driver violation in New York

2003Here, in opposition to the prima facie showing by the defendants of their entitlement to summary judgment by showing that there was no evidence that the plaintiff’s injuries arose by reason of the intoxication of the driver (see General Obligations Law § 11-101), the plaintiff adduced evidence to raise a question of fact as to whether a reasonable connection existed between the alcohol served to the driver by the bar and the injuries sustained by the plaintiff (see McNeill v Rugby Joe’s, 298 AD2d 369 ; Johnson v Plotkin, 172 AD2d 88 ).

2003Here, in opposition to the prima facie showing by the defendants of their entitlement to summary judgment by showing that there was no evidence that the plaintiff’s injuries arose by reason of the intoxication of the driver (see General Obligations Law § 11-101), the plaintiff adduced evidence to raise a question of fact as to whether a reasonable connection existed between the alcohol served to the driver by the bar and the injuries sustained by the plaintiff (see McNeill v Rugby Joe’s, 298 AD2d 369 ; Johnson v Plotkin, 172 AD2d 88 ).

1994Therefore, in other jurisdictions a statute prohibiting a driver from leaving the scene of an accident applies with equal force to the owner of the vehicle who is riding therein at the time of the accident since he is vested with full authority to direct and control the operation of the automobile (see, People v Odom, supra, 19 Cal App 2d, 66 P2d, at 209 ).

1971No. 3, Romulus ( 179 Misc. 333, 335 , affd. 264 App. Div. 943 , affd. 289 N. Y. 800 ), wherein he stated: “ To hold as a matter of law that no driver in the exercise of reasonable care need anticipate negligent driving on the part of others would be to ignore the realities of experience.” This statement was made in the court’s opinion denying a motion for a new trial in an action where an infant plaintiff recovered a judgment for injuries .sustained when leaving a school bus without signal or direction from the driver and in violation of a rule of the Board of Education that when the bus stopp

1971No. 3, Romulus ( 179 Misc. 333, 335 , affd. 264 App. Div. 943 , affd. 289 N. Y. 800 ), wherein he stated: “ To hold as a matter of law that no driver in the exercise of reasonable care need anticipate negligent driving on the part of others would be to ignore the realities of experience.” This statement was made in the court’s opinion denying a motion for a new trial in an action where an infant plaintiff recovered a judgment for injuries .sustained when leaving a school bus without signal or direction from the driver and in violation of a rule of the Board of Education that when the bus stopp

1971Co. of N. Y., 297 N. Y. 148, 153 ), it has steadfastly denied the driver a defense, claiming that the driver does not qualify as an insured under the provisions of the owner’s policy.

1971No. 3, Romulus ( 179 Misc. 333, 335 , affd. 264 App. Div. 943 , affd. 289 N. Y. 800 ), wherein he stated: “ To hold as a matter of law that no driver in the exercise of reasonable care need anticipate negligent driving on the part of others would be to ignore the realities of experience.” This statement was made in the court’s opinion denying a motion for a new trial in an action where an infant plaintiff recovered a judgment for injuries .sustained when leaving a school bus without signal or direction from the driver and in violation of a rule of the Board of Education that when the bus stopp

1958Although the possession of a license to drive is a vested property right (Matter of Moore v. Macduff, 309 N. Y. 35 ) and may not be taken away except by due process (Matter of Wignall v. Fletcher, 303 N. Y. 435 ), the Legislature in exercising its power reasonably to regulate the use of highways may impose reasonable conditions before a license is issued and for the continued possession of the same.

1958Although the possession of a license to drive is a vested property right (Matter of Moore v. Macduff, 309 N. Y. 35 ) and may not be taken away except by due process (Matter of Wignall v. Fletcher, 303 N. Y. 435 ), the Legislature in exercising its power reasonably to regulate the use of highways may impose reasonable conditions before a license is issued and for the continued possession of the same.

1918It was decided by the Appellate Division that the defendant was not fiable for the negligence of the driver under the doctrine of respondeat superior, but the judgment of that court was reversed upon the opinion of Mr. Justice Miller ( 214 N. Y. 675 ).