taxpayer standing doctrine in California

2023In Wirin v. Parker, supra, 31 We are aware of the recent observation by our colleagues in Division One that, “[g]iven the hundreds of cases in which defendants had not waived time, a boilerplate order setting forth the background of the COVID-19 pandemic and [defendant] court’s response was not only within the trial court’s discretion, but a time-efficient way of addressing motions to dismiss.” (Estrada, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1118.) We agree that it is permissible to utilize, in orders resolving motions to dismiss, boilerplate language reflecting general, judicially noticeable facts rega

2023In Wirin v. Parker, supra, 31 We are aware of the recent observation by our colleagues in Division One that, “[g]iven the hundreds of cases in which defendants had not waived time, a boilerplate order setting forth the background of the COVID-19 pandemic and [defendant] court’s response was not only within the trial court’s discretion, but a time-efficient way of addressing motions to dismiss.” (Estrada, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1118.) We agree that it is permissible to utilize, in orders resolving motions to dismiss, boilerplate language reflecting general, judicially noticeable facts rega

2023Such an argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the taxpayer standing doctrine, which exists to enable citizens who have not suffered particularized injury to nonetheless enforce legal duties protecting the general public: “ ‘As a general principle, standing to invoke the judicial process’ ” requires that a plaintiff have “ ‘suffered or is about to suffer an injury,’ ” but “the concept of standing . . . has been considerably relaxed by [Code of Civil Procedure] section 526a,” under which “ ‘ “no showing of special damage to the particular taxpayer [is] necessary” ’ for the taxpayer

2023Such an argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the taxpayer standing doctrine, which exists to enable citizens who have not suffered particularized injury to nonetheless enforce legal duties protecting the general public: “ ‘As a general principle, standing to invoke the judicial process’ ” requires that a plaintiff have “ ‘suffered or is about to suffer an injury,’ ” but “the concept of standing . . . has been considerably relaxed by [Code of Civil Procedure] section 526a,” under which “ ‘ “no showing of special damage to the particular taxpayer [is] necessary” ’ for the taxpayer

2023Thus, we focus primarily on the demand for declaratory judgment. 36 demand for injunctive relief, observing “[i]f we were to hold that [statutory taxpayer actions] did not present a true case or controversy unless the plaintiff and the defendant each had a special, personal interest in the outcome, we would drastically curtail their usefulness as a check on illegal government activity”]; Kawaichi, supra, 53 Cal.App.3d at p. 463, fn. 2 [applying same principle to declaratory relief].) Defendants also contend declaratory relief is not available to settle the “rights of third parties,” citing Con

2023Thus, we focus primarily on the demand for declaratory judgment. 36 demand for injunctive relief, observing “[i]f we were to hold that [statutory taxpayer actions] did not present a true case or controversy unless the plaintiff and the defendant each had a special, personal interest in the outcome, we would drastically curtail their usefulness as a check on illegal government activity”]; Kawaichi, supra, 53 Cal.App.3d at p. 463, fn. 2 [applying same principle to declaratory relief].) Defendants also contend declaratory relief is not available to settle the “rights of third parties,” citing Con

2026(Raju v. Superior Court, S281001, Supreme Ct. Mins., Sept. 13, 2023; id., Feb. 11, 2026.) In their supplemental briefing in this court following the Supreme Court’s transfer, plaintiffs state that, as a result of this court’s decision in Mendoza v. Superior Court (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 865 (Mendoza), the backlog of cases in defendant court has been dismissed, so declaratory and injunctive relief are no longer needed, and this case is moot.

2017(See Torres v.City of Yorba Linda (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1035 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 ; Cornelius v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1761 , 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 618 ( Cornelius ).) Weatherford averred that those opinions interpreted section 526a to require the payment of a property tax and, further, that they had rejected her argument that such a requirement is an unconstitutional wealth-based classification.

2017(See Torres v.City of Yorba Linda (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1035 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 ; Cornelius v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1761 , 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 618 ( Cornelius ).) Weatherford averred that those opinions interpreted section 526a to require the payment of a property tax and, further, that they had rejected her argument that such a requirement is an unconstitutional wealth-based classification.

2017(See Torres v.City of Yorba Linda (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1035 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 ; Cornelius v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1761 , 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 618 ( Cornelius ).) Weatherford averred that those opinions interpreted section 526a to require the payment of a property tax and, further, that they had rejected her argument that such a requirement is an unconstitutional wealth-based classification.

2017(See Torres v.City of Yorba Linda (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1035 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 ; Cornelius v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1761 , 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 618 ( Cornelius ).) Weatherford averred that those opinions interpreted section 526a to require the payment of a property tax and, further, that they had rejected her argument that such a requirement is an unconstitutional wealth-based classification.