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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Navellier v. Slettengreen2 sentences2018Rather, the anti-SLAPP statute applies to all claims that are based on acts in furtherance of protected rights of petition and free speech. (§ 425.16, subds. (b)(1), (e); see Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89 .) 22 Further, and contrary to MBT’s suggestion, Ruiz’s filing of his complaint against MBAG did not prevent MBT from seeking to enforce Ruiz’s performance of the 2010 arbitration agreements with MBT. “[T]he anti-SLAPP statute [does not] allow[] a defendant to escape the consequences of wrongful conduct by asserting a spurious First Amendment defense. [Citation.] In fact, the statute 2018Rather, the anti-SLAPP statute applies to all claims that are based on acts in furtherance of protected rights of petition and free speech. (§ 425.16, subds. (b)(1), (e); see Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89 .) 22 Further, and contrary to MBT’s suggestion, Ruiz’s filing of his complaint against MBAG did not prevent MBT from seeking to enforce Ruiz’s performance of the 2010 arbitration agreements with MBT. “[T]he anti-SLAPP statute [does not] allow[] a defendant to escape the consequences of wrongful conduct by asserting a spurious First Amendment defense. [Citation.] In fact, the statute | 2 | 4 |
Daimlerchrysler Motors Co. v. Lew Williams, Inc.green1 sentence2015In its brief, the District quotes a statement from the trial court to that effect: "I am just not sure you can ever get a breach of contract out of what they said to FERC, and that is what I'm really struggling with, that that wouldn't fall under their free speech rights at that point." The Supreme Court has expressly rejected this view: "[P]laintiffs fall prey . . . to the fallacy that the anti-SLAPP statute allows a defendant to escape the consequences of wrongful conduct by asserting a spurious First Amendment defense. [Citation.] In fact, the statute does not bar a plaintiff from litigatin | 1 | 1 |
Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp.green2 sentences2002(See Ericsson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1601 .) In fact, the statute does not bar a plaintiff from litigating an action that arises out of the defendant’s free speech or petitioning (see Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 63); it subjects to potential dismissal only those actions in which the plaintiff cannot “state [] and substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 412). 10 Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion, moreover, applying the antiSLAPP statute to an action based, as this one is, on alleged breach of a release does not take away from the releasee the c 2002(See Ericsson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1601 , 57 Cal. Rptr.2d 491 .) In fact, the statute does not bar a plaintiff from litigating an action that arises out of the defendant's free speech or petitioning (see Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 63, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 , 52 P.3d 685 ); it subjects to potential dismissal only those actions in which the plaintiff cannot "state[ ] and substantiate[ ] a legally sufficient claim" ( Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 412, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875 , 926 P.2d 1061 ). [10] Contrary to plaintiffs' suggestion, *540 moreover, applying the anti-SLAPP statute to a | 1 | 1 |
Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.green2 sentences2002(See Ericsson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1601 .) In fact, the statute does not bar a plaintiff from litigating an action that arises out of the defendant’s free speech or petitioning (see Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 63); it subjects to potential dismissal only those actions in which the plaintiff cannot “state [] and substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 412). 10 Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion, moreover, applying the antiSLAPP statute to an action based, as this one is, on alleged breach of a release does not take away from the releasee the c 2002(See Ericsson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1601 .) In fact, the statute does not bar a plaintiff from litigating an action that arises out of the defendant’s free speech or petitioning (see Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 63); it subjects to potential dismissal only those actions in which the plaintiff cannot “state [] and substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 412). 10 Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion, moreover, applying the antiSLAPP statute to an action based, as this one is, on alleged breach of a release does not take away from the releasee the c | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting Inc.
green
2 sentences2016(Hunter, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1521 .) The majority, however, concludes that if CNN‘s actions are covered by the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute, it will have a ―special immunity from generally applicable laws.‖ (Maj. opn. ante, at p. 13.) This point, like a similar argument rejected in Hunter, is ―predicated on the ‗fallacy that the anti-SLAPP statute allows a defendant to escape the consequences of wrongful conduct by asserting a spurious First Amendment defense. [Citation.] In fact, the statute does not bar a plaintiff from litigating an action that arises out of the defendant‘ 2016(Hunter, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1521 .) The majority, however, concludes that if CNN‘s actions are covered by the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute, it will have a ―special immunity from generally applicable laws.‖ (Maj. opn. ante, at p. 13.) This point, like a similar argument rejected in Hunter, is ―predicated on the ‗fallacy that the anti-SLAPP statute allows a defendant to escape the consequences of wrongful conduct by asserting a spurious First Amendment defense. [Citation.] In fact, the statute does not bar a plaintiff from litigating an action that arises out of the defendant‘ | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Ericsson Ge Mobile Communications, Inc. v. C.S.I. Telecommunications Engineers
yellow
2 sentences2002(See Ericsson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1601 .) In fact, the statute does not bar a plaintiff from litigating an action that arises out of the defendant’s free speech or petitioning (see Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 63); it subjects to potential dismissal only those actions in which the plaintiff cannot “state [] and substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 412). 10 Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion, moreover, applying the antiSLAPP statute to an action based, as this one is, on alleged breach of a release does not take away from the releasee the c 2002(See Ericsson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1601 , 57 Cal. Rptr.2d 491 .) In fact, the statute does not bar a plaintiff from litigating an action that arises out of the defendant's free speech or petitioning (see Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 63, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 , 52 P.3d 685 ); it subjects to potential dismissal only those actions in which the plaintiff cannot "state[ ] and substantiate[ ] a legally sufficient claim" ( Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 412, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875 , 926 P.2d 1061 ). [10] Contrary to plaintiffs' suggestion, *540 moreover, applying the anti-SLAPP statute to a | 1 | 2002–2002 |