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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Rocco M.green1 sentence2023(In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820 [subdivision (b) “consists of three elements: (1) neglectful conduct by the parent . . ; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm . . .’ to the minor, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm . . .’”], abrogated on other grounds by In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 .) Thus, the fact that the Department did not affirmatively prove these elements is irrelevant because they were satisfied by the unrebutted presumption. | 1 | 1 |
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Roger S.green1 sentence2016(R.M. v. T.A., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 780-781.) The appellate court explained that although the mother “may have initially intended to raise Child as a single parent, . . . during the first two years of Child’s life Mother’s relationship with RM developed such that RM, with Mother’s full support, undertook a parental role and established a parent-child relationship with Child.” (Id. at p. 781, italics added.) The critical distinction is not the living situation but whether a parent-child relationship has been established. 8 “ ‘[T]he premise behind the category of *385 presumed [parent] | 1 | 1 |
Santa Clara County Department of Family and Childrren's Services v. J.J.green2 sentences2016(R.M. v. T.A., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 780-781.) The appellate court explained that although the mother “may have initially intended to raise Child as a single parent, . . . during the first two years of Child’s life Mother’s relationship with RM developed such that RM, with Mother’s full support, undertook a parental role and established a parent-child relationship with Child.” (Id. at p. 781, italics added.) The critical distinction is not the living situation but whether a parent-child relationship has been established. 8 “ ‘[T]he premise behind the category of *385 presumed [parent] 2016(R.M. v. T.A., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 780-781.) The appellate court explained that although the mother “may have initially intended to raise Child as a single parent, . . . during the first two years of Child’s life Mother’s relationship with RM developed such that RM, with Mother’s full support, undertook a parental role and established a parent-child relationship with Child.” (Id. at p. 781, italics added.) The critical distinction is not the living situation but whether a parent-child relationship has been established. 8 “ ‘[T]he premise behind the category of *385 presumed [parent] | 1 | 1 |
In Re Nicholas H.green1 sentence2016(R.M. v. T.A., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 780-781.) The appellate court explained that although the mother “may have initially intended to raise Child as a single parent, . . . during the first two years of Child’s life Mother’s relationship with RM developed such that RM, with Mother’s full support, undertook a parental role and established a parent-child relationship with Child.” (Id. at p. 781, italics added.) The critical distinction is not the living situation but whether a parent-child relationship has been established. 8 “ ‘[T]he premise behind the category of *385 presumed [parent] | 1 | 1 |
Jason People v. Danielle S.green2 sentences2016(R.M. v. T.A., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 780-781.) The appellate court explained that although the mother “may have initially intended to raise Child as a single parent, . . . during the first two years of Child’s life Mother’s relationship with RM developed such that RM, with Mother’s full support, undertook a parental role and established a parent-child relationship with Child.” (Id. at p. 781, italics added.) The critical distinction is not the living situation but whether a parent-child relationship has been established. 8 “ ‘[T]he premise behind the category of *385 presumed [parent] 2016(R.M. v. T.A., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 780-781.) The appellate court explained that although the mother “may have initially intended to raise Child as a single parent, . . . during the first two years of Child’s life Mother’s relationship with RM developed such that RM, with Mother’s full support, undertook a parental role and established a parent-child relationship with Child.” (Id. at p. 781, italics added.) The critical distinction is not the living situation but whether a parent-child relationship has been established. 8 “ ‘[T]he premise behind the category of *385 presumed [parent] | 1 | 1 |
State of South Dakota v. Browngreen2 sentences1986“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that where legislation is framed in the language of an earlier enactment on the same or an analoguous subject, which has been judicially construed, there is a very strong presumption of intent to adopt the construction as well as the language of the prior enactment.” (Union Oil Associates v. Johnson (1935) 2 Cal.2d 727, 734-735 [ 43 P.2d 291 , 98 A.L.R. 1499 ].) Stated another way, “when the Legislature enacts a law ‘framed in the identical language’ of a previous law on the same subject, it is presumed that the new law has the same fundame 1986“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that where legislation is framed in the language of an earlier enactment on the same or an analoguous subject, which has been judicially construed, there is a very strong presumption of intent to adopt the construction as well as the language of the prior enactment.” (Union Oil Associates v. Johnson (1935) 2 Cal.2d 727, 734-735 [ 43 P.2d 291 , 98 A.L.R. 1499 ].) Stated another way, “when the Legislature enacts a law ‘framed in the identical language’ of a previous law on the same subject, it is presumed that the new law has the same fundame | 1 | 1 |
