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6 California opinions name it 1 courts 2002–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. Californiayellow2 sentences2016According to him, he suffered prejudice under the state prejudice standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (whether there was a reasonable probability of a more favorable result but for the trial court’s error) and the federal prejudice standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 2016According to him, he suffered prejudice under the state prejudice standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (whether there was a reasonable probability of a more favorable result but for the trial court’s error) and the federal prejudice standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). | 2 | 4 |
People v. Watsongreen2 sentences2016According to him, he suffered prejudice under the state prejudice standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (whether there was a reasonable probability of a more favorable result but for the trial court’s error) and the federal prejudice standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 2016According to him, he suffered prejudice under the state prejudice standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (whether there was a reasonable probability of a more favorable result but for the trial court’s error) and the federal prejudice standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). | 1 | 6 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2016(Smith, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193 [“the proper standard for evaluating an alleged erroneous failure to instruct on the statute of limitations is the traditional state prejudice standard set out in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818”]; see also People v. Thomas (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1290 [reviewing failure to instruct regarding statute extending statute of limitations for error under Watson standard], disapproved of on another ground by People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400 ; but see People v. Stanfill (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1154 [reviewing failure to instruct on statut 2007(People v. Smith, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193 .) Under the Watson standard, we reverse when there exists a reasonable probability the defendant would have received a more favorable outcome had the error not occurred based on the evidence as a whole. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Stanfillgreen2 sentences2016(Smith, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193 [“the proper standard for evaluating an alleged erroneous failure to instruct on the statute of limitations is the traditional state prejudice standard set out in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818”]; see also People v. Thomas (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1290 [reviewing failure to instruct regarding statute extending statute of limitations for error under Watson standard], disapproved of on another ground by People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400 ; but see People v. Stanfill (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1154 [reviewing failure to instruct on statut 2002(People v. Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 770-772 [noting “[c]riminal statutes of limitation appear no more rooted in the Constitution or the traditions underlying the American legal system than their civil counterparts” and rejecting a due process claim against retroactive application of a change in the statute of limitations].) We are aware that in People v. Stanfill (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1154 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885 ], the court applied the federal *1194 Chapman 11 harmless error standard to the failure to instruct on the statute of limitations. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Thomasred1 sentence2016(Smith, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193 [“the proper standard for evaluating an alleged erroneous failure to instruct on the statute of limitations is the traditional state prejudice standard set out in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818”]; see also People v. Thomas (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1290 [reviewing failure to instruct regarding statute extending statute of limitations for error under Watson standard], disapproved of on another ground by People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400 ; but see People v. Stanfill (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1154 [reviewing failure to instruct on statut | 1 | 1 |
People v. Crosbygreen2 sentences2003In reaching this conclusion, we initially reject an important premise underlying Athar's contention: that the statute of limitations is an "essential element of the offense charged." [5] His assertion is undermined by People v. Frazer (1999) 21 Cal.4th 737 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 , 982 P.2d 180 ( Frazer ), in which the court addressed the retroactive application of a statute extending the statute of limitations in certain instances of child sexual abuse and held such application does not violate ex post facto law. ( Frazer, supra, at p. 742 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 , 982 P.2d 180 .) In so holding, th 2003In reaching this conclusion, we initially reject an important premise underlying Athar's contention: that the statute of limitations is an "essential element of the offense charged." [5] His assertion is undermined by People v. Frazer (1999) 21 Cal.4th 737 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 , 982 P.2d 180 ( Frazer ), in which the court addressed the retroactive application of a statute extending the statute of limitations in certain instances of child sexual abuse and held such application does not violate ex post facto law. ( Frazer, supra, at p. 742 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 , 982 P.2d 180 .) In so holding, th | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Stanfillgreen2 sentences2016(Smith, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193 [“the proper standard for evaluating an alleged erroneous failure to instruct on the statute of limitations is the traditional state prejudice standard set out in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818”]; see also People v. Thomas (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1290 [reviewing failure to instruct regarding statute extending statute of limitations for error under Watson standard], disapproved of on another ground by People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400 ; but see People v. Stanfill (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1154 [reviewing failure to instruct on statut 2002(People v. Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 770-772 [noting “[c]riminal statutes of limitation appear no more rooted in the Constitution or the traditions underlying the American legal system than their civil counterparts” and rejecting a due process claim against retroactive application of a change in the statute of limitations].) We are aware that in People v. Stanfill (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1154 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885 ], the court applied the federal *1194 Chapman 11 harmless error standard to the failure to instruct on the statute of limitations. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Shockley
