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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hillgreen2 sentences2010Section 795's enactment two years later tempered Shirley 's effect by allowing some witnesses who had been hypnotized to testify under certain conditions. ( People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 430, fn. 1 (conc. opn. of Kaus, J.) [§ 795 "modifies Shirley by authorizing a witness who has previously undergone hypnosis to testify to matters which the witness recalled and related prior to the hypnosis, so long as a number of specified safeguards are followed"].) It is the holding of Shirley , not section 795, that is the basis for excluding a previously hypnotized witness's testimony, a situat 2010(People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 430, fn. 1 (conc. opn. of Kaus, J.) [§ 795 “modifies Shirley by authorizing a witness who has previously undergone hypnosis to testify to matters which the witness recalled and related prior to the hypnosis, so long as a number of specified safeguards are followed”].) It is the holding of Shirley , not section 795, that is the basis for excluding a previously hypnotized witness’s testimony, a situation somewhat akin to the operation of the hearsay rule and the statutory exceptions to that rule. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Alcalagreen2 sentences2010(See People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 773, fn. 10 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d *882 432, 842 P.2d 1192 ] [§ 795 sets forth conditions “which, if met, permit a trial court to determine that the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness is not rendered inadmissible by ‘the fact that the witness has previously undergone hypnosis for the purpose of recalling events which are the subject of the witnesses] testimony’ ”]; Evid. 2010(See People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 773, fn. 10 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d *882 432, 842 P.2d 1192 ] [§ 795 sets forth conditions “which, if met, permit a trial court to determine that the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness is not rendered inadmissible by ‘the fact that the witness has previously undergone hypnosis for the purpose of recalling events which are the subject of the witnesses] testimony’ ”]; Evid. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hopkinsgreen1 sentence2024(In re A.C. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 262, 266 , citing Gonzales, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 371, 380; cf. People v. Hopkins (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 669, 674 (Hopkins) [§ 1024’s “interference” with a patient’s interest in the confidentiality of the psychotherapist relationship was both “reasonable” and “proper”].) There was a question raised below whether Ellsworth was a “psychotherapist” within the meaning of the privilege, although there was no dispute that Victoria was a “patient,” and the trial court ultimately found that he was. | 1 | 1 |
Fish v. Super. Ct.green1 sentence2024(Fish, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at 23. p. 817.) Nevertheless, “ ‘[d]espite its broad and protective nature, the psychotherapist– patient privilege is not absolute. [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at p. 818.) “Upon a proper showing, the records of psychotherapy may be disclosed in litigation.” (Story, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1014 .) As noted above, among the statutory exceptions to the privilege, section 1024 states that “[t]here is no privilege … if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the person | 1 | 1 |
Solon v. Lichtensteingreen2 sentences1995(See Privileged Communications, supra, 71 Yale L.J. at p. 1252, fn. 175.) For this reason, courts do not distinguish between privileged and nonprivileged communications between an attorney and a client made in the same consultation, except perhaps when it is manifest that the client intended certain communications to be nonconfidential, as when he or she makes the same or similar communications to a third party (see Solon v. Lichtenstein (1952) 39 Cal.2d 75, 80 [ 244 P.2d 907 ]), or when the statement falls within one of the statutory exceptions to the privilege (see Evid. 1995(See Privileged Communications, supra, 71 Yale L.J. at p. 1252, fn. 175.) For this reason, courts do not distinguish between privileged and nonprivileged communications between an attorney and a client made in the same consultation, except perhaps when it is manifest that the client intended certain communications to be nonconfidential, as when he or she makes the same or similar communications to a third party (see Solon v. Lichtenstein (1952) 39 Cal.2d 75, 80 [ 244 P.2d 907 ]), or when the statement falls within one of the statutory exceptions to the privilege (see Evid. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. A.C. (In re A.C.)
