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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2001 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Cortezgreen2 sentences1973Code, § 1203; People v. Rojas (1962) 57 Cal.2d 676, 682 [ 21 Cal. Rptr. 564 , 371 P.2d 300 ]; People v. Keller (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 711, 715-718 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 154 ]; People v. Causey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 576, 579-580 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 116 ].) The soundness of petitioner’s claim in this regard is shown by In re Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d 78—decided seven months after petitioner’s Tenorio hearing. 1972Since the Tenorio rule is fully *336 retroactive (In re Cortez, 6 Cal.3d 78, 82-83 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 307 , 490 P.2d 819 ]), it obviously applies on a direct appeal. 5 The judgment is reversed as to the sentence, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court of Los Angeles County for that court to exercise its independent judicial discretion as to defendant’s eligibility for probation. | 1 | 2 |
Sledge v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1988(See, e.g., People v. Clay (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 964 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 213 ] [district attorney’s veto over judicial decision to grant probation]; People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d 481 ] [district attorney’s veto over judicial decision to commit convicted defendant to drug treatment program in lieu of prison sentence].) The Court of Appeal, in finding the local wobbler rule unconstitutional, relied heavily on this court’s decisions in People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho), supra, 11 Cal.3d 59 and Sledge v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 70 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 28 , 52 1988(See, e.g., People v. Clay (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 964 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 213 ] [district attorney’s veto over judicial decision to grant probation]; People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d 481 ] [district attorney’s veto over judicial decision to commit convicted defendant to drug treatment program in lieu of prison sentence].) The Court of Appeal, in finding the local wobbler rule unconstitutional, relied heavily on this court’s decisions in People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho), supra, 11 Cal.3d 59 and Sledge v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 70 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 28 , 52 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rojasgreen2 sentences1973Code, § 1203; People v. Rojas (1962) 57 Cal.2d 676, 682 [ 21 Cal. Rptr. 564 , 371 P.2d 300 ]; People v. Keller (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 711, 715-718 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 154 ]; People v. Causey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 576, 579-580 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 116 ].) The soundness of petitioner’s claim in this regard is shown by In re Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d 78—decided seven months after petitioner’s Tenorio hearing. 1973Code, § 1203; People v. Rojas (1962) 57 Cal.2d 676, 682 [ 21 Cal. Rptr. 564 , 371 P.2d 300 ]; People v. Keller (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 711, 715-718 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 154 ]; People v. Causey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 576, 579-580 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 116 ].) The soundness of petitioner’s claim in this regard is shown by In re Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d 78—decided seven months after petitioner’s Tenorio hearing. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lempiagreen2 sentences1973“Habeas corpus ordinarily cannot serve as a second appeal [citations], or as a substitute for an appeal [citations].” (In re Terry (1971) 4 Cal.3d 911, 927 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 484 P.2d 1375 ].) “It is only where the facts alleged indicate that the accused had no opportunity to present his contentions at the trial, or on appeal, that he may resort to the writ of habeas corpus.” (People v. Lempia (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 393, 398 [ 301 P.2d 40 ].) Petitioner gives no explanation for his long delay in asserting that the federal proceedings involved a denial of counsel. 1973“Habeas corpus ordinarily cannot serve as a second appeal [citations], or as a substitute for an appeal [citations].” (In re Terry (1971) 4 Cal.3d 911, 927 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 484 P.2d 1375 ].) “It is only where the facts alleged indicate that the accused had no opportunity to present his contentions at the trial, or on appeal, that he may resort to the writ of habeas corpus.” (People v. Lempia (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 393, 398 [ 301 P.2d 40 ].) Petitioner gives no explanation for his long delay in asserting that the federal proceedings involved a denial of counsel. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Causeygreen2 sentences1973Code, § 1203; People v. Rojas (1962) 57 Cal.2d 676, 682 [ 21 Cal. Rptr. 564 , 371 P.2d 300 ]; People v. Keller (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 711, 715-718 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 154 ]; People v. Causey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 576, 579-580 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 116 ].) The soundness of petitioner’s claim in this regard is shown by In re Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d 78—decided seven months after petitioner’s Tenorio hearing. 1973Code, § 1203; People v. Rojas (1962) 57 Cal.2d 676, 682 [ 21 Cal. Rptr. 564 , 371 P.2d 300 ]; People v. Keller (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 711, 715-718 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 154 ]; People v. Causey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 576, 579-580 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 116 ].) The soundness of petitioner’s claim in this regard is shown by In re Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d 78—decided seven months after petitioner’s Tenorio hearing. