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6 California opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2023(Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 522 ; accord, Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 233 .) The Courts of Appeal have generally assumed the same must be true in evaluating claims of due process violations in the SVP context. 2022Although an uncommonly long delay in bringing a case to trial may give rise to a “presumption of prejudice” sufficient “to trigger the Barker enquiry,” in balancing the Barker factors, the trial court must nonetheless consider whether defendant suffered unjustified prejudice as a result of the delay. ( Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 234, 235–236.)6 6 Once “a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation has been established, reversal of a subsequent judgment of conviction and dismissal of the charge are necessary in every case. | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Loud Hawkgreen1 sentence2022(See id. at p. 541; see also Loud Hawk, supra, 474 U.S. at pp. 307-308, 311-312 [applying MacDonald to exclude from the Sixth Amendment speedy trial analysis time during which defendants were freed without restraint while the government appealed the district court’s dismissal of the original indictment against them].) The election by a prosecuting attorney not to file a complaint within the initial 25 days contemplated by section 853.6 places the arrestee in a position that is indistinguishable, for Sixth Amendment speedy trial purposes, from an arrestee who is free pending an ongoing investig | 1 | 1 |
Gallenkamp v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1997(Id. at p. 533 [ 92 S.Ct. at p. 2193 ].) To prevail on a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim, a defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice unless “ ‘the first three Barker factors weighed heavily against the government. . . .’ [Citations.]” (Gallenkamp v. Superior Court (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1, 18 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 346 ].) Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has established that a trial court must consider how much time had passed beyond the “presumptive prejudice” threshold. 1997(Id. at p. 533 [ 92 S.Ct. at p. 2193 ].) To prevail on a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim, a defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice unless “ ‘the first three Barker factors weighed heavily against the government. . . .’ [Citations.]” (Gallenkamp v. Superior Court (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1, 18 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 346 ].) Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has established that a trial court must consider how much time had passed beyond the “presumptive prejudice” threshold. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. MacDonaldgreen2 sentences1985Formal charges must be pending. ( United States v. MacDonald (1982) 456 U.S. 1, 7 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 696, 703 , 102 S.Ct. 1497 ].) Prearrest delay may give rise to a due process claim, but only delay following formal accusation or delay subsequent to arrest are considered in evaluating a claim under the Sixth Amendment speedy trial clause. ( Ibid. ) In United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 307 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 468 , 92 S.Ct. 455 ], the United States Supreme Court explained the purposes of the speedy trial guarantee and, in so doing, referred to filing of an information or indictment as the triggering 1985Formal charges must be pending. ( United States v. MacDonald (1982) 456 U.S. 1, 7 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 696, 703 , 102 S.Ct. 1497 ].) Prearrest delay may give rise to a due process claim, but only delay following formal accusation or delay subsequent to arrest are considered in evaluating a claim under the Sixth Amendment speedy trial clause. ( Ibid. ) In United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 307 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 468 , 92 S.Ct. 455 ], the United States Supreme Court explained the purposes of the speedy trial guarantee and, in so doing, referred to filing of an information or indictment as the triggering | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences2024That right cannot be “quantified into a specified number of days or months.” (Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 523 .) Rather, a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim is determined by balancing all relevant factors, particularly the length and reason for the delay, whether the defendant asserted the right, and prejudice to the defendant. 1997(Id. at p. 533 [ 92 S.Ct. at p. 2193 ].) To prevail on a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim, a defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice unless “ ‘the first three Barker factors weighed heavily against the government. . . .’ [Citations.]” (Gallenkamp v. Superior Court (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1, 18 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 346 ].) Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has established that a trial court must consider how much time had passed beyond the “presumptive prejudice” threshold. | 3 | 1997–2024 |
Serna v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2022When unjustified prejudice to the defendant’s ability to defend has been established there can be no question that reversal and dismissal are required.” (Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239, 263 .) 5 Defendant’s claim under the federal Constitution may be rejected rather summarily. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
United States v. Marion
green
2 sentences1985Formal charges must be pending. ( United States v. MacDonald (1982) 456 U.S. 1, 7 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 696, 703 , 102 S.Ct. 1497 ].) Prearrest delay may give rise to a due process claim, but only delay following formal accusation or delay subsequent to arrest are considered in evaluating a claim under the Sixth Amendment speedy trial clause. ( Ibid. ) In United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 307 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 468 , 92 S.Ct. 455 ], the United States Supreme Court explained the purposes of the speedy trial guarantee and, in so doing, referred to filing of an information or indictment as the triggering 1985Formal charges must be pending. ( United States v. MacDonald (1982) 456 U.S. 1, 7 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 696, 703 , 102 S.Ct. 1497 ].) Prearrest delay may give rise to a due process claim, but only delay following formal accusation or delay subsequent to arrest are considered in evaluating a claim under the Sixth Amendment speedy trial clause. ( Ibid. ) In United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 307 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 468 , 92 S.Ct. 455 ], the United States Supreme Court explained the purposes of the speedy trial guarantee and, in so doing, referred to filing of an information or indictment as the triggering | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.