jury followed instruction in California

2021Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury: “Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence your decision.” As the California Supreme Court has explained, “ ‘The crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury is that jurors generally understand and faithfully follow instructions.’ ” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 517 , quoting People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17 .) We presume that the jury followed this instruction to avoid deciding based on sympathy or prejudice.

2013Contrary to defendant’s assertion, absent evidence to the contrary, a reviewing court must “presume the jury was guided by the written instructions.” (People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 115 .) This rule is consistent with “[t]he crucial assumption underlying our Constitutional system of trial by jury”—i.e., “jurors generally understand and faithfully follow instructions.” (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17 .) Here, because the jury was given a written instruction on the elements of the gun use enhancement, and there was no indication in the record that they failed to unders

2021(People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 436 .) At no time did the jury request readback of Irving’s testimony.

2020(People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 436 .) B.

2025(People v. Franklin (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 938, 953 .) Appellant has failed to show it is reasonably probable he would have obtained a more favorable result had the court admitted less gang evidence.

2025(People v. Franklin (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 938, 953 .) Appellant has failed to show it is reasonably probable he would have obtained a more favorable result had the court admitted less gang evidence.

2009Further, the jury was properly instructed to disregard the fact that defendant was in custody. [8] We presume the jury followed this instruction. ( People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 139 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 , 72 P.3d 1166 ].) (7) Defendant also claims he was prejudiced by the contrast between his law enforcement escort and his accuser's accompaniment by a person the prosecutor described as a "victim witness advocate." Penal Code section 868.5, subdivision (a) entitles the prosecuting witness in a sex abuse case to have a support person present at the stand during the witness's testimony.

2009Further, the jury was properly instructed to disregard the fact that defendant was in custody. [8] We presume the jury followed this instruction. ( People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 139 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 , 72 P.3d 1166 ].) (7) Defendant also claims he was prejudiced by the contrast between his law enforcement escort and his accuser's accompaniment by a person the prosecutor described as a "victim witness advocate." Penal Code section 868.5, subdivision (a) entitles the prosecuting witness in a sex abuse case to have a support person present at the stand during the witness's testimony.

2020This court must presume the jury followed the instruction (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 574 ) and that, as instructed, the jury only considered Detective Vaughn’s domestic violence testimony in evaluating M.M.’s conduct and credibility.

2012(See People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 575 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 133 P.3d 1076 ] [“[Assuming [codefendant’s] extrajudicial statement about defendant incriminated defendant, it did not prejudice defendant because the court admonished the jury not to consider it for any purpose against defendant, and we presume the jury followed the instruction.”].) Defendant next renewed his motion to sever during the testimony of FBI Agent Joseph Gersky.

2016We presume the jury followed this instruction in the absence of evidence to the contrary (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 866-867 ), and here there was none.

2014Granting Trinh’s counsel’s contention that Trinh’s testimony at the third penalty trial was calculated to persuade the jury to vote for death, we note that the jury was expressly instructed not to abdicate its 42 responsibilities and simply accede to Trinh’s wishes.13 We assume the jury followed this instruction (People v. Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 414 ; People v. Whalen, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 88 ; People v. Homick, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 867 ) and independently evaluated the aggravating and mitigating evidence.

2016(See generally People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 662 [jurors are presumed to understand and follow the trial court's instructions].) Accordingly, we reject Romero's unsupported assertion the jury would "inevitably and invariably" use CSAAS evidence for an improper purpose.

2016(People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 662 .) 13 As to Danielson's claim the prosecutor's argument regarding Barker's testimony was misleading, he did not object to it below and therefore he has forfeited any claim of error.

2025(People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 217 .) Moreover, the evidence of Gray’s guilt was so strong that the two brief references to a possible different punishment do not undermine confidence in the verdict.

2015“Absent any contrary indication, we presume the jury followed this instruction.” (People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 217 .) As to Estrada’s argument that the books were more prejudicial than probative, we note that “ ‘[a]ll evidence [that] tends to prove guilt is prejudicial or damaging to the defendant’s case.

2025(See People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346 , 371–372 [“The fact that defendant was convicted of the [uncharged act] reduced any prejudicial effect”]; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 917 [“the prejudicial impact of the evidence is reduced if the uncharged offenses resulted in actual convictions and a prison term”].) Finally, the court instructed the jury on the limited purpose for which it could consider evidence of the 2009 incident, which “eliminated any danger ‘of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’ ” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1 , 25–26.) We presume the ju

2023(See People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346 , 371–372 [“The fact that defendant was convicted of the [uncharged act] reduced any prejudicial effect”]; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 917 [“the prejudicial impact of the evidence is reduced if the uncharged offenses resulted in actual convictions and a prison term”].) Finally, the court instructed the jury on the limited purpose for which it could consider evidence of the 2009 incident, which “eliminated any danger ‘of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’ ” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1 , 25–26.) We presume the ju

2026(People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 725 ; People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 689, fn. 17 .) Appellant contends that this presumption does not apply because a codefendant’s incriminating statement is so compelling that jurors cannot be expected to follow an instruction to disregard it.