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Terrygreen2 sentences1973“Habeas corpus ordinarily cannot serve as a second appeal [citations], or as a substitute for an appeal [citations].” (In re Terry (1971) 4 Cal.3d 911, 927 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 484 P.2d 1375 ].) “It is only where the facts alleged indicate that the accused had no opportunity to present his contentions at the trial, or on appeal, that he may resort to the writ of habeas corpus.” (People v. Lempia (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 393, 398 [ 301 P.2d 40 ].) Petitioner gives no explanation for his long delay in asserting that the federal proceedings involved a denial of counsel. 1973“Habeas corpus ordinarily cannot serve as a second appeal [citations], or as a substitute for an appeal [citations].” (In re Terry (1971) 4 Cal.3d 911, 927 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 484 P.2d 1375 ].) “It is only where the facts alleged indicate that the accused had no opportunity to present his contentions at the trial, or on appeal, that he may resort to the writ of habeas corpus.” (People v. Lempia (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 393, 398 [ 301 P.2d 40 ].) Petitioner gives no explanation for his long delay in asserting that the federal proceedings involved a denial of counsel. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kellergreen2 sentences1973Code, § 1203; People v. Rojas (1962) 57 Cal.2d 676, 682 [ 21 Cal. Rptr. 564 , 371 P.2d 300 ]; People v. Keller (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 711, 715-718 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 154 ]; People v. Causey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 576, 579-580 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 116 ].) The soundness of petitioner’s claim in this regard is shown by In re Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d 78—decided seven months after petitioner’s Tenorio hearing. 1973Code, § 1203; People v. Rojas (1962) 57 Cal.2d 676, 682 [ 21 Cal. Rptr. 564 , 371 P.2d 300 ]; People v. Keller (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 711, 715-718 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 154 ]; People v. Causey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 576, 579-580 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 116 ].) The soundness of petitioner’s claim in this regard is shown by In re Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d 78—decided seven months after petitioner’s Tenorio hearing. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Johnsongreen2 sentences1971The reinstatement of the appeal in 1970, therefore, made available to appellant the Aranda contention now raised. 2 Although habeas corpus is the apparently proper procedure for asserting the Tenorio issue (In re Johnson, 3 Cal.3d 404, 418-420 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 475 P.2d 841 ]), in the instant case where the appeal is pending, a separate proceeding would be wasteful and the People have no objection. 1971The reinstatement of the appeal in 1970, therefore, made available to appellant the Aranda contention now raised. 2 Although habeas corpus is the apparently proper procedure for asserting the Tenorio issue (In re Johnson, 3 Cal.3d 404, 418-420 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 475 P.2d 841 ]), in the instant case where the appeal is pending, a separate proceeding would be wasteful and the People have no objection. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Clay
green
2 sentences1988(See, e.g., People v. Clay (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 964 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 213 ] [district attorney’s veto over judicial decision to grant probation]; People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d 481 ] [district attorney’s veto over judicial decision to commit convicted defendant to drug treatment program in lieu of prison sentence].) The Court of Appeal, in finding the local wobbler rule unconstitutional, relied heavily on this court’s decisions in People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho), supra, 11 Cal.3d 59 and Sledge v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 70 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 28 , 52 1988(See, e.g., People v. Clay (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 964 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 213 ] [district attorney’s veto over judicial decision to grant probation]; People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d 481 ] [district attorney’s veto over judicial decision to commit convicted defendant to drug treatment program in lieu of prison sentence].) The Court of Appeal, in finding the local wobbler rule unconstitutional, relied heavily on this court’s decisions in People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho), supra, 11 Cal.3d 59 and Sledge v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 70 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 28 , 52 | 3 | 1972–1988 |
Davis v. Municipal Court for San Francisco Judicial District
green
2 sentences2001The court noted that " Esteybar expressly emphasized the timing of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as a crucial factor in the Tenorio analysis." ( Davis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 83 , 249 Cal.Rptr. 300 , 757 P.2d 11 .) The Davis court concluded that the Tenorio line of cases all involved statutes that gave the prosecution a veto power over judicial sentencing decisions and that such an executive branch "review" of a judicial function was improper under the separation of powers doctrine. ( Davis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 84 , 249 Cal.Rptr. 300 , 757 P.2d 11 .) An exercise of prosecutorial dis 2001The court noted that " Esteybar expressly emphasized the timing of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as a crucial factor in the Tenorio analysis." ( Davis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 83 , 249 Cal.Rptr. 300 , 757 P.2d 11 .) The Davis court concluded that the Tenorio line of cases all involved statutes that gave the prosecution a veto power over judicial sentencing decisions and that such an executive branch "review" of a judicial function was improper under the separation of powers doctrine. ( Davis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 84 , 249 Cal.Rptr. 300 , 757 P.2d 11 .) An exercise of prosecutorial dis | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Navarro
