingo
green
1 sentence2021(People v. Price (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 536, 542 [“actual prejudice must be shown”].) Prejudice from delay in conducting a hearing or trial typically arises when the delay “impair[s]” “the defense” through the loss of evidence or fading of memories (e.g., Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 532 ), but defendant has made no claim that the postponement of his hearing from May 15 to June 23 caused him any such prejudice. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
SWAB FINANCIAL v. E Trade Securities
green
1 sentence2016(SWAB, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 1198 .) Mattos advised Rad in December 2013 that he intended to set the arbitration for late January or early February 2014. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Olivera v. Grace
green
1 sentence1985(Olivera v. Grace, supra, 19 Cal.2d 570, 578-579 .) In his response in the superior court, which incorporated his letters to the hearing officer and to the Labor Commissioner, appellant provided sufficient factual basis upon which the court might conclude he had been improperly denied a postponement of the hearing before the Labor Commissioner, thus entitling him to vacation of that determination. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Beaudreau v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1979“We start with the basic proposition that in every case involving a deprivation of property within the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution requires some form of notice and hearing. [Citations.] Absent extraordinary circumstances justifying resort to summary procedures, this hearing must take place before an individual is deprived of a significant property interest. [Citations.]” (Beaudreau v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.3d 448, 458 ; initial italics added.) In the case of Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 556 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 ], the United States Supreme Court | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Fuentes v. Shevin
green
2 sentences1979“We start with the basic proposition that in every case involving a deprivation of property within the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution requires some form of notice and hearing. [Citations.] Absent extraordinary circumstances justifying resort to summary procedures, this hearing must take place before an individual is deprived of a significant property interest. [Citations.]” (Beaudreau v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.3d 448, 458 ; initial italics added.) In the case of Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 556 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 ], the United States Supreme Court 1979“We start with the basic proposition that in every case involving a deprivation of property within the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution requires some form of notice and hearing. [Citations.] Absent extraordinary circumstances justifying resort to summary procedures, this hearing must take place before an individual is deprived of a significant property interest. [Citations.]” (Beaudreau v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.3d 448, 458 ; initial italics added.) In the case of Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 556 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 ], the United States Supreme Court | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Baker v. Superior Court
neutral
1 sentence1890It does not, as counsel seem to suppose, require that the state should have been made a formal party to this proceeding, by being named as a defendant in the petition or writ, but only that the names of the parties really interested should be disclosed by the petition, and that service of a copy of the petition and writ should be made upon them. {Baker v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 583 .) The effect, therefore, of a failure to serve such parties would not be an abatement of the whole proceeding, but, at most, to require a postponement of the hearing or trial until they could be served and have a | 1 | 1890–1890 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.