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6 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp.green1 sentence2024Cannon Corp., 778 F.3d 401, 408 (2d Cir. 2015) (‘‘it remains the black letter rule that a class may obtain certification under [r]ule 23 (b) (3) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] when liability questions common to the class predominate over damages questions unique to class members’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Connecticut v. Whelan
green
2 sentences2025This approach departs from the black letter principle that ‘‘[i]nconsistencies may be shown not only by contradictory statements but also by omissions.’’ State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 , 748 n.4, 513 A.2d 86, 91 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986). ‘‘Inconsistency in effect, rather than contradiction in express terms, is the test for admitting a witness’ prior statement . . . . 2025This approach departs from the black letter principle that ‘‘[i]nconsistencies may be shown not only by contradictory statements but also by omissions.’’ State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 , 748 n.4, 513 A.2d 86, 91 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986). ‘‘Inconsistency in effect, rather than contradiction in express terms, is the test for admitting a witness’ prior statement . . . . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Whelan
green
2 sentences2025This approach departs from the black letter principle that ‘‘[i]nconsistencies may be shown not only by contradictory statements but also by omissions.’’ State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 , 748 n.4, 513 A.2d 86, 91 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986). ‘‘Inconsistency in effect, rather than contradiction in express terms, is the test for admitting a witness’ prior statement . . . . 2025This approach departs from the black letter principle that ‘‘[i]nconsistencies may be shown not only by contradictory statements but also by omissions.’’ State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 , 748 n.4, 513 A.2d 86, 91 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986). ‘‘Inconsistency in effect, rather than contradiction in express terms, is the test for admitting a witness’ prior statement . . . . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Asherman v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences2021It also found no prejudice under the particular facts of this case because ‘‘utilization of [the] dictionary definition [of manslaughter] would be inconsistent with the actual verdict reached,’’ given the difference between that definition and the statutory definition that the jury applied.16 In considering the second and third Johnson inquiries, the court also relied on the black letter principle that, ‘‘[i]n the absence of a clear indication to the contrary, [the court] must presume that the jury followed [the court’s] instruction.’’ State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695 , 737-38, 478 A.2d 227 (1 2021It also found no prejudice under the particular facts of this case because ‘‘utilization of [the] dictionary definition [of manslaughter] would be inconsistent with the actual verdict reached,’’ given the difference between that definition and the statutory definition that the jury applied.16 In considering the second and third Johnson inquiries, the court also relied on the black letter principle that, ‘‘[i]n the absence of a clear indication to the contrary, [the court] must presume that the jury followed [the court’s] instruction.’’ State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695 , 737-38, 478 A.2d 227 (1 | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Asherman
green
2 sentences2021It also found no prejudice under the particular facts of this case because ‘‘utilization of [the] dictionary definition [of manslaughter] would be inconsistent with the actual verdict reached,’’ given the difference between that definition and the statutory definition that the jury applied.16 In considering the second and third Johnson inquiries, the court also relied on the black letter principle that, ‘‘[i]n the absence of a clear indication to the contrary, [the court] must presume that the jury followed [the court’s] instruction.’’ State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695 , 737-38, 478 A.2d 227 (1 2021It also found no prejudice under the particular facts of this case because ‘‘utilization of [the] dictionary definition [of manslaughter] would be inconsistent with the actual verdict reached,’’ given the difference between that definition and the statutory definition that the jury applied.16 In considering the second and third Johnson inquiries, the court also relied on the black letter principle that, ‘‘[i]n the absence of a clear indication to the contrary, [the court] must presume that the jury followed [the court’s] instruction.’’ State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695 , 737-38, 478 A.2d 227 (1 | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Leo Foundation, Inc. v. Kiernan
neutral
1 sentence2020Leo Foundation, Inc. v. Kiernan, 5 Conn. Cir. 11, 15-16, 240 A.2d 218 (1967).’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) The trial court noted that ‘‘[t]his observation comports well with the black letter rule that ‘a contract is considered as a whole so as to give effect to all its provisions without narrowly concentrating [on] some clause or language taken out of context.’ Gold v. Rowland, 325 Conn. 146, 160 , 156 A.3d 477 (2017).’’ Thereafter, the court analyzed the various characteristics of the east branch to determine whether, as required by the separation agreement, a simil | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Gold v. Rowland
green
2 sentences2020Leo Foundation, Inc. v. Kiernan, 5 Conn. Cir. 11, 15-16, 240 A.2d 218 (1967).’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) The trial court noted that ‘‘[t]his observation comports well with the black letter rule that ‘a contract is considered as a whole so as to give effect to all its provisions without narrowly concentrating [on] some clause or language taken out of context.’ Gold v. Rowland, 325 Conn. 146, 160 , 156 A.3d 477 (2017).’’ Thereafter, the court analyzed the various characteristics of the east branch to determine whether, as required by the separation agreement, a simil 2020Leo Foundation, Inc. v. Kiernan, 5 Conn. Cir. 11, 15-16, 240 A.2d 218 (1967).’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) The trial court noted that ‘‘[t]his observation comports well with the black letter rule that ‘a contract is considered as a whole so as to give effect to all its provisions without narrowly concentrating [on] some clause or language taken out of context.’ Gold v. Rowland, 325 Conn. 146, 160 , 156 A.3d 477 (2017).’’ Thereafter, the court analyzed the various characteristics of the east branch to determine whether, as required by the separation agreement, a simil | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Ortiz
green
2 sentences2020It ‘‘is well settled that prosecutorial disobedience of a trial court order, even one the prosecutor considers legally incorrect, constitutes improper conduct.’’ State v. Ortiz, 280 Conn. 686, 704 , 911 A.2d 1055 (2006). ‘‘In many cases, however, this black letter principle is easier stated than applied. 2020It ‘‘is well settled that prosecutorial disobedience of a trial court order, even one the prosecutor considers legally incorrect, constitutes improper conduct.’’ State v. Ortiz, 280 Conn. 686, 704 , 911 A.2d 1055 (2006). ‘‘In many cases, however, this black letter principle is easier stated than applied. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood
green
2 sentences1985Jur. 2d, Administrative Law § 241 (1962); have used such terms as “considerable deference”; Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 107 , 99 S. Ct. 1601 , 60 L. 1985Jur. 2d, Administrative Law § 241 (1962); have used such terms as “considerable deference”; Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 107 , 99 S. Ct. 1601 , 60 L. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.