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6 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1956–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Maris Distributing Co. v. Anheuser-Buschgreen2 sentences2015Co. v. Anheuser–Busch, Inc., 710 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (quashing order severing breach of contract cause of action from numerous other counts which arose in the context of the contract, as facts underlying all counts were interrelated). 2015See Minty, 97 So.3d at 931 (granting certiorari relief where the order severed some of the borrower’s counterclaims from the lender’s equitable claim for injunctive relief; final judgment; for the lender on its claim would moot the borrower’s inextricably interwoven affirmative defenses and counterclaim,' leaving the borrower no appellate remedy); Rooss v. Mayberry, 866 So.2d 174, 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (granting petition, finding' liability and damages issues to be intertwined; bifurcating them would convert what should be one trial into two, with duplicative testimony from many of the same | 2 | 2 |
Rooss v. Mayberrygreen2 sentences2015See Minty, 97 So. 3d at 931 (granting certiorari relief where the order severed some of the borrower’s counterclaims from the lender’s equitable claim for injunctive relief; final judgment for the lender on its claim would moot the borrower’s inextricably interwoven affirmative defenses and counterclaim, leaving the borrower no appellate remedy); Rooss v. Mayberry, 866 So. 2d 174, 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (granting petition, finding liability and damages issues to be intertwined; bifurcating them would convert what should be one trial into two, with duplicative testimony from many of the same w 2015See Minty, 97 So.3d at 931 (granting certiorari relief where the order severed some of the borrower’s counterclaims from the lender’s equitable claim for injunctive relief; final judgment; for the lender on its claim would moot the borrower’s inextricably interwoven affirmative defenses and counterclaim,' leaving the borrower no appellate remedy); Rooss v. Mayberry, 866 So.2d 174, 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (granting petition, finding' liability and damages issues to be intertwined; bifurcating them would convert what should be one trial into two, with duplicative testimony from many of the same | 2 | 2 |
Minty v. Meister Financialgroup, Inc.green2 sentences2015See Minty, 97 So. 3d at 931 (granting certiorari relief where the order severed some of the borrower’s counterclaims from the lender’s equitable claim for injunctive relief; final judgment for the lender on its claim would moot the borrower’s inextricably interwoven affirmative defenses and counterclaim, leaving the borrower no appellate remedy); Rooss v. Mayberry, 866 So. 2d 174, 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (granting petition, finding liability and damages issues to be intertwined; bifurcating them would convert what should be one trial into two, with duplicative testimony from many of the same w 2015See Minty, 97 So.3d at 931 (granting certiorari relief where the order severed some of the borrower’s counterclaims from the lender’s equitable claim for injunctive relief; final judgment; for the lender on its claim would moot the borrower’s inextricably interwoven affirmative defenses and counterclaim,' leaving the borrower no appellate remedy); Rooss v. Mayberry, 866 So.2d 174, 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (granting petition, finding' liability and damages issues to be intertwined; bifurcating them would convert what should be one trial into two, with duplicative testimony from many of the same | 2 | 2 |
Tylinski v. Klein Automotive, Inc.green1 sentence2025Analysis “Generally, an order granting or denying attorney’s fees and costs is reviewed [under] an abuse of discretion standard.” Tylinski v. Klein Auto., Inc., 90 So. 3d 870, 872 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta
green
2 sentences1982In a sweeping opinion which issued subsequent to the filing of briefs in this case, the United States Supreme Court held in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. de la Cuesta, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 3014 , 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982), that (1) the Federal Home Loan Bank Board’s due-on-sale regulation was meant to pre-empt conflicting state limitations on the due-on-sale practices of federal savings and loan associations, 3 and (2) the applicable regulations do not confine a federal association’s right to accelerate a loan to cases where the lender’s security is impaired. 4 De la Cuesta overrul 1982In a sweeping opinion which issued subsequent to the filing of briefs in this case, the United States Supreme Court held in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. de la Cuesta, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 3014 , 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982), that (1) the Federal Home Loan Bank Board’s due-on-sale regulation was meant to pre-empt conflicting state limitations on the due-on-sale practices of federal savings and loan associations, 3 and (2) the applicable regulations do not confine a federal association’s right to accelerate a loan to cases where the lender’s security is impaired. 4 De la Cuesta overrul | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Jones, Et Vir v. Hammock Et Ux.
green
2 sentences1957The appellant first contends that he should not be penalized for violation of the statutes denouncing usury because he did not intentionally exact for the use of his money more than a lawful return and he cites the familiar decisions of this court, Jones v. Hammock, 131 Fla. 321 , 179 So. 674 , and Chandler v. Kendrick, 108 Fla. 450 , 146 So. 551 , in which the court held a corrupt or unlawful intent to charge more than the legal rate must be present in order to penalize a lender for violation of the law against usury. 1957The appellant first contends that he should not be penalized for violation of the statutes denouncing usury because he did not intentionally exact for the use of his money more than a lawful return and he cites the familiar decisions of this court, Jones v. Hammock, 131 Fla. 321 , 179 So. 674 , and Chandler v. Kendrick, 108 Fla. 450 , 146 So. 551 , in which the court held a corrupt or unlawful intent to charge more than the legal rate must be present in order to penalize a lender for violation of the law against usury. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Chandler and Chandler v. Kendrick
green
2 sentences1957The appellant first contends that he should not be penalized for violation of the statutes denouncing usury because he did not intentionally exact for the use of his money more than a lawful return and he cites the familiar decisions of this court, Jones v. Hammock, 131 Fla. 321 , 179 So. 674 , and Chandler v. Kendrick, 108 Fla. 450 , 146 So. 551 , in which the court held a corrupt or unlawful intent to charge more than the legal rate must be present in order to penalize a lender for violation of the law against usury. 1957The appellant first contends that he should not be penalized for violation of the statutes denouncing usury because he did not intentionally exact for the use of his money more than a lawful return and he cites the familiar decisions of this court, Jones v. Hammock, 131 Fla. 321 , 179 So. 674 , and Chandler v. Kendrick, 108 Fla. 450 , 146 So. 551 , in which the court held a corrupt or unlawful intent to charge more than the legal rate must be present in order to penalize a lender for violation of the law against usury. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Maule v. Eckis
green
2 sentences1957The appellant claims that all negotiations except the initial agreement to complete the loan were handled by his attorney and that in such circumstances he was in the same position as the lender described in Maule v. Eckis, 156 Fla. 790 , 24 So.2d 576 . 1957The appellant claims that all negotiations except the initial agreement to complete the loan were handled by his attorney and that in such circumstances he was in the same position as the lender described in Maule v. Eckis, 156 Fla. 790 , 24 So.2d 576 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Mason v. City Finance Co.
neutral
2 sentences1956“If unlawful demands, charges, or exactions dehors the face of the mortgage itself have been perpetrated under guise of a contrary construction of the mortgage by the lender in violation of section 13 of the statute, so as to render void the obligation under that section, such invalidity must be set up as an affirmative defense in an answer, and duly established by proofs, in order to avail defendant.” Mason v. City Finance Co., 1933, 113 Fla. 73 , 151 So. 521, 523 . 1956“If unlawful demands, charges, or exactions dehors the face of the mortgage itself have been perpetrated under guise of a contrary construction of the mortgage by the lender in violation of section 13 of the statute, so as to render void the obligation under that section, such invalidity must be set up as an affirmative defense in an answer, and duly established by proofs, in order to avail defendant.” Mason v. City Finance Co., 1933, 113 Fla. 73 , 151 So. 521, 523 . | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.