6 Indiana opinions name it 1 courts 1993–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Transport Motor Express, Inc. v. Smithgreen2 sentences2000Id. at 426. 1993The driver was operating under a "trip lease" with the carrier, which lease, apparently in order to comply with ICC regulations, assigned the driver a route, required the driver to keep a log, and gave the lessee the right to replace the driver for violation of ICC or PSCI rules or regulations. 262 Ind. at 44-45 , 811 N.E.2d at 426. | 1 | 2 |
In the Matter of the Supervised Estate of Evelyn Garrard Ronald Garrard v. Debra L. Teibel and Douglas Grimmer and Debra Lindsaygreen1 sentence2017See In re Garrard, 985 N.E.2d 1097, 1104-05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noncompliance with Appellate Rules results in waiver), trans. denied. 12 Pursuant to Appellate Rule 50(A), the Appellants' Appendix must contain “those parts of the Record on Appeal that are necessary for the Court to decide the issues presented,” including “pleadings and other documents from the Clerk’s Record . . . that are necessary for resolution of the issues on appeal.” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1605-PC-1018 | August 23, 2017 Page 22 of 24 [34] Nevertheless, despite Driver’s failure to include | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Meeker v. Indiana Parole Board
green
1 sentence2017Driver’s situation is not the same as that in [] Meeker v. Ind. Parole Bd., 794 N.E.2d 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ransom v. State
green
1 sentence2013The State argues that Ransom v. State, 741 N.E.2d 419 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied, is not applicable here because in Ransom the officer incorrectly believed it was unlawful for the defendant to operate his vehicle in reverse and that in contrast, here the officer correctly knew that Indiana law prohibits a vehicle from being driven when the vehicle’s rear back window is tinted to the extent that the vehicle’s occupants cannot be easily identified through that window. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Soft Water Utilities, Inc. v. Le Fevre
green
2 sentences2011Driver cites Soft Water Utils., Inc. v. LeFevre, 261 Ind. 260 , 301 N.E.2d 745 (Ind.1973), in support of his appeal. 2011Driver cites Soft Water Utils., Inc. v. LeFevre, 261 Ind. 260 , 301 N.E.2d 745 (Ind.1973), in support of his appeal. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Dunn v. Milwaukee County
green
1 sentence2007As explained below, under these undisputed facts I cannot join the majority's statement "[t]his was a single ongoing stop continuously supported by reasonable suspicion." (Op. at 682.) Rather, Campos was subjected to an illegal "second stop." [9] The State does not explain why the officer was seeking "consent" from the passenger Campos, who the State now asserts had no standing to object to a search anyway. [10] The State does not acknowledge the Sellmer facts, analysis, or result. [11] The Court also noted such a reasonable person might well conclude that even if she refused, her car would be | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.