jury followed instruction in Colorado

2005See People v. Moody, 676 P.2d 691 (Colo.1984) (court instructed the jurors that they should rely on the evidence and the instructions, not on closing arguments; absent a contrary showing, jury is presumed to have heeded the court’s instructions).

1992If the jury followed this instruction correctly, which we presume it did, People v. Moody, 676 P.2d 691 (Colo.1984), it logically would have equated the amount of unpaid wages with the amount of plaintiff’s damages.

2025See People v. Dominguez-Castor, 2020 COA 1, ¶ 91 (“Absent a contrary showing, we presume that the jury followed [an] instruction.”). ¶ 49 Thus, we conclude that, as it relates to the prosecutor’s questions during cross-examination, the error wasn’t plain, and, as it relates to the prosecutor’s closing argument, the error was harmless.

2023See People v. Dominguez-Castor, 2020 COA 1, ¶ 91 (“Absent a contrary showing, we presume that the jury followed that instruction.”). ¶ 43 Given all this, we conclude that the alleged error did not substantially influence the verdict or impair the fairness of the trial.

2006In light of this instruction, it is logical and permissible to conclude that the jury followed the instruction, see Copeland v. People, 2 P.3d 1283, 1288 (Colo.2000), and that (1) the jury gave little or no weight to the circumstances of the arrest in finding Summitt guilty and (2) admission of the circumstances of arrest and the prosecutor’s comment were not so prejudicial as to require reversal.

2006In light of this instruction, it is logical and permissible to conclude that the jury followed the instruction, see Copeland v. People, 2 P.3d 1283, 1288 (Colo.2000), and that (1) the jury gave little or no weight to the circumstances of the arrest in finding Summitt guilty and (2) admission of the circumstances of arrest and the prosecutor's comment were not so prejudicial as to require reversal.

2024See People v. Garcia, 2012 COA 79, ¶ 20 . ¶ 39 Therefore, we consider Barber’s remaining contentions only as they relate to his conviction on count 2.

2024See People v. Martinez, 2020 COA 141, ¶ 43 (The erroneous admission of evidence was harmless because it “constituted a minor portion of [the defendant’s] trial,” and “the prosecutor did not refer 17 to or repeat this testimony at any other point of the trial, including during her opening statement and closing argument.”). ¶ 38 Still, J.P.D. argues that the demonstrative aid was used only to engender sympathy for the victim because seeing the speculum “conjures the image of a uniquely unpleasant procedure.” But the trial court instructed the jurors that they “must not be influenced by sympathy,

2019See People v. Phillips, 91 P.3d 476, 484 (Colo. App. 2004) (“It is presumed the jury understood and heeded the trial court’s instructions.”).

2017If such a comment had an impact on the jury, it was not “so prejudicial that, but for its exposure, the jury might not have found against the defendant.” People v. McNeely, 68 P.3d 540, 542 (Colo. App. 2002) (citation omitted); see also People v. Ned, 923 P.2d 271, 275 (Colo. App. 1996) (“Speculation of prejudice is insufficient to warrant reversal of a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial.”). ¶ 17 Further, the trial court immediately instructed the jurors to disregard grandmother’s comment, and, absent exceptional circumstances where the evidence against Salas is thin, we presume tha

2017If such a comment had an impact on the jury, it was not “so prejudicial that, but for its exposure, the jury might not have found against the defendant.” People v. McNeely, 68 P.3d 540, 542 (Colo. App. 2002) (citation omitted); see also People v. Ned, 923 P.2d 271, 275 (Colo. App. 1996) (“Speculation of prejudice is insufficient to warrant reversal of a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial.”). ¶ 17 Further, the trial court immediately instructed the jurors to disregard grandmother’s comment, and, absent exceptional circumstances where the evidence against Salas is thin, we presume tha

2012See People v. Scarlett, 985 P.2d 36, 42 (Colo.App.1998). @The jury was instructed that "[nleither sympathy nor prejudice should influence [its] decision." See Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1053 (we presume the jury followed the court's instructions); People v. Kenny, 30 P.3d 734, 740 (Colo.App.2000) ("[Thhe jury was instructed that neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence its decision, and defendant has not overcome the presumption that the jury followed this instruction."). ® The testimony was brief. @ Defense counsel did not object to the testimony.