green
2 sentences1988(See, e.g., People v. Clay (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 964 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 213 ] [district attorney’s veto over judicial decision to grant probation]; People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d 481 ] [district attorney’s veto over judicial decision to commit convicted defendant to drug treatment program in lieu of prison sentence].) The Court of Appeal, in finding the local wobbler rule unconstitutional, relied heavily on this court’s decisions in People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho), supra, 11 Cal.3d 59 and Sledge v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 70 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 28 , 52 1988(See, e.g., People v. Clay (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 964 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 213 ] [district attorney’s veto over judicial decision to grant probation]; People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d 481 ] [district attorney’s veto over judicial decision to commit convicted defendant to drug treatment program in lieu of prison sentence].) The Court of Appeal, in finding the local wobbler rule unconstitutional, relied heavily on this court’s decisions in People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho), supra, 11 Cal.3d 59 and Sledge v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 70 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 28 , 52 | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Esteybar v. Municipal Court
green
2 sentences1988As stated in Tenorio : `When the decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal or sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature.'" (Original italics.) ( Ibid. ) Thus, Esteybar expressly emphasized the timing of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as a crucial factor in the Tenorio analysis. 1988As stated in Tenorio : `When the decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal or sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature.'" (Original italics.) ( Ibid. ) Thus, Esteybar expressly emphasized the timing of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as a crucial factor in the Tenorio analysis. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho)
green
2 sentences1988(See, e.g., People v. Clay (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 964 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 213 ] [district attorney’s veto over judicial decision to grant probation]; People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d 481 ] [district attorney’s veto over judicial decision to commit convicted defendant to drug treatment program in lieu of prison sentence].) The Court of Appeal, in finding the local wobbler rule unconstitutional, relied heavily on this court’s decisions in People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho), supra, 11 Cal.3d 59 and Sledge v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 70 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 28 , 52 1988(See, e.g., People v. Clay (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 964 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 213 ] [district attorney’s veto over judicial decision to grant probation]; People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 497 P.2d 481 ] [district attorney’s veto over judicial decision to commit convicted defendant to drug treatment program in lieu of prison sentence].) The Court of Appeal, in finding the local wobbler rule unconstitutional, relied heavily on this court’s decisions in People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho), supra, 11 Cal.3d 59 and Sledge v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 70 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 28 , 52 | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Wax
green
2 sentences1973(Stats. 1972, ch. 1407, §§ 2, 3.) 5 In People v. Wax (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 302 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 289 ], without discussion, the court applied the requirement of “a new probation report and/or a report from the Director of Corrections” to a Tenorio hearing which (like the one at bench) was post-Tenorio and pre-Cortez. * Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 1973(Stats. 1972, ch. 1407, §§ 2, 3.) 5 In People v. Wax (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 302 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 289 ], without discussion, the court applied the requirement of “a new probation report and/or a report from the Director of Corrections” to a Tenorio hearing which (like the one at bench) was post-Tenorio and pre-Cortez. * Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
People v. Tenorio
green
2 sentences1972The court therefore did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal.3d 89 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 473 P.2d 993 ], decided on September 1, of that year, let alone the decision in People v. Clay, 18 *379 Cal.App.3d 964 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 213 ], decided about a year later, which made the Tenorio principle applicable to the grant of probation. 1972The court therefore did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal.3d 89 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 473 P.2d 993 ], decided on September 1, of that year, let alone the decision in People v. Clay, 18 *379 Cal.App.3d 964 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 213 ], decided about a year later, which made the Tenorio principle applicable to the grant of probation. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.