Union Oil Associates v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1986“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that where legislation is framed in the language of an earlier enactment on the same or an analoguous subject, which has been judicially construed, there is a very strong presumption of intent to adopt the construction as well as the language of the prior enactment.” (Union Oil Associates v. Johnson (1935) 2 Cal.2d 727, 734-735 [ 43 P.2d 291 , 98 A.L.R. 1499 ].) Stated another way, “when the Legislature enacts a law ‘framed in the identical language’ of a previous law on the same subject, it is presumed that the new law has the same fundame 1986“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that where legislation is framed in the language of an earlier enactment on the same or an analoguous subject, which has been judicially construed, there is a very strong presumption of intent to adopt the construction as well as the language of the prior enactment.” (Union Oil Associates v. Johnson (1935) 2 Cal.2d 727, 734-735 [ 43 P.2d 291 , 98 A.L.R. 1499 ].) Stated another way, “when the Legislature enacts a law ‘framed in the identical language’ of a previous law on the same subject, it is presumed that the new law has the same fundame | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Scott v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2018The court rejected that argument, finding that the interplay between the Probate Code and the Family Code meant that an unrebutted presumption of presumed parent status provided standing: "In sum, because the wrongful death statute *168 incorporates the Probate Code's intestacy chain of succession to determine proper plaintiffs, and the intestacy statutes in turn incorporate the UPA to determine presumed fatherhood, and Scott has no standing under the UPA to deny or rebut that Thompson is Michael's presumed father, her action for a declaratory judgment rejecting Thompson's paternity fails as a 2018The court rejected that argument, finding that the interplay between the Probate Code and the Family Code meant that an unrebutted presumption of presumed parent status provided standing: "In sum, because the wrongful death statute *168 incorporates the Probate Code's intestacy chain of succession to determine proper plaintiffs, and the intestacy statutes in turn incorporate the UPA to determine presumed fatherhood, and Scott has no standing under the UPA to deny or rebut that Thompson is Michael's presumed father, her action for a declaratory judgment rejecting Thompson's paternity fails as a | 2 | 2018–2018 |
L. A. Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Lisa E. (In Re R.T.)
green
1 sentence2023(In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820 [subdivision (b) “consists of three elements: (1) neglectful conduct by the parent . . ; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm . . .’ to the minor, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm . . .’”], abrogated on other grounds by In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 .) Thus, the fact that the Department did not affirmatively prove these elements is irrelevant because they were satisfied by the unrebutted presumption. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In Re TR
green
2 sentences2016(R.M. v. T.A., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 780-781.) The appellate court explained that although the mother “may have initially intended to raise Child as a single parent, . . . during the first two years of Child’s life Mother’s relationship with RM developed such that RM, with Mother’s full support, undertook a parental role and established a parent-child relationship with Child.” (Id. at p. 781, italics added.) The critical distinction is not the living situation but whether a parent-child relationship has been established. 8 “ ‘[T]he premise behind the category of *385 presumed [parent] 2016(R.M. v. T.A., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 780-781.) The appellate court explained that although the mother “may have initially intended to raise Child as a single parent, . . . during the first two years of Child’s life Mother’s relationship with RM developed such that RM, with Mother’s full support, undertook a parental role and established a parent-child relationship with Child.” (Id. at p. 781, italics added.) The critical distinction is not the living situation but whether a parent-child relationship has been established. 8 “ ‘[T]he premise behind the category of *385 presumed [parent] | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Butler Bros. v. McColgan, Franchise Tax Commissioner
green
1 sentence1991Tenneco also asserts the substantial intercompany financing it provided to the Tenneco Excluded Subsidiaries affected their operations and income to such extent as to require a finding they were engaged in a single unitary business with Tenneco. (a) Tests to Determine Unitary Business “A general test to determine whether a business is unitary is ‘ “[i]f the operation of the portion of the business done within the state is dependent upon or contributes to the operation of the business without the state, . . . ” ’ [Citations.] A three-part test was set out in Butler Brothers v. McColgan (1941) 1 | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Mole-Richardson Co. v. Franchise Tax Board
green
2 sentences1991Tenneco also asserts the substantial intercompany financing it provided to the Tenneco Excluded Subsidiaries affected their operations and income to such extent as to require a finding they were engaged in a single unitary business with Tenneco. (a) Tests to Determine Unitary Business “A general test to determine whether a business is unitary is ‘ “[i]f the operation of the portion of the business done within the state is dependent upon or contributes to the operation of the business without the state, . . . ” ’ [Citations.] A three-part test was set out in Butler Brothers v. McColgan (1941) 1 1991Tenneco also asserts the substantial intercompany financing it provided to the Tenneco Excluded Subsidiaries affected their operations and income to such extent as to require a finding they were engaged in a single unitary business with Tenneco. (a) Tests to Determine Unitary Business “A general test to determine whether a business is unitary is ‘ “[i]f the operation of the portion of the business done within the state is dependent upon or contributes to the operation of the business without the state, . . . ” ’ [Citations.] A three-part test was set out in Butler Brothers v. McColgan (1941) 1 | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Butler Brothers v. McColgan
green
1 sentence1991Tenneco also asserts the substantial intercompany financing it provided to the Tenneco Excluded Subsidiaries affected their operations and income to such extent as to require a finding they were engaged in a single unitary business with Tenneco. (a) Tests to Determine Unitary Business “A general test to determine whether a business is unitary is ‘ “[i]f the operation of the portion of the business done within the state is dependent upon or contributes to the operation of the business without the state, . . . ” ’ [Citations.] A three-part test was set out in Butler Brothers v. McColgan (1941) 1 | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.