2012See People v. Scarlett, 985 P.2d 36, 42 (Colo.App.1998). @The jury was instructed that "[nleither sympathy nor prejudice should influence [its] decision." See Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1053 (we presume the jury followed the court's instructions); People v. Kenny, 30 P.3d 734, 740 (Colo.App.2000) ("[Thhe jury was instructed that neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence its decision, and defendant has not overcome the presumption that the jury followed this instruction."). ® The testimony was brief. @ Defense counsel did not object to the testimony.

2012See People v. Scarlett, 985 P.2d 36, 42 (Colo.App.1998). @The jury was instructed that "[nleither sympathy nor prejudice should influence [its] decision." See Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1053 (we presume the jury followed the court's instructions); People v. Kenny, 30 P.3d 734, 740 (Colo.App.2000) ("[Thhe jury was instructed that neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence its decision, and defendant has not overcome the presumption that the jury followed this instruction."). ® The testimony was brief. @ Defense counsel did not object to the testimony.

2012Cf. Strock, 252 P.3d at 1153 (failure to object is a factor that may be considered in examining whether prosecutor's argument rises to the level of plain error). e K.P. was present in the courtroom in her wheelchair, making the testimony regarding her injuries somewhat cumulative.

2011See e.g., People v. Palmer, 189 Colo. 358, 360 , 540 P.2d 341, 342 (Colo.1975) (presuming that the jury followed an instruction to disregard hearsay evidence and noting that "defense counsel was afforded the opportunity, of which he did not take advantage, of submitting additional curative instructions."); People v. Anderson, 183 P.3d 649, 651-52 (Colo.App.2007) (presuming that jury followed curative instruction to disregard inadmissible testimony, in a sexual assault on a child case, when caseworker improperly testified that she believed victim's allegations were true); Roget v. Grand Pontiac

2011See e.g., People v. Palmer, 189 Colo. 358, 360 , 540 P.2d 341, 342 (Colo.1975) (presuming that the jury followed an instruction to disregard hearsay evidence and noting that "defense counsel was afforded the opportunity, of which he did not take advantage, of submitting additional curative instructions."); People v. Anderson, 183 P.3d 649, 651-52 (Colo.App.2007) (presuming that jury followed curative instruction to disregard inadmissible testimony, in a sexual assault on a child case, when caseworker improperly testified that she believed victim's allegations were true); Roget v. Grand Pontiac

2011See e.g., People v. Palmer, 189 Colo. 358, 360 , 540 P.2d 341, 342 (Colo.1975) (presuming that the jury followed an instruction to disregard hearsay evidence and noting that "defense counsel was afforded the opportunity, of which he did not take advantage, of submitting additional curative instructions."); People v. Anderson, 183 P.3d 649, 651-52 (Colo.App.2007) (presuming that jury followed curative instruction to disregard inadmissible testimony, in a sexual assault on a child case, when caseworker improperly testified that she believed victim's allegations were true); Roget v. Grand Pontiac

2011See e.g., People v. Palmer, 189 Colo. 358, 360 , 540 P.2d 341, 342 (Colo.1975) (presuming that the jury followed an instruction to disregard hearsay evidence and noting that "defense counsel was afforded the opportunity, of which he did not take advantage, of submitting additional curative instructions."); People v. Anderson, 183 P.3d 649, 651-52 (Colo.App.2007) (presuming that jury followed curative instruction to disregard inadmissible testimony, in a sexual assault on a child case, when caseworker improperly testified that she believed victim's allegations were true); Roget v. Grand Pontiac

2004See People v. Martinez, supra, 24 P.3d at 634 (same instruction).

2000See Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224 (Colo.1998). .

1998See People v. Smith, 685 P.2d 786 (Colo.App.1984).

1995See People v. Ibarra, 849 P.2d 33 (Colo.1993); People v. Moody, 676 P.2d 691 (Colo.1984). *432 B.

1986See Madrid v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 709 P.2d 950 (Colo.App.1985).

1979See People v. Scheldt, 182 Colo. 374 , 513 P.2d 446 (1973).

1979See People v. Scheldt, 182 Colo. 374 , 513 P.2d 446 (1973).

1977See People v. Mejia, 188 Colo. 120 , 534 P.2d 779 (1975).

1977See People v. Mejia, 188 Colo. 120 , 534 P.2d 779 (1975).