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9 California opinions name it 1 courts 2004–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Borges v. Home Insurance Co.green1 sentence2023Co. (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 275, 276 [“We have been cited to no case and know of none which permits a reviewing court to treat two contesting motions for a summary judgment as 15 a submission of the case to the court for a judgment on the record”].) For these same reasons, we reject Lender’s argument that defendant invited error in the resolution of Lender’s motion based on a position he took in his own motion. | 1 | 1 |
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasegreen1 sentence2023As such errors are outside of the limited judicial review of arbitration awards (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 11 [“an arbitrator’s decision cannot be reviewed for errors of fact or law”]), Lender’s claim necessarily fails. | 1 | 1 |
Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.green2 sentences2004Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A triable issue of material fact exists only if “the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 24 P.3d 493 ], fn. omitted.) “If a party moving for summary judgment. . . would prevail at trial without submission of any issue of material fact to a trier of fact for determination, then he should prevail on summary judgment.” (Id. at p. 855.) Lender defendant 2004Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A triable issue of material fact exists only if “the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 24 P.3d 493 ], fn. omitted.) “If a party moving for summary judgment. . . would prevail at trial without submission of any issue of material fact to a trier of fact for determination, then he should prevail on summary judgment.” (Id. at p. 855.) Lender defendant | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
green
2 sentences2014The trial court properly sustained the demurrers to the ninth cause of action for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) “While the scope of conduct covered by the UCL is broad, its remedies are limited. [Citation.] A UCL action is equitable in nature; damages cannot be recovered. [Citation.] . . . [U]nder the UCL, ‘[p]revailing plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.’ [Citation.]” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144 ; id. at p. 1146.) In Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed M 2014The trial court properly sustained the demurrers to the ninth cause of action for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) “While the scope of conduct covered by the UCL is broad, its remedies are limited. [Citation.] A UCL action is equitable in nature; damages cannot be recovered. [Citation.] . . . [U]nder the UCL, ‘[p]revailing plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.’ [Citation.]” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144 ; id. at p. 1146.) In Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed M | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Cervantez v. J. C. Penney Co.
red
2 sentences2014Penney Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 579, 593 .) Weed’s failure adequately to allege that the Broker and Lender defendants caused her damages is fatal to this cause of action as well. 13 G. 2014Penney Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 579, 593 .) Weed’s failure adequately to allege that the Broker and Lender defendants caused her damages is fatal to this cause of action as well. 13 G. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Carpenter
green
1 sentence2022Moreover, posttrial prejudice is a mixed question of law and fact ultimately determined by the ‘reviewing court.’ [Citations.] Because there is now a full factual record regarding the misconduct with all conflicts in the evidence resolved and with the relevant historical facts found . . . the question is for our independent determination.” (In re Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 658-659.) We are reviewing the denial of the Lender’s motion for mistrial, which was made during trial. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Bisno v. Sax
green
1 sentence2014In both Bisno v. Sax (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 714 and Baypoint Mortgage Corp. v. Crest Premium Real Estate Investments (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 818 , 829 the California Court of Appeal refused the efforts of lenders to foreclose on property for nonmaterial defaults involving later payments.20 Baypoint in particular uttered some very pointed language against forfeitures. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Baypoint Mortgage Corp. v. Crest Premium Real Estate Investment Retirement
green
1 sentence2014In both Bisno v. Sax (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 714 and Baypoint Mortgage Corp. v. Crest Premium Real Estate Investments (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 818 , 829 the California Court of Appeal refused the efforts of lenders to foreclose on property for nonmaterial defaults involving later payments.20 Baypoint in particular uttered some very pointed language against forfeitures. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Cal. Bank & Trust v. Lawlor CA4/3
green
1 sentence2014(Lawlor, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 638 .) In a declaration opposing Lender’s motion for summary judgment, Nevis declared that, at all relevant times, he was the general and controlling partner of SB Holding Co. (coprimary debtor on Loan 1); the chief executive officer and sole shareholder of McCoy 4 (coprimary debtor on Loan 1, and primary debtor on Loan 2); and the chief executive officer and owner of PK Investments (guarantor on Loans 1 and 2, along with Nevis individually). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Jackson v. County of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2004(See id. at p. 183 & fn. 8 [judicial estoppel requires, inter alia, showing that party was successful in assertion of earlier position].) 15 Lender’s brief contains four material misstatements of the record to the effect that Borrowers made no payments in 2001 and that the only two attempted payments that year (on Jan. 4 and Mar. 7, 2001) were both returned for insufficient funds. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.