recess without hearing in California

2023(Id. at pp. 1223–1224; Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 752 .) Due to the immediate recess, the Dorsey court held that “the prosecutor had no opportunity, meaningful or otherwise, to object.” (Dorsey, at p. 1224; Gonzalez, at p. 752.) Here, unlike Dorsey, the record shows that the trial court, after pronouncing the sentence and stating its reasons, therefore, did not immediately declare a recess without hearing from the parties.

2023(Id. at pp. 1223–1224; Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 752 .) Due to the immediate recess, the Dorsey court held that “the prosecutor had no opportunity, meaningful or otherwise, to object.” (Dorsey, at p. 1224; Gonzalez, at p. 752.) Here, unlike Dorsey, the record shows that the trial court, after pronouncing the sentence and stating its reasons, therefore, did not immediately declare a recess without hearing from the parties.

2023(Cf., People v. Superior Court (Dorsey) (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1224 [trial court placed the defendant on probation in the interest of justice even though he was presumptively ineligible and then immediately declared a recess without hearing from either party did not provide a meaningful opportunity to object].) In any event, we see no prejudicial error resulting from the trial court’s two brief passing references to violence during the sentencing hearing, made in the context of orally reviewing the contents of the probation report with the parties.

2020(People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 752 (Gonzalez).) For example, in People v. Superior Court (Dorsey) (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1216 , the trial court placed the defendant on probation and “immediately declared a recess without hearing from either party.” ( Gonzalez, supra, at p. 752 , citing Dorsey, supra, at p. 1224 .) The defendant was presumptively ineligible for probation, but “the prosecutor had no opportunity, meaningful or otherwise, to object.” ( Dorsey, supra, at p. 1224 .) Therefore, an appeal of the sentence was permissible despite the lack of any objections.

2016(Id. at pp. 1223- 1224; see People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 752 (Gonzalez).) Because of the 21 immediate recess, the Dorsey court held that "the prosecutor had no opportunity, meaningful or otherwise, to object." (Dorsey, at p. 1224; see Gonzalez, at p. 752.) Here, Flores forfeited his claim that the court abused its sentencing discretion in denying probation and imposing the upper prison term of three years because he is complaining on appeal that the court misweighed the various mitigating and aggravating factors, he had a meaningful opportunity to object to the court's discretiona