2025(See People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 725 .) The additional cases Morales relies upon do not change the above analysis.

2022(See People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 152 [presuming jury followed instruction to separately consider the evidence against each defendant].) II.

2021(See People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 152 [presuming jury followed instruction to separately consider the evidence against each defendant].) II.

1992Absent a contrary indication in the record, it must be assumed the jury followed its instruction to avoid all publicity in the case. ( People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 252-253 [ 253 Cal. Rptr. 55 , 763 P.2d 906 ].) The court was not obliged to inquire into the matter based on mere speculation or conjecture that some impropriety had occurred. ( Id., at p. 253.) The court did not err in failing to ask further questions on the publicity issue.

1992Absent a contrary indication in the record, it must be assumed the jury followed its instruction to avoid all publicity in the case. ( People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 252-253 [ 253 Cal. Rptr. 55 , 763 P.2d 906 ].) The court was not obliged to inquire into the matter based on mere speculation or conjecture that some impropriety had occurred. ( Id., at p. 253.) The court did not err in failing to ask further questions on the publicity issue.

2022However, each item of damages may be awarded only once regardless of the number of theories alleged.” We assume that the jury followed that instruction (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 851 ) when it awarded different damage awards. 28 IV.

2018In addition, the trial court appropriately limited the use of Gutierrez's prior felony conviction by instructing the jury under CALCRIM No. 375, "Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose except for the limited purpose of intent, consent, or motive[.] [¶] Do not conclude from this evidence that the defendant has a bad character or is disposed to commit crime." It is presumed the jury followed this instruction. ( People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834 , 852, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129 , 29 P.3d 209 .) Gutierrez nonetheless argues any potential error was not harmless because the case was a c

2010(See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Besides instructing that the prosecution must prove the victim did not consent, the trial court also instructed that the prosecution had to prove that appellant “did not actually and reasonably believe that the woman consented.” (See CALCRIM No. 1000.) We must presume that the jury followed this instruction (People v. Cline (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1336 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 41 ]), and thus we must conclude that the jury had no reasonable doubt that a

2010(See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Besides instructing that the prosecution must prove the victim did not consent, the trial court also instructed that the prosecution had to prove that appellant “did not actually and reasonably believe that the woman consented.” (See CALCRIM No. 1000.) We must presume that the jury followed this instruction (People v. Cline (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1336 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 41 ]), and thus we must conclude that the jury had no reasonable doubt that a

2016Consequently, “the court’s instruction that the lawyers’ opening and closing statements were not to be considered evidence by the jury vitiated the misleading effect of any inaccurate remarks.” (People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 70 , overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390 .) In Beltran, our Supreme Court held that a trial court’s correct explanation of the law of voluntary manslaughter in response to a jury note cured any prejudice flowing from the prosecutor’s argument erroneously focusing on whether the provocation would prompt a reasonable person

2005(People v. Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 70 .) The prosecutor quoted CALJIC No. 8.88 in his argument to the jury, and he told the jurors that they must decide whether the death penalty was the appropriate punishment whether or not the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.

2025“Absent a contrary indication in the record, it must be assumed the jury followed its instruction to avoid all publicity in the case.” (Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 226 ; see Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 542, fn. 17 .) Defendant’s suggestion otherwise is based on sheer conjecture.

2025But, “[a]bsent a contrary indication in the record, it must be assumed the jury followed its instruction to avoid all publicity in the case.” (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 226 .) Here, we need not just assume the jurors avoided publicity about the trial.

2023(See Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 947 ; accord, People v. Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 760–762.) Irrespective, even assuming it was error to include the instruction because it was unsupported by the evidence, it was “‘“only a technical error which does not constitute ground for reversal.”’” (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67 .) And, to the extent such an instruction was not applicable to the facts of the case, we presume the jury followed the instruction to disregard it.

2016That defendant told Deputy Collins that Ross had been hit in the mouth does not, as defendant now argues, “constitute substantial evidence that he [defendant] acted in defense of Ross,” because neither defendant nor Ross ever connected that injury to anyone other than the “six men.” 14 (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67 .) Moreover, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 200 that it should in effect ignore an instruction that was not supported by how the jury viewed the evidence.9 It is presumed the jury followed this instruction.