green
1 sentence2016(Smith, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193 [“the proper standard for evaluating an alleged erroneous failure to instruct on the statute of limitations is the traditional state prejudice standard set out in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818”]; see also People v. Thomas (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1290 [reviewing failure to instruct regarding statute extending statute of limitations for error under Watson standard], disapproved of on another ground by People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400 ; but see People v. Stanfill (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1154 [reviewing failure to instruct on statut | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
1 sentence2007Prejudice Analysis Even if we were to hold the court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury regarding former section 803, subdivision (g), we would find the error harmless under the state prejudice standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ] (Watson). *1290 Because we have concluded that the former section 803, subdivision (g) extension is not equivalent to an element under Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466 , we reject defendant’s contention that the relevant prejudice standard is the more stringent standard of prejudicial error under Chapman v. California (19 | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Bell
red
2 sentences2003In reaching this conclusion, we initially reject an important premise underlying Athar's contention: that the statute of limitations is an "essential element of the offense charged." [5] His assertion is undermined by People v. Frazer (1999) 21 Cal.4th 737 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 , 982 P.2d 180 ( Frazer ), in which the court addressed the retroactive application of a statute extending the statute of limitations in certain instances of child sexual abuse and held such application does not violate ex post facto law. ( Frazer, supra, at p. 742 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 , 982 P.2d 180 .) In so holding, th 2003In reaching this conclusion, we initially reject an important premise underlying Athar's contention: that the statute of limitations is an "essential element of the offense charged." [5] His assertion is undermined by People v. Frazer (1999) 21 Cal.4th 737 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 , 982 P.2d 180 ( Frazer ), in which the court addressed the retroactive application of a statute extending the statute of limitations in certain instances of child sexual abuse and held such application does not violate ex post facto law. ( Frazer, supra, at p. 742 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 , 982 P.2d 180 .) In so holding, th | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Cowan v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2003In reaching this conclusion, we initially reject an important premise underlying Athar's contention: that the statute of limitations is an "essential element of the offense charged." [5] His assertion is undermined by People v. Frazer (1999) 21 Cal.4th 737 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 , 982 P.2d 180 ( Frazer ), in which the court addressed the retroactive application of a statute extending the statute of limitations in certain instances of child sexual abuse and held such application does not violate ex post facto law. ( Frazer, supra, at p. 742 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 , 982 P.2d 180 .) In so holding, th 2003In reaching this conclusion, we initially reject an important premise underlying Athar's contention: that the statute of limitations is an "essential element of the offense charged." [5] His assertion is undermined by People v. Frazer (1999) 21 Cal.4th 737 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 , 982 P.2d 180 ( Frazer ), in which the court addressed the retroactive application of a statute extending the statute of limitations in certain instances of child sexual abuse and held such application does not violate ex post facto law. ( Frazer, supra, at p. 742 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 , 982 P.2d 180 .) In so holding, th | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Frazer
red
2 sentences2003In reaching this conclusion, we initially reject an important premise underlying Athar's contention: that the statute of limitations is an "essential element of the offense charged." [5] His assertion is undermined by People v. Frazer (1999) 21 Cal.4th 737 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 , 982 P.2d 180 ( Frazer ), in which the court addressed the retroactive application of a statute extending the statute of limitations in certain instances of child sexual abuse and held such application does not violate ex post facto law. ( Frazer, supra, at p. 742 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 , 982 P.2d 180 .) In so holding, th 2003In reaching this conclusion, we initially reject an important premise underlying Athar's contention: that the statute of limitations is an "essential element of the offense charged." [5] His assertion is undermined by People v. Frazer (1999) 21 Cal.4th 737 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 , 982 P.2d 180 ( Frazer ), in which the court addressed the retroactive application of a statute extending the statute of limitations in certain instances of child sexual abuse and held such application does not violate ex post facto law. ( Frazer, supra, at p. 742 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 , 982 P.2d 180 .) In so holding, th | 1 | 2003–2003 |