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6 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Excelsior Leather Washer Co. v. Industrial Commissiongreen1 sentence1979The claimant correctly cites Crane Co. v. Industrial Com. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 348, 353 , for the proposition that “the opinion of a medical expert who does not treat the patient, but examines him for the purpose of testifying, is not admissible if it rests partly upon the expert’s own observation, and partly upon a history of subjective symptoms supplied by others.” However, the claimant ignores the next sentence in Crane: “[T]he mere fact that an examining physician obtains a history from the patient does not disqualify his expert testimony based on objective findings or upon a hypothetical qu | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020Without deciding whether the snow and ice on the staircase was the result of natural or unnatural accumulation, our supreme court also noted that its presence did not necessarily “break the causal connection between the violation of the ordinance [i.e., the lack of handrail] and [the] plaintiff’s injuries.” Id. at 439 . ¶ 84 Here, in contrast, the issue is not the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a factfinder’s determination regarding proximate cause, but whether the jury should have been instructed that natural accumulation could be a defense. 1992The court held the defendant liable, finding that “the presence of ice and snow [did] not break the causal connection between the violation of the ordinance and plaintiff’s injuries.” Kalata, 144 Ill. 2d at 439 , 581 N.E.2d at 663 . | 2 | 1992–2020 |
Demski v. Mundelein Police Pension Board
green
2 sentences2017Id. 2017Id. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
First National Bank v. City of Aurora
green
2 sentences1992In First National Bank v. City of Aurora (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 1 , 373 N.E.2d 1326 , the plaintiff brought a negligence action against the City of Aurora to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile accident at an intersection. 1992In First National Bank v. City of Aurora (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 1 , 373 N.E.2d 1326 , the plaintiff brought a negligence action against the City of Aurora to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile accident at an intersection. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Davis v. Marathon Oil Co.
green
1 sentence1991Davis v. Marathon Oil Co. (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 380, 394-95 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Crane Co. v. Industrial Commission
neutral
2 sentences1979The claimant correctly cites Crane Co. v. Industrial Com. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 348, 353 , for the proposition that “the opinion of a medical expert who does not treat the patient, but examines him for the purpose of testifying, is not admissible if it rests partly upon the expert’s own observation, and partly upon a history of subjective symptoms supplied by others.” However, the claimant ignores the next sentence in Crane: “[T]he mere fact that an examining physician obtains a history from the patient does not disqualify his expert testimony based on objective findings or upon a hypothetical qu 1979The claimant correctly cites Crane Co. v. Industrial Com. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 348, 353 , for the proposition that “the opinion of a medical expert who does not treat the patient, but examines him for the purpose of testifying, is not admissible if it rests partly upon the expert’s own observation, and partly upon a history of subjective symptoms supplied by others.” However, the claimant ignores the next sentence in Crane: “[T]he mere fact that an examining physician obtains a history from the patient does not disqualify his expert testimony based on objective findings or upon a hypothetical qu | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.