green
1 sentence2024(In re A.C. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 262, 266 , citing Gonzales, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 371, 380; cf. People v. Hopkins (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 669, 674 (Hopkins) [§ 1024’s “interference” with a patient’s interest in the confidentiality of the psychotherapist relationship was both “reasonable” and “proper”].) There was a question raised below whether Ellsworth was a “psychotherapist” within the meaning of the privilege, although there was no dispute that Victoria was a “patient,” and the trial court ultimately found that he was. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Gonzales
green
1 sentence2024(In re A.C. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 262, 266 , citing Gonzales, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 371, 380; cf. People v. Hopkins (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 669, 674 (Hopkins) [§ 1024’s “interference” with a patient’s interest in the confidentiality of the psychotherapist relationship was both “reasonable” and “proper”].) There was a question raised below whether Ellsworth was a “psychotherapist” within the meaning of the privilege, although there was no dispute that Victoria was a “patient,” and the trial court ultimately found that he was. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Story v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2024(Fish, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at 23. p. 817.) Nevertheless, “ ‘[d]espite its broad and protective nature, the psychotherapist– patient privilege is not absolute. [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at p. 818.) “Upon a proper showing, the records of psychotherapy may be disclosed in litigation.” (Story, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1014 .) As noted above, among the statutory exceptions to the privilege, section 1024 states that “[t]here is no privilege … if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the person | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Cates Construction, Inc. v. Talbot Partners
green
1 sentence2011It relies upon the general rule codified in Civil Code section 2810 that “a surety is entitled to assert as defenses to payment of a surety bond all defenses available to its principal” ( Cates, supra, 21 Cal.4th 28, 48 ), and denies the statutory exceptions to this rule set forth in Civil Code sections 2810 and 2825 apply to Solano’s CIGA defenses, as the trial court ruled. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Pepper v. Litton
green
2 sentences1961Code, § 311, as it is now contained in Corp. Code, § 820, was not in existence); Stewart v. Stewart Hotel Co., 33 Cal.App. 167 [ 164 P. 620 ] (same category); Tiedje v. Aluminum, Taper Milling Go., supra (reversing dismissal judgment on sustaining of general demurrer to complaint alleging complainant ignorant of true facts, thus excluding the case from both the statutory exceptions rule (§ 820) and the in pari delicto rule) ; Mindenberg v. Carmel Film Productions, Inc., 132 Cal.App.2d 598 [ 282 P.2d 1024 ] (fraud and conspiracy charged but not proved on dispute over sale of corporate stock, ju 1961Code, § 311, as it is now contained in Corp. Code, § 820, was not in existence); Stewart v. Stewart Hotel Co., 33 Cal.App. 167 [ 164 P. 620 ] (same category); Tiedje v. Aluminum, Taper Milling Go., supra (reversing dismissal judgment on sustaining of general demurrer to complaint alleging complainant ignorant of true facts, thus excluding the case from both the statutory exceptions rule (§ 820) and the in pari delicto rule) ; Mindenberg v. Carmel Film Productions, Inc., 132 Cal.App.2d 598 [ 282 P.2d 1024 ] (fraud and conspiracy charged but not proved on dispute over sale of corporate stock, ju | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Mindenberg v. Carmel Film Productions, Inc.
green
2 sentences1961Code, § 311, as it is now contained in Corp. Code, § 820, was not in existence); Stewart v. Stewart Hotel Co., 33 Cal.App. 167 [ 164 P. 620 ] (same category); Tiedje v. Aluminum, Taper Milling Go., supra (reversing dismissal judgment on sustaining of general demurrer to complaint alleging complainant ignorant of true facts, thus excluding the case from both the statutory exceptions rule (§ 820) and the in pari delicto rule) ; Mindenberg v. Carmel Film Productions, Inc., 132 Cal.App.2d 598 [ 282 P.2d 1024 ] (fraud and conspiracy charged but not proved on dispute over sale of corporate stock, ju 1961Code, § 311, as it is now contained in Corp. Code, § 820, was not in existence); Stewart v. Stewart Hotel Co., 33 Cal.App. 167 [ 164 P. 620 ] (same category); Tiedje v. Aluminum, Taper Milling Go., supra (reversing dismissal judgment on sustaining of general demurrer to complaint alleging complainant ignorant of true facts, thus excluding the case from both the statutory exceptions rule (§ 820) and the in pari delicto rule) ; Mindenberg v. Carmel Film Productions, Inc., 132 Cal.App.2d 598 [ 282 P.2d 1024 ] (fraud and conspiracy charged but not proved on dispute over sale of corporate stock, ju | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Stewart v. Stewart Hotel Co.
neutral
2 sentences1961Code, § 311, as it is now contained in Corp. Code, § 820, was not in existence); Stewart v. Stewart Hotel Co., 33 Cal.App. 167 [ 164 P. 620 ] (same category); Tiedje v. Aluminum, Taper Milling Go., supra (reversing dismissal judgment on sustaining of general demurrer to complaint alleging complainant ignorant of true facts, thus excluding the case from both the statutory exceptions rule (§ 820) and the in pari delicto rule) ; Mindenberg v. Carmel Film Productions, Inc., 132 Cal.App.2d 598 [ 282 P.2d 1024 ] (fraud and conspiracy charged but not proved on dispute over sale of corporate stock, ju 1961Code, § 311, as it is now contained in Corp. Code, § 820, was not in existence); Stewart v. Stewart Hotel Co., 33 Cal.App. 167 [ 164 P. 620 ] (same category); Tiedje v. Aluminum, Taper Milling Go., supra (reversing dismissal judgment on sustaining of general demurrer to complaint alleging complainant ignorant of true facts, thus excluding the case from both the statutory exceptions rule (§ 820) and the in pari delicto rule) ; Mindenberg v. Carmel Film Productions, Inc., 132 Cal.App.2d 598 [ 282 P.2d 1024 ] (fraud and conspiracy charged but not proved on dispute over sale of corporate stock, ju | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.