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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1936–1966 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Yuma Motor Freight Terminal Co.green2 sentences1954In conducting the inquiry we must consider all the evidence and all reasonable inferences that tend to support a finding, disregarding all conflicts, a principle well expressed in Jones v. Yuma Motor F. Terminal Co., 45 Cal.App.2d 497, 500-501 [ 114 P.2d 438 ], when testing the propriety of giving an instruction on the doctrine of last clear chance: “. . .we must consider all of the evidence before the court regardless of which party presented it and, disregarding conflicts, must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the contention that the doctrine is applicable, indulging every re 1954In conducting the inquiry we must consider all the evidence and all reasonable inferences that tend to support a finding, disregarding all conflicts, a principle well expressed in Jones v. Yuma Motor F. Terminal Co., 45 Cal.App.2d 497, 500-501 [ 114 P.2d 438 ], when testing the propriety of giving an instruction on the doctrine of last clear chance: “. . .we must consider all of the evidence before the court regardless of which party presented it and, disregarding conflicts, must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the contention that the doctrine is applicable, indulging every re | 2 | 2 |
Knickrihm v. Hazelgreen2 sentences1954If under any reasonable view of the evidence the doctrine could apply it was proper to give instructions on the subject.” Concerning the propriety of giving an instruction on the subject here involved, this principle has been expressed in these words: “While there is no legal presumption that one is intoxicated because he has taken a drink of liquor, it is within the province of the trial court or the jury to take into consideration the number of drinks of intoxicating liquor which one has imbibed, and his subsequent actions, in determining whether at the time of the accident such person is in 1954If under any reasonable view of the evidence the doctrine could apply it was proper to give instructions on the subject.” Concerning the propriety of giving an instruction on the subject here involved, this principle has been expressed in these words: “While there is no legal presumption that one is intoxicated because he has taken a drink of liquor, it is within the province of the trial court or the jury to take into consideration the number of drinks of intoxicating liquor which one has imbibed, and his subsequent actions, in determining whether at the time of the accident such person is in | 2 | 2 |
People v. McNealgreen2 sentences1961The decisive question on this appeal is, Did the court commit prejudicial error in giving the instruction on “Lying in Wait.” * Penal Code section 189, in part, reads: “All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, ... is murder of the first degree. . . .” People v. Merkouris, 46 Cal.2d 540 [ 297 P.2d 999 ], at page 559, states: “ [I]n order to constitute lying in wait the elements of w 1961The decisive question on this appeal is, Did the court commit prejudicial error in giving the instruction on “Lying in Wait.” * Penal Code section 189, in part, reads: “All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, ... is murder of the first degree. . . .” People v. Merkouris, 46 Cal.2d 540 [ 297 P.2d 999 ], at page 559, states: “ [I]n order to constitute lying in wait the elements of w | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Modesto
green
2 sentences1966The court felt compelled to give it because of People v. Modesto (1965) 62 Cal.2d 436 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 417 , 398 P.2d 753 ], but with commendable foresight preferred not to because of evolving principles in the Supreme Court of the United States. 1966The court felt compelled to give it because of People v. Modesto (1965) 62 Cal.2d 436 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 417 , 398 P.2d 753 ], but with commendable foresight preferred not to because of evolving principles in the Supreme Court of the United States. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
People v. Graham
green
2 sentences1962The propriety of giving the instruction on the presumption of innocence along with the standard instruction on malice was recognized and discussed in People v. Graham, supra, 191 Cal. App.2d 521, 530-532 , consistent with the prosecution's full reliance on the introduction of evidence rather than on any presumption to show appellant's malice. [23] 2. 1962The propriety of giving the instruction on the presumption of innocence along with the standard instruction on malice was recognized and discussed in People v. Graham, supra, 191 Cal.App.2d 521, 530-532 , consistent with the prosecution’s full reliance on the introduction of evidence rather than on any presumption to show appellant’s malice. 2. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
People v. Merkouris
green
2 sentences1961The decisive question on this appeal is, Did the court commit prejudicial error in giving the instruction on “Lying in Wait.” * Penal Code section 189, in part, reads: “All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, ... is murder of the first degree. . . .” People v. Merkouris, 46 Cal.2d 540 [ 297 P.2d 999 ], at page 559, states: “ [I]n order to constitute lying in wait the elements of w 1961The decisive question on this appeal is, Did the court commit prejudicial error in giving the instruction on “Lying in Wait.” * Penal Code section 189, in part, reads: “All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, ... is murder of the first degree. . . .” People v. Merkouris, 46 Cal.2d 540 [ 297 P.2d 999 ], at page 559, states: “ [I]n order to constitute lying in wait the elements of w | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Paulsen v. McDuffie
green
1 sentence1936(See Paulsen v. McDuffie, 4 Cal. (2d) 111 [ 47 Pac. (2d) 709 ].) In view of the giving of the instructions by which the presumption was made applicable to both the deceased and the truck driver, it cannot be successfully argued that defendants were prejudiced by the giving of the instruction making the presumption applicable to the conduct of the deceased. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.