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9 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1962–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Jose Luis Guzman and Sonia Cruz-Lazogreen2 sentences2013See U.S. v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 407-08 (5th Cir. 2006) (officers must ask for a driver’s consent to search before concluding other reasons for the stop); U.S. v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 508-09 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (consent to search obtained while waiting for computer background check, therefore not “involuntary”); U.S. v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2001) (detention beyond time needed to write the citation unreasonable); U.S. v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 442 (5th Cir. 1993) (conflicting answers to police questioning and nervousness led officers to seek consent to search car); Guzm 2013See U.S. v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 407-08 (5th Cir.2006) (officers must ask for a driver’s consent to search before concluding other reasons for the stop); U.S. v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500 , 508-09 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc) (consent to search obtained while waiting for computer backgróund check, therefore not “involuntary”); U.S. v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir.2001) (detention beyond time needed to write the citation unreasonable); U.S. v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 442 (5th Cir.1993) (conflicting answers to police questioning and nervousness led officers to seek consent to search car); Guzman, | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Mateen Yusuf Shabazz, A/K/A Edward L. Eberhart, A/K/A Edward Wallace, and Keith Lamar Parkergreen2 sentences2013See U.S. v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 407-08 (5th Cir. 2006) (officers must ask for a driver’s consent to search before concluding other reasons for the stop); U.S. v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 508-09 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (consent to search obtained while waiting for computer background check, therefore not “involuntary”); U.S. v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2001) (detention beyond time needed to write the citation unreasonable); U.S. v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 442 (5th Cir. 1993) (conflicting answers to police questioning and nervousness led officers to seek consent to search car); Guzm 2013See U.S. v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 407-08 (5th Cir.2006) (officers must ask for a driver’s consent to search before concluding other reasons for the stop); U.S. v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500 , 508-09 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc) (consent to search obtained while waiting for computer backgróund check, therefore not “involuntary”); U.S. v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir.2001) (detention beyond time needed to write the citation unreasonable); U.S. v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 442 (5th Cir.1993) (conflicting answers to police questioning and nervousness led officers to seek consent to search car); Guzman, | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Jesus Valadezgreen2 sentences2013See U.S. v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 407-08 (5th Cir. 2006) (officers must ask for a driver’s consent to search before concluding other reasons for the stop); U.S. v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 508-09 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (consent to search obtained while waiting for computer background check, therefore not “involuntary”); U.S. v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2001) (detention beyond time needed to write the citation unreasonable); U.S. v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 442 (5th Cir. 1993) (conflicting answers to police questioning and nervousness led officers to seek consent to search car); Guzm 2013See U.S. v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 407-08 (5th Cir.2006) (officers must ask for a driver’s consent to search before concluding other reasons for the stop); U.S. v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500 , 508-09 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc) (consent to search obtained while waiting for computer backgróund check, therefore not “involuntary”); U.S. v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir.2001) (detention beyond time needed to write the citation unreasonable); U.S. v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 442 (5th Cir.1993) (conflicting answers to police questioning and nervousness led officers to seek consent to search car); Guzman, | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Jensongreen2 sentences2013See U.S. v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 407-08 (5th Cir. 2006) (officers must ask for a driver’s consent to search before concluding other reasons for the stop); U.S. v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 508-09 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (consent to search obtained while waiting for computer background check, therefore not “involuntary”); U.S. v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2001) (detention beyond time needed to write the citation unreasonable); U.S. v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 442 (5th Cir. 1993) (conflicting answers to police questioning and nervousness led officers to seek consent to search car); Guzm 2013See U.S. v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 407-08 (5th Cir.2006) (officers must ask for a driver’s consent to search before concluding other reasons for the stop); U.S. v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500 , 508-09 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc) (consent to search obtained while waiting for computer backgróund check, therefore not “involuntary”); U.S. v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir.2001) (detention beyond time needed to write the citation unreasonable); U.S. v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 442 (5th Cir.1993) (conflicting answers to police questioning and nervousness led officers to seek consent to search car); Guzman, | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Brighamgreen2 sentences2013See U.S. v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 407-08 (5th Cir. 2006) (officers must ask for a driver’s consent to search before concluding other reasons for the stop); U.S. v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 508-09 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (consent to search obtained while waiting for computer background check, therefore not “involuntary”); U.S. v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2001) (detention beyond time needed to write the citation unreasonable); U.S. v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 442 (5th Cir. 1993) (conflicting answers to police questioning and nervousness led officers to seek consent to search car); Guzm 2013See U.S. v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 407-08 (5th Cir.2006) (officers must ask for a driver’s consent to search before concluding other reasons for the stop); U.S. v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500 , 508-09 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc) (consent to search obtained while waiting for computer backgróund check, therefore not “involuntary”); U.S. v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir.2001) (detention beyond time needed to write the citation unreasonable); U.S. v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 442 (5th Cir.1993) (conflicting answers to police questioning and nervousness led officers to seek consent to search car); Guzman, | 1 | 2 |
Graff v. Beardgreen1 sentence2026Inc., 149 S.W.3d 300 , 306 n.7 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). “‘The risk and likelihood of injury from serving alcohol to an intoxicated person whom the licensee knows will probably drive a car is as readily foreseen as injury resulting from setting loose a live rattlesnake in a shopping mall.’ If we substitute ‘social host’ for ‘licensee,’ the statement remains equally true.” Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 922 (Tex. 1993) (Gammage, J., dissenting) (quoting El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex.1987). 5 2. | 1 | 1 |
Vela v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See Herrera v. State, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 6375 , at *15-19 (upholding the stop of a vehicle carrying old temporary dealer tags and driving through a residential area at 6 p.m. in a manner that failed to indicate the driver was on a test drive); Heisel v. State, No. 07-98-0027-CR, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 4150 , at *5-7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 13, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (upholding the stop of a vehicle displaying dealer tags when the vehicle was being driven on a Sunday afternoon in a neighborhood lacking auto dealerships); Vela v. State, 871 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex. App.—Ho | 1 | 1 |
Christen v. Leegreen2 sentences2000“Driver error is a commonly understood *825 and foreseeable consequence of serving intoxicants to an already obviously intoxicated person.” Id. (citing Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash.2d 479 , 780 P.2d 1307, 1315 (1989)). 2000“Driver error is a commonly understood *825 and foreseeable consequence of serving intoxicants to an already obviously intoxicated person.” Id. (citing Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash.2d 479 , 780 P.2d 1307, 1315 (1989)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co.
green
2 sentences2024Id. 2005Id. | 2 | 2005–2024 |
Phan Son Van v. Pena
green
2 sentences2004Pena, 990 S.W.2d at 755 . 8 . 2000“Driver error is a commonly understood *825 and foreseeable consequence of serving intoxicants to an already obviously intoxicated person.” Id. (citing Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash.2d 479 , 780 P.2d 1307, 1315 (1989)). | 2 | 2000–2004 |
El Chico Corp. v. Poole
red
1 sentence2026Inc., 149 S.W.3d 300 , 306 n.7 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). “‘The risk and likelihood of injury from serving alcohol to an intoxicated person whom the licensee knows will probably drive a car is as readily foreseen as injury resulting from setting loose a live rattlesnake in a shopping mall.’ If we substitute ‘social host’ for ‘licensee,’ the statement remains equally true.” Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 922 (Tex. 1993) (Gammage, J., dissenting) (quoting El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex.1987). 5 2. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Biaggi v. Patrizio Restaurant Inc.
green
1 sentence2026Inc., 149 S.W.3d 300 , 306 n.7 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). “‘The risk and likelihood of injury from serving alcohol to an intoxicated person whom the licensee knows will probably drive a car is as readily foreseen as injury resulting from setting loose a live rattlesnake in a shopping mall.’ If we substitute ‘social host’ for ‘licensee,’ the statement remains equally true.” Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 922 (Tex. 1993) (Gammage, J., dissenting) (quoting El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex.1987). 5 2. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Allen v. Keck
neutral
1 sentence1962A substantial consideration moving to the driver was the requirement laid down in Allen v. Keck, 113 F.Supp. 873